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In its transition from a Soviet republic to an independent nation, Ukraine has 
struggled to bridge a centuries-old political, cultural, and linguistic divide that in the 
twentieth century alone has spawned deadly protests, two revolutions, the ousting of a 
president, the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and an ongoing war in eastern Ukraine. 
Current political tensions between Russia and Ukraine threaten to split the country in 
two, so questions of language policy and national unity have taken on even greater 
urgency since 2014. 
This dissertation examines the evolution of policy related to Russian-language 
education in Ukraine at the primary and secondary levels and explores the impact of 
changes in policy on the teaching of Russian in that country. Based on data collected 
through interviews with seventeen teachers of Russian in Ukraine, this study presents an 
ethnographic portrait of Russian-language education after Maidan and answers three 
broad questions: 1) How have policies related to the role and status of the Russian 
language in Ukraine evolved since Ukraine became an independent nation, and how has 
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this evolution in language policy affected the teaching of Russian there?; 2) How do 
geography and political conditions in contemporary Ukraine affect language policy, 
attitudes toward the Russian language, and the teaching of Russian?; and 3) How has the 
geopolitical relationship between Ukraine and Russia affected the status of, and attitudes 
toward, the Russian language and the study of Russian in Ukraine? 
An analysis of the data leads to several major findings: 1) Modifications to 
language policy in post-Soviet Ukraine have resulted in sweeping changes in the role of 
the Russian language within the education system and led to an end to compulsory 
Russian language studies, a drop in the prestige of the Russian language within the 
education system, and increasingly negative attitudes toward the study of Russian. 2) 
Political conditions and the historic cultural and linguist divide between western and 
eastern Ukraine continue to influence attitudes toward the Russian language in 
predictable ways. 3) Attitudes toward the Russian language in Ukraine worsened 
considerably following Euromaidan and Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and negative 
attitudes persist due to Russia’s ongoing support of the war in Donbas. These findings 
suggest that language issues in Ukraine will continue to be of critical importance in the 
years to come and, if left unresolved, may lead to further division and conflict on a 





Table of Contents 
Chapter 1: Background and Context of the Study .................................................. 1	
In Lieu of an Introduction .............................................................................. 1	
An Introduction to Ukraine .......................................................... 5	
Geography ............................................................................................. 5	
Administrative Divisions ...................................................................... 6	
Languages of Ukraine ........................................................................... 7	
The Russian Language in Ukraine ........................................................ 7	
The Language Problem ................................................................................ 10	
Language Policy and Ethnography in Ukraine ............................................ 11	
Significance of the Study ............................................................................. 12	
Chapter 2: Literature Review ................................................................................ 14	
Language Planning and Policy ..................................................................... 14	
Language Planning: History and Definitions ...................................... 15	
Language Policy: Definitions ............................................................. 18	
Language Policy in Ukraine ................................................................ 22	
Language-in-Education Planning and Policy ............................................... 26	
Language Policy and Education in Ukraine ................................................. 29	
Ethnographies in Language Planning and Policy ........................................ 33	
Ethnographic Research in Ukrainian Language Planning and Policy ......... 35	
The Ethnographic Portrait ............................................................................ 36	
Chapter 3: Language and Education Policy in Ukraine ........................................ 38	
Language policy in Ukraine ......................................................................... 38	
Eighteenth Century ............................................................................. 38	
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries ................................................... 39	
Language Policy in Post-Soviet Ukraine (1991 - Present) ................. 45	
Russian Rights Activists in Ukraine ................................................... 47	
Russia’s Reaction to Post-Soviet Language Policy in Ukraine .......... 50	
 
xi 
Education Policy in Ukraine: An Introduction ............................................ 56	
Education Policy in Ukraine Under Late Tsarist and Soviet Rule ...... 56	
Education Policy in Post-Soviet Ukraine ............................................ 66	
Education Policy in the Self-Proclaimed People’s Republics                   
and Crimea ................................................................................. 71	
Education System in Ukraine ....................................................................... 73	
Structure .............................................................................................. 73	
Types of Schools ................................................................................. 74	
Curriculum .......................................................................................... 75	
Language Education in Ukraine ................................................................... 76	
Ukrainian Language ............................................................................ 76	
Russian Language ............................................................................... 77	
Foreign Languages .............................................................................. 77	
World Literature .................................................................................. 78	
Chapter 4: Methodology and Description of Study .............................................. 80	
Pre-dissertation Beta Study .......................................................................... 82	
Distribution of Beta Study Questionnaires ......................................... 83	
Beta Study Findings ............................................................................ 84	
Conclusions ......................................................................................... 92	
The Research Study ..................................................................................... 92	
Research Questions ............................................................................. 92	
Hypotheses .......................................................................................... 93	
Recruitment and Interview Processes ................................................. 94	
Gathering Data Remotely .......................................................... 94	
Technology Used to Conduct Interviews ................................. 100	
Recruitment of Research Subjects ........................................... 104	
Collection of Demographic Questionnaire Data ...................... 105	
Interview Protocol .................................................................... 107	
Research Participants ........................................................................ 108	
Geographical Representation ................................................... 110	
 
xii 
Gender Representation ............................................................. 111	
Age of Research Participants ................................................... 113	
Place of Birth versus Ethnic Identification .............................. 113	
Language .................................................................................. 115	
Types of Schools ...................................................................... 117	
Russian as a Required or Elective Language ........................... 118	
Hours of Russian Language Instruction ................................... 120	
Profiles of Research Participants ...................................................... 120	
Chapter 5: Data Presentation and Analysis ......................................................... 131	
Policy and the Teaching of Russian ........................................................... 131	
Should Russian be a Required Course in Ukrainian Schools? ......... 131	
Russian-Language Schools in Independent Ukraine                             
(1991 - Present) ........................................................................ 140	
The Status of the Russian Language in Ukraine ............................... 145	
Second State Language ............................................................ 147	
Regional Language .................................................................. 148	
National Minority Language .................................................... 149	
Language of International Communication ............................. 150	
Foreign Language .................................................................... 151	
No Response ............................................................................ 151	
Changes in the Role of Russian in Ukrainian Schools ..................... 153	
Policy Changes ......................................................................... 154	
Attitudes toward the Russian Language .................................. 156	
Ukrainian Politics and the Teaching of Russian ........................................ 157	
Central Regions ................................................................................. 159	
Western Ukraine ............................................................................... 162	
Southern Ukraine .............................................................................. 163	
Crimea ...................................................................................... 164	




Geopolitical Relations Between Russia and Ukraine                                         
and Attitudes Toward the Russian Language ................................... 174	
Most Pressing Issues Facing Teachers of Russian                                                
in Contemporary Ukraine ................................................................. 181	
Material Support ............................................................................... 181	
Textbooks ................................................................................. 181	
Methodological Materials ........................................................ 183	
Access to Technology .............................................................. 184	
Working Conditions .......................................................................... 185	
Lack of hours ........................................................................... 185	
Low Salaries ............................................................................. 186	
Other Issues ....................................................................................... 187	
Positive Responses ............................................................................ 187	
Chapter 6: Findings and Conclusions ................................................................. 191	
Summary of Procedures and Findings ....................................................... 191	
Discussion of the Findings ......................................................................... 193	
Research Question One: Language Policies                                             
and the Teaching of Russian .................................................... 193	
Research Question Two: The Effects of Politics and Historic               
Divisions on Attitudes Toward the Russian Language                    
and the Teaching of Russian .................................................... 196	
Research Question Three: The Effects of the Geopolitical         
Relationship Between Ukraine and Russia                                        
on Attitudes Toward the Russian Language                                    
and the Study of Russian in Ukraine ........................................ 198	
Practical Policy Implications for Language and Education ....................... 199	
Limitations ................................................................................................. 200	












Chapter 1: Background and Context of the Study 
IN LIEU OF AN INTRODUCTION 
My first trip to Ukraine fifteen years ago felt eerily like earlier visits I had made 
to Russia. The process of applying for a visa was the same: tedious and laborious. The 
dreary lines at passport inspection and customs felt comfortingly familiar to me. The ride 
from the airport into Kiev was along a bumpy highway lined with trees, very much like 
the road that leads from Domodedovo Airport into Moscow. And with its gray, Soviet-era 
buildings and its street signs and billboards in Russian, Kiev resembled the large cities I 
had visited in Russia. Kiev had its unique history and charms, to be sure, but the city felt 
Russian. On that first trip to Kiev and Dnepropetrovsk, nothing stood out as Ukrainian to 
me. I saw no signage in Ukrainian, nor did I hear it spoken on the streets or on the radio 
or television.  
Over the course of subsequent visits, I witnessed Ukraine’s efforts to shake off its 
Soviet past and stake its place in modern-day Europe. Visa requirements for tourists were 
lifted, which allowed me to travel there freely. Signage was displayed in both Ukrainian 
and Russian, and both languages could be heard throughout the city. New construction 
and renovations graced Kiev with a more European and less Soviet feel. Kiev, now Kyiv, 
emerged from the gray into a brightly colored world.  
In the summer of 2013, I studied advanced Russian in Kyiv on a Title VIII grant. 
As I explored the familiar streets of the capital, I noticed that the bilingual signage was 
largely gone; Kyiv had transitioned to a Ukrainian-speaking city. I was addressed in 
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Ukrainian in restaurants and shops, but I felt no hostility when I responded in Russian. 
From what I could see, the two languages coexisted quite nicely. 
 One weekend, I visited a friend in Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine, which had 
retained more of its Soviet-era feel than had Kyiv. As we strolled toward downtown one 
afternoon, some graffiti scrawled on a fence caught my eye. A glaring mistake stood out 
to me: a misspelling of the demonstrative pronoun “this,” as in “This is a bird.”1 It is a 
simple three-letter word in Russian—это—easily mastered by my students of Russian 
during week one of their studies. I pointed out the error to my friend Marina,2 who, to my 
surprise, did not appear in the least bit shocked by the misspelling. She explained that in 
recent years, most of the Russian-language schools in her city had closed, and now the 
children—native speakers of Russian—were being taught exclusively in Ukrainian. Since 
the number of hours devoted to the study of Russian had dropped, in many cases, to zero, 
the newest generation of children was lacking literacy skills in their native Russian. 
Marina recounted that her daughter, a college freshman at the time, had attended Russian-
language schools and was fully literate in Russian. In contrast, Marina’s son, age ten, 
struggled to read and write in Russian, because he was attending a Ukrainian-language 
school where the study of Russian was not offered. If enough parents of the children in 
her son’s school contributed money to cover related expenses, the administration might 
agree to offer Russian as an extra-curricular course after school. At the moment, no such 
                                                
1 In the graffiti message, the first letter of the Russian word это was spelled using the Ukrainian letter є. 
2 All personal names mentioned are pseudonyms. 
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arrangement had been made. So as a language teacher herself, Marina carved out time in 
the evenings to help her son develop reading skills in his native language. 
Marina’s personal account of the effects of language policy on her own family 
piqued my interest. I wondered how the closure of Russian-language schools had affected 
other Russian-speaking families in Ukraine. I was curious to explore the policy changes 
that had led to Marina’s experiences and hear more about their effects on the education 
system and on those who work within it. As a teacher of Russian, language policy was a 
new area of research for me that would complement my long-standing interest in 
language pedagogy. I returned to the States, eager to explore Ukraine’s language and 
education policies and, I hoped, to return the following year to gather more first-hand 
accounts of those affected by changes in the language laws. Little did I know that within 
a few short months, Ukraine would be shaken by a revolution, the annexation of Crimea, 
the downing of a Malaysian airliner, and an armed conflict in Donbas. These events 
would ultimately alter the shape and scope of this study and the fabric of Ukraine itself.   
Two years later, Olena Tereshchuk, age 45, worked quietly at her desk before her 
next class began in Gymnasium #3 in a large city in western Ukraine. She had been 
teaching Russian for twenty-one years, having entered the profession just three years 
after Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Like other classrooms in 
this typical three-story brick school, hers was sparse. It contained little more than rows of 
desks that seated two students each, a linoleum floor, bookshelves and chalkboards. The 
appearance of her classroom had changed little since Soviet times. She looked up as her 
seventh-grade students entered the room, chatting among themselves in Ukrainian. They 
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found their seats and took out their textbooks: Baranov’s Russian Language, published in 
1986. According to Olena, very little governmental funding is allocated to the study of 
Russian, which is why so few new textbooks are available. As such, she spends much of 
her time outside of class preparing materials to present at lessons.  
When the bell rings, Olena rises from her desk and begins the lesson. But on the 
other side of the country, a war rages between Ukrainian governmental troops and pro-
Russian separatists, driven by competing ideologies, languages, and values. The 
Ukrainian and Russian languages in Ukraine have long lived both in harmony and at odds 
with each other, and this latest clash of political and cultural ideologies has led to 
bloodshed and heartache for thousands of Ukrainians and further destabilized a nation 
that has struggled with questions of national identity throughout its history.  
Olena, an ethnic Ukrainian, has loved the Russian language since she began 
studying it as a girl in what was at the time the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. She 
attended a Ukrainian-language school and began studying Russian in fifth grade. At that 
time, in the 1980s, students at her Ukrainian-language school studied Russian twice as 
many hours as they studied Ukrainian, and Olena says she knew Russian literature better 
than she knew Ukrainian literature. Today, however, students want to study English, as 
they view it as a more popular language and believe it will open doors to greater 
opportunities for employment. When she was growing up, all students in Ukraine studied 
Russian, but today, the school where Olena works is one of only three in her city that 
offer Russian, and then only as an elective course. The rest of the schools in her city have 
stopped teaching Russian altogether. Some of Olena’s students, particularly those who 
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have fled the war zone in eastern Ukraine, enjoy studying Russian and competing in 
Russian-language competitions. Other students express contempt toward the Russian 
language, calling it “the language of the aggressor.” Olena herself expresses mixed 
feelings about the need for Ukrainians to study Russian. While she would like students to 
become multilingual so that they will gain the respect of others and demonstrate that 
Ukraine is an educated and cosmopolitan nation, she laments that the school allots only 
one hour per week to the study of Russian, a widespread second language in her country. 
Over the past twenty-one years as a teacher of Russian, Olena has witnessed a fall in the 
prestige of her profession and is unsure what the future holds for the study of Russian in 
Ukraine. Her country has been struggling with questions of language and national unity 
for as long as Olena can remember, and she sees no resolution in sight.   
_______________________________________________________________________ 
An Introduction to Ukraine 
Geography 
Covering an area of 603,628 square kilometers (or 233,060 square miles), Ukraine 
is the largest country located entirely within the borders of Europe. With a population of 
45.49 million3 as of 2013, Ukraine is also the most populous country with boundaries 
entirely in Europe. The country is bordered by Belarus to the northwest, Poland and 
                                                
3 Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of 
legal status or citizenship—except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are 
generally considered part of the population of their country of origin. The population of Ukraine cited here 
is a mid-2013 estimate made by the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL).  
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Slovakia to the west, Hungary, Romania and Moldova to the southwest, and Russia to the 
east.  
Ukraine is strategically located between Central Europe and Russia. Due to its 
history and geographical location, Ukraine falls under two overlapping spheres of 
influence: the European Union and the Russian Federation. These competing centers of 
power both contribute to and prolong a political, cultural and linguistic divide between 
western and eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian-speaking west tends to be more nationalistic 
and to model its cultural values on those of Europe, whereas the primarily Russian-
speaking east and south take their cultural cues from Russia. This divergence in 
ideologies has led to significant political turmoil in post-Soviet Ukraine, including the 
Orange Revolution of 2004, widespread protests and civil unrest in 2013, and, in 2014, 
the ousting of President Yanukovych, the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and a civil 
war in eastern Ukraine that continues to this day. 
Administrative Divisions 
Ukraine is a unitary state, meaning that it is governed as a single power by a 
central government, and administrative divisions within the country exercise only those 
powers that the central government chooses to delegate through the Ukrainian 
Constitution and by law. Ukraine is divided into 27 administrative units: 24 oblasts, or 
administrative regions, one autonomous republic—the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea—and two “cities with special status”: Kyiv, the capital, and Sevastopol, which is 
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located on the Crimean Peninsula but is politically separate from the autonomous 
republic itself.4 
Languages of Ukraine 
Ukraine is a multilingual nation. Twenty-five native languages are spoken there, 
and eleven of these languages boast 100,000 or more native speakers. The most widely 
spoken languages, in order of descending numbers of speakers, are as follows: Ukrainian, 
Russian, Eastern Yiddish, Rusyn, Romanian/Moldovan, Belarusian, Crimean Tatar, 
Bulgarian, Ukrainian Sign Language, Hungarian, and Polish. Six other languages are 
spoken by 20,000 or more people: Armenian, Urum, German, Gaguaz, Carpathian 
Romani, and Czech.  
Languages in Ukraine fall under one or more of four official classifications: the 
state language (Ukrainian), indigenous languages (Crimean Tatar, Krymchak, Karaim, 
and Urum), regional languages (Russian, Hungarian, and Romanian), and minority 
languages (Belarusian, Bulgarian, Crimean Tatar, Gagauz, German, Greek, Hungarian, 
Yiddish, Moldovan, Polish, Romanian, Russian, and Slovak). All of the countries that 
border Ukraine have languages that are recognized in Ukraine as minority languages.5 
The Russian Language in Ukraine 
Under Soviet rule in the 20th century, authorities sought to strengthen Russian 
national, political, and linguistic influence in Ukraine through a structured campaign of 
                                                
4 Since the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation on March 18, 2014, Ukraine’s control of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol has been disputed.  




Russification.6 These efforts led to an increase in the use of the Russian language in many 
public and private establishments. As Soviet rule weakened, the Ukrainian government 
sought to revive and increase the use of the Ukrainian language through its adoption as 
the state language in 1989 and legislation to promote Ukrainian culture in education, 
publishing, government, and religion. While the Ukrainian language is the sole state 
language of Ukraine and has enjoyed an upsurge in use and popularity in much of the 
country, Russian continues to be the dominant language in southern and eastern areas of 
the country, particularly among the urban population. Russian is a common second 
language throughout much of the country and remains the primary language of ethnic 
Russians (22% of the population) and other non-Ukrainian ethnic minorities in Ukraine 
(Pavlenko, 2006). Russian is widely spoken in about a third of Ukraine—the areas in 
green on the map on the next page. In the 2001 census, a full third of Ukrainian citizens 
indicated Russian to be their native language.  
                                                
6 Russification refers to official and unofficial policies in Imperial Russia and, later, in the Soviet Union, 






Once the dominant and official language of the Soviet Union, Russian continues 
to play an influential role in the policies of Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries. As 
Verschik (2009) noted, “all languages spoken on post-Soviet territory have been or still 
are in contact with Russian” (299). Many scholars researching post-Soviet language 
policy and schooling have argued that current developments can be understood either as a 
reaction to or an extension of Soviet-era policies promoting Russian. Besters-Dilger 
(2007) posited that Ukrainian-language policy “can only be understood from a historical 
perspective, as a reaction to the Russification policy of the twentieth century” (283). The 




THE LANGUAGE PROBLEM 
Since the early years of Ukrainian independence, one of the most controversial 
issues in public discourse and political process has been the so-called language 
problem, pertaining first and foremost to balancing the statuses and scopes of use 
of the country’s most widespread languages, Ukrainian and Russian. Despite its 
unabated political prominence, both native and foreign scholars pay rather little 
attention to the problem’s substance and prospects of solution (Kulyk, 2013, p. 
280). 
 
The so-called language problem is deeply embedded in Ukraine’s cultural and 
historical background. Since Ukrainian independence in 1991, the language problem has 
been a source of controversy both within the establishment and in society as a whole, 
with some segments of the population denying the existence of the problem, and others 
describing far-reaching implications of the language situation in their country.   
Efforts to meet the linguistic needs and rights of all Ukrainian citizens have led to 
a series of language-related policies that have been well received by some and reviled by 
others. Language policies in Ukraine have swung back and forth between laws that favor 
Ukrainian and those that favor Russian, although on the whole, policymakers have sought 
to broaden the use of Ukrainian while at the same time protecting the language rights of 
speakers of minority languages. A balance that satisfies the majority of Ukrainian citizens 
has yet to be struck.  
The language problem in Ukraine is closely related to nationalism, 
Ukrainianization7 efforts, and geopolitical relations with neighboring countries, 
particularly Russia. Ukraine wishes to assert its status as an independent nation, and 
                                                
7 Ukrainianization is often cited as a response and a means to address the consequences of previous policies 
aimed at suppressing or even eradicating the Ukrainian language and culture from most spheres of public 
life, most frequently a policy of Russification on the part of the Russian Empire and again under Stalin, but 
also Polonization and Rumanization in some western Ukrainian regions. 
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maintaining Ukrainian as a sole state language is one way to demonstrate and assert its 
independence. But the wording of language policy that is legislated does not always 
translate directly into what happens on the ground, nor does it have a direct and 
immediate influence on attitudes toward language.  
LANGUAGE POLICY AND ETHNOGRAPHY IN UKRAINE 
Language issues have taken on greater urgency as various populations within 
independent Ukraine struggle to shape the political and linguistic landscape of that 
country. Since current language policies seem to satisfy neither the predominantly pro-
European west nor the historically pro-Russian east, legislation pertaining to language 
use has the very real potential to stabilize or destabilize the country. The issue of 
language policy needs to be addressed and analyzed in depth, because laws and practices 
related to language use help shape the political and cultural landscape and affect stability 
of the nation as a whole.  
Language policy encompasses much more than official mandates issued by 
legislative bodies. Instead, language policy refers to a whole range of processes: 
practices, attitudes, ideologies, and mechanisms that overtly or covertly influence 
people’s language choices in everyday life. Far from being a prescriptive document, 
language policy “exists even where it has not been made explicit or established by 
authority” Spolsky (2004, p. 8). In order to explore language policy and understand its 
impact on the teaching of Russian in Ukraine, this study takes an ethnographic approach, 
which allows the researcher to “move beyond top-down policy constructs to the level of 
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teachers’ practice where policy actually takes shape” (McCarty, 2001, p. 17). Due to its 
emphasis on cultural interpretation and “thick description,” a term popularized by Geertz 
(1973), ethnography is “ideally suited to critically examine these language policy 
processes” (McCarty, p. xii).  
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Although the collapse of the Soviet Union provided an opportunity for researchers 
to study education in depth during the period of transition, extensive research on 
transformations within the realm of education has not been conducted and 
remains mainly secondary. Notably missing from the literature are the voices of 
teachers—unarguably one of the groups most significantly and directly affected 
by post-Soviet reforms in elementary and secondary education (Kutsyuruba, 
2011, p. 233). 
 
Kulyk (2013) suggests that while the advantages of combining quantitative and 
qualitative methods (such as those used in ethnographic studies) are widely recognized, 
such a combination has rarely been used in studies of language policy in Ukraine or other 
post-Soviet countries.8 Kutsyuruba (2011) argues that “explor[ing] school practices 
through the eye of teachers, one of the groups most significantly affected by educational 
reforms,” allows researchers “to make sense of the complexities of post-Soviet 
transformations in education” (26). Leclercq (1996), too, asserts: “secondary teachers in 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe constitute an occupational category about 
which relatively little is known” (74). 
 Statistics related to the teaching of Russian—e.g., how many schools offer the 
language in their curriculum, whether Russian is a required or elective course, how many 
                                                
8 A notable exception is Laitin’s 1998 work entitled Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking 
Populations in the Near Abroad. 
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teachers of Russian are employed in Ukraine—offer minimal information about the state 
of Russian-language education today. Numbers do not tell a story or offer a nuanced 
understanding of what goes on in Ukraine’s classrooms. Furthermore, statistics can be 
easily manipulated to meet the aims of those reporting or requesting them. As human 
beings, we are drawn to the human aspects of phenomena. We seek to understand how 
others experience their lives and their world. By drawing on data from demographic 
questionnaires and interviews with teachers of Russian in Ukraine, this study offers an 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This study documents the evolution of language policy in post-Soviet Ukraine, 
focusing on the ways in which changes in policies related to language and education have 
affected the teaching of Russian in Ukrainian schools. The pertinent literature used to 
place this study in an ongoing conversation about issues related to language-in-education 
policies in Ukraine can be divided among five categories that largely overlap: 
1) language planning and policy, 2) educational policy, 3) language-in-education policy, 
4) the use of ethnographies in language policy, and 5) ethnographic policy research in 
Ukraine. 
LANGUAGE PLANNING AND POLICY 
Although they often appear together in scholarly literature, the terms language 
planning and language policy are not entirely interchangeable, even though most scholars 
agree that language planning and language policy are closely related but different 
activities (Johnson, 2013). Both terms emerged in the mid-twentieth century,9 just as 
scholars began to recognize language planning and policy as a discrete field, a new 
branch of sociolinguistics (Ricento, 2006).10 In current practice, the term language policy 
is used to describe both language planning and language policy, with some scholars, such 
                                                
9 The first book in the Library of Congress to include the words “language policy” in its title was published 
by Cebollero (1945), whereas the first title that referenced “language planning” was published by Haugen 
(1966). Haugen’s book was based on a journal article published in 1959 with the words “language 
planning” in its title. 
10 Wright (2003) notes that as an informal activity, language planning and policy “is as old as language 
itself” and is integral “in the distribution of power and resources in all societies” (1).  
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as Hornberger (2006), suggesting that the fields have, for all intents and purposes, 
coalesced into one. For the purposes of this dissertation, the term language policy refers 
to language planning and policy (LPP) as a whole. I choose to use the term language 
policy for two reasons: first, it is more concise than language planning and policy, and 
second, current literature in the field confirms that the term may now be used to refer to 
LPP as a whole.  
Language Planning: History and Definitions 
Although language planning is not a new phenomenon, it is a relatively new 
discipline. Evidence of significant interest in the area of language planning, which 
initially focused primarily on the decolonization of certain African states, first appeared 
in the early 1960s, while major research in the field began in the late 1970s (Kaplan and 
Baldauf, 1997). Since research in language planning was performed by scholars working 
in a variety of fields, the defining literature for this relatively new and complex academic 
discipline remained for decades scattered across books and journals in many fields, 
including history, education, and anthropology. The field of language planning grew 
considerably more complex as interest in language issues continued to develop in the 
final decade of the 20th century, fueled in large part by the “imperious spread of English 
and other global languages and, reciprocally, the alarming loss and endangerment of 
indigenous and small language communities world-wide” (Hornberger, 2006, p. 24). 
Scholars of that day called for or proposed new theoretical directions. Cooper (1989), for 
example, noted “we have as yet no generally accepted language planning theory, if by 
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theory we mean a set of logically interrelated, empirically testable propositions” (41). He 
believed a theory of social change was needed in order to move the field forward. 
Tollefson (1991), too,  sought to “contribute to a theory of language planning that locates 
the field within social theory” (8).  
Just as the field of language planning has evolved over the past sixty years, so too 
have definitions of the discipline. Indeed, scholars in the field are not consistent in their 
definitions of language planning. Einar Haugen (1959), one of the earliest language-
planning researchers, uses the term language planning to refer to the preparation of a 
normative grammar that could be used by writers and speakers in a non-homogeneous 
community. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, language planning—originally designated 
“language engineering”—began focusing on language issues in newly independent 
developing countries (Kaplan and Baldauf xi). By the mid-1970s, however, it became 
clear that language issues existed outside of newly independent nations, and research in 
language planning increased in breadth to include applied linguists’ work with 
governmental agencies and multinational corporations.  
In his seminal book on the subject, Cooper (1989) defines language planning as 
“deliberate efforts to influence the behavior of others with respect to the acquisition, 
structure, or functional allocation of their language codes” (45). He posits that any 
“systematic, theory-based, rational, and organized societal attention to language 
problems” may be termed language planning (31). Fettes (1997) argues that Cooper 
defines language planning too broadly, and that if understood this way, language 
planning comprises all systematic language policy development and implementation, 
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including foreign language planning and language-in-education planning. Fettes takes 
issue with this interpretation, suggesting instead that a large amount of language policy-
making “goes on in a haphazard or uncoordinated way, far removed from the language 
planning ideal” (14). He suggests, as did Grabe (1994), that the field of study “would be 
better described as ‘language policy and planning,’ LPP” (14). He envisions the 
connection between language planning and language policy thus: 
Language planning…must be linked to the critical evaluation of language policy: 
the former providing standards of rationality and effectiveness, the latter testing 
these ideas against actual practice in order to promote the development of better 
(more sophisticated, more useful) language planning models (14).  
In the 1990s, some researchers added the word policy to language planning 
(Kaplan and Baldauf, 1997; Ricento and Hornberger, 1996), although researchers still 
debate whether planning is a component of policy or policy is a component of planning 
(Ricento, 2000). The relationship between the two is complex and understood differently 
by different scholars. Does planning subsume policy (Fettes, 1997, p. 14), or policy 
subsume planning (Ricento, 2000, p. 209; Schiffman, 1996, p. 4)? Kaplan and Baldauf 
describe language planning as a decision-making process aimed at changing language 
practice in order to address a perceived linguistic problem, while language policy is a set 
of tools, such as texts, ideas, discourses, practices, etc. That is, Kaplan and Baldauf view 
language planning as a process through which policy is established. In contrast, Djité 
(1994) defines language planning as the processes adopted to implement policy decisions 
that have been made. Diallo (2014) sums up the interrelatedness of these two terms by 
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stating that language policy leads to, or is directed by, language planning. Language 
planning work is both a precursor to policy in the sense that it is a process through which 
policy is developed and a consequence of policy in that it is the process through which 
policy is implemented. Hornberger (2006) finds the LPP designation useful both as a 
reminder of the deeply interrelated nature of language planning and language policy (and 
of the recognition of the important role of each) and as a way around the lack of 
agreement on the exact nature of the relationship. LPP “offers a unified conceptual rubric 
under which to pursue fuller understanding of the complexity of the policy-planning 
relationship and in turn of its insertion in processes of social change” (25).  
Language Policy: Definitions 
As a field of study and practice, language policy touches on several social science 
disciplines. Today, language policy is part of the field of study commonly referred to as 
language planning and policy, or LPP. Although the term LPP has become widely 
accepted as an abbreviation of the name of the field since it was introduced a generation 
ago, continued debate leads some scholars to change the order of these two interrelated 
fields, suggesting that policy plays a superordinate role.   
In terms of definition, the natural first question is: What is language policy? 
Concrete definitions of the term are less commonly offered than discussions of language 
policy in terms of types, goals, or examples (Johnson, 2013). Complicating the question 
is the relationship between language policy and the term that preceded it, language 
planning. Definitions of language policy, therefore, vary widely; some definitions focus 
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solely on the norms of language use, whereas others refer to legislation pertaining to 
language use. In other words, some definitions of language policy include references to 
language planning, whereas some scholars choose to distinguish between these largely 
overlapping fields. In order to find a definition appropriate for the purposes of this 
dissertation, I will examine four commonly cited definitions of language policy: those of 
Schiffman, Kaplan and Baldauf, Ricento, and Spolsky.  
 Schiffman (1996) defines language policy as primarily a social construct, explicit 
or implicit. Schiffman focuses not on language-related legislation but on language policy 
as a phenomenon that is created and developed by society or as a perception that is 
“constructed” through cultural or social practice (276). Schiffman’s primary argument is 
that whether or not a particular polity has created explicit documents to shape and carry 
out language policies, language policy is, first and foremost, grounded in what he refers 
to as linguistic culture, which is the “sum totality of ideas, values, beliefs, attitudes, 
prejudices, religious strictures, and all the other cultural ‘baggage’ that speakers bring to 
their dealings with language from their background” (276). Schiffman’s definition of 
language policy as primarily a social construct does not fully apply to the context of this 
study, which focuses both on an examination of language-related legislation and on 
actual language practices. While I do not argue that language policy is a social construct, 
this study focuses more on the motives that drive language policy and the legislation that 




Kaplan and Baldauf (1997) expand on Schiffman’s definition in their description 
of language policy as a “body of ideas, laws, regulations, rules and practices intended to 
achieve the planned language change in the societies, group or system” (xi). They focus 
less on the practice of language use and more on the laws, regulations, or rules issued by 
an authority as part of a language plan. While Ukrainianization efforts, for example, are 
clearly geared toward achieving language change—namely an increase in the use of the 
Ukrainian language—this dissertation focuses less specifically on Ukrainianization 
efforts themselves and more specifically on how these efforts affect Russian language 
education. Therefore, a definition that encompasses not only policy legislation, but also 
the language beliefs and ideology that shape the legislation itself, is needed. 
Tollefson (1991) looks at language policy from an altogether different angle, 
defining it as: 
the institutionalization of language as a basis for distinctions among social groups 
(classes). That is, language policy is one mechanism for locating language within 
social structure so that language determines who has access to political power and 
economic recourses. Language policy is one mechanism by which dominant 
groups establish hegemony in language use (16).  
Rather than focusing on language policy solely in terms of basic language practices or as 
a way to generate changes in language use, he goes one step further in an attempt to 
define the underlying motives of those who create language policy: to maintain power 
and authority. Here, Tollefson adds a critical approach to LPP research that other 
definitions lack. While I agree with Tollefson’s assertion that language policy is used as a 
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basis for distinctions among social groups, his definition does not easily lend itself to the 
context of this study, which focuses primarily on language policy as a mechanism to 
achieve national unity and to counteract the legacy left by centuries of dominance by 
outside powers. Furthermore, the language situation in Ukraine—where a previously 
oppressed national language (Ukrainian) was overshadowed by Russian, the language of 
the educated Soviet elite—does not lend itself to Tollefson’s assertion that language 
policy is one method used by dominant groups to establish hegemony in language use. In 
the case of Ukraine, Ukrainianization is being used not by the group that has been 
traditionally dominant in Ukraine—the Russian-speaking elite—but by those who have 
traditionally been marginalized: native speakers of Ukrainian. While it is important to 
recognize the power of language policies to marginalize minority and indigenous 
languages, language policies can have the opposite effect, as in Ukraine, “specifically 
when they are designed to promote access to, education in, and use of minority and 
indigenous languages” (Johnson, 2013, p. 8).11  
While each of these three definitions sheds a unique light on questions of 
language use and policy and might serve well in particular contexts, the definition of 
language policy offered by Spolsky (2004) lends itself best to the purpose of this study. 
Spolsky describes three major subfields to language policy: acquisition planning, status 
planning, and corpus planning, all three of which are addressed in this study. 
                                                
11 The complicated history of the Ukrainian and Russian languages in Ukraine makes it difficult to define 
the relative statuses of these languages. While in terms of numbers of native speakers, Russian is a minority 
language in Ukraine, the historical dominance of Russian over Ukrainian and the active repression and 




Furthermore, he succinctly describes what he considers to be three components of the 
language policy of a speech community: language practices—the habitual pattern of 
selecting among the varieties that make up its linguistic repertoire; language beliefs or 
ideology—beliefs about language and language use; and any specific efforts made to 
modify or influence that practice by any kind of language intervention, planning or 
management (5). His definition encompasses not only policy legislation, which I will 
compare with language practices described by the interviewees, but also the language 
beliefs or ideology that shape the legislation itself. While this study focuses on language 
legislation and how this legislation has affected the teaching of Russian in Ukraine, the 
study also focuses on actual language practices—most specifically in the classroom—and 
language beliefs and ideologies that drive both language practices and language-related 
laws. Spolsky’s definition of language policy, then, is the one that shapes this study.  
Language Policy in Ukraine 
Researchers and politicians have long debated what kinds of language policies 
best suit the needs of Ukrainian citizens in light of that country’s unique history and 
relations with neighboring countries. Beginning in the mid-1990s, half a dozen years after 
Ukraine adopted its Law on Languages,12 researchers began documenting the impact of 
this law and debating its relative success in increasing the use and status of the Ukrainian 
language in that country.  
                                                
12 The “Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR” codified Ukrainian as the sole state language and 
guaranteed each child the right to receive an education in Ukrainian. See Chapter 3 “Language and 




While scholars’ views on language policy in Ukraine have evolved significantly 
over the past twenty years, there is a general consensus regarding what factors contribute 
to the contentious nature of the language issue. Arel (1995) suggested that the central 
issue in Ukrainian language policy was the collision between politics of anxiety among 
Russian-speakers, who feared being marginalized on account of increasing post-
independence Ukrainianization, and politics of identity among nationally-conscious 
Ukrainians, for whom it was a question of principle that the use of Ukrainian be more 
widespread. He defined language politics in the Ukrainian context as the politics of 
threatened identity, and he expressed specific concerns regarding the state of language 
politics in Ukraine. First, he declared that the 1992 Law on National Minorities of 
Ukraine13 was at odds with the language law and suggested that it made too many 
allowances for the use of Russian in Ukraine. Second, he asserted that the 
implementation of the new language policy had been regionally uneven. Third, he 
observed that Russian-speakers—speakers of the Russian language either natively or by 
preference—in the east and south of the country did not wish to use Ukrainian in their 
official capacities. They demanded that Russian be declared a “second state language,” at 
least at the regional level, leading to territorial bilingualism.14 Fourth, he suggested that 
Russian-speakers in the east and south feared the Ukrainianization of their regions and 
wished to preserve their “historic” distinctness (615). As we will see later in this 
                                                
13 The 1992 Law on National Minorities of Ukraine guarantees national-cultural autonomy for all national 
minorities and the right to native-language instruction for all schoolchildren in Ukraine. 
14 Territorial bilingualism is defined as a situation in which “each group finds itself mostly within its own 
politically defined territory, with the two (or more) languages having official status in their own territory” 




dissertation, many of Arel’s early concerns and conclusions regarding the nature of the 
language issue in Ukraine still hold true today.  
While Arel focused on disputes related to the rights of speakers of Ukrainian and 
Russian, Solchanyk (1998) concluded that on a practical level, the status of Ukrainian as 
the sole state language had been rendered largely meaningless by the fact that the 1989 
Law on Languages allowed for widespread use of Russian and all other languages used in 
Ukraine, particularly in “places compactly inhabited by citizens of other [non-Ukrainian] 
nationalities” (542). He expressed concern that the law provided timelines of up to ten 
years for the implementation of several of its provisions and that no mechanism had been 
established to enforce the law. He concurred with Chinn and Kaiser’s (1996) assertion 
that the law had relatively little impact in the years immediately following its passage and 
was “still largely irrelevant” (155). Solchanyk also expressed that it appeared that 
Moscow believed the Russian minority in Ukraine required its attention—specifically, 
that the Russian language and culture were under siege (547). Clearly, Solchanyk’s 
assertion continues to hold true nearly twenty years later, because as of the summer of 
2016, Russia continues to wage war against Ukrainian soldiers and to support separatist 
troops in eastern Ukraine, all under the guise of protecting the rights of ethnic Russians 
living in Ukraine. 
Bilaniuk and Melnyk (2008) explore the persistent struggles over language policy 
in Ukraine and the uneven implementations of existing policies. They further argue that 
language laws in Ukraine continue to be sensitive barometers of Ukraine’s and other 
post-Soviet countries’ political leanings. They state: “The choice between Ukrainian and 
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Russian is often portrayed as shorthand for the choice between two polar political and 
cultural allegiances: with Russia, in the case of Russian language, or with Europe and the 
West, in the case of Ukrainian” (340). They pose important questions that are central to 
the language issue in Ukraine and that still have yet to be answered: Should all Ukrainian 
citizens be able to understand and speak Ukrainian? Will the titular language unify the 
population and consolidate independence? Should all Ukrainian citizens know Russian, 
and if so, is it for practical reasons and/or in support of a spiritual East-Slavic kinship? 
Should Russian be prioritized over other minority languages in Ukraine? They believe 
that the answers to these questions affect people’s sense of identity and social status and 
go so far as to impact the country’s politics. 
Recent research on language policy in Ukraine by Kulyk (2013) proposes possible 
solutions to Ukraine’s language problem based on his research in that country. He 
suggests that although Ukrainian speakers would prefer that Ukrainian be the dominant 
language in all domains and throughout the country, they are willing to accept the 
widespread use of Russian, provided that their own right to use Ukrainian is not 
questioned and that Ukrainian retain both its status as sole state language and its priority 
status and exclusive role in certain symbolically important practices. In contrast, Russian 
speakers prefer an upgrade of the status of Russian, which they suggest as a way to 
ensure the equality of speakers of the two languages. Just as Arel (1995) concluded, 
Kulyk further declares that most Russian-speakers in Ukraine actually want official 
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bilingualism to allow them to remain unilingual15 in their capacities both as citizens and 
employees. He suggests, then, that the best solution would be to adopt compromise 
legislation providing for a limited upgrade of the status of Russian and then facilitate its 
observance by both bureaucrats and citizens (280). 
LANGUAGE-IN-EDUCATION PLANNING AND POLICY 
Although it is important to look at language policy in general in order to explore 
issues that are raised during language policy research, this dissertation focuses more 
specifically on language-in-education planning and policy, the subfield within language 
planning and policy that focuses on those policies related to the language of instruction in 
the classroom. The field of language-in-education planning, also referred to as language 
policies in education or language education policies, encompasses not only medium-of-
instruction policies but also decisions that govern which languages will be taught when 
and by whom, using which materials and assessments (Kaplan and Baldauf, 1997).  
Tollefson (2013) argues strongly that the world has entered a time of crisis when 
it comes to language policy in education, with global capitalism leading to the spread of 
English at the expense of children’s home languages. Support for right-wing political 
movements, he claims, has led to a widespread reassertion of dominant languages in 
education (e.g., in France, England, Australia, and the United States). Transformations in 
the role of nationalism and identity in language policies have resulted in major 
                                                
15 Here, the term “unilingual” refers to the desire of Russian-speakers in Ukraine to conduct the business of 
their daily lives in Russian instead of having to learn Ukrainian.  
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implications for language policies in education and changing paradigms in language 
policy research.   
Tollefson makes the following four major generalizations about language policies 
in education: first, that multilingualism is common in today’s world, despite continuing 
efforts to create monolingual policies; second, that nations use language policies to 
influence social and political conflict; third, that the conflicts that develop over language 
policies are usually based on the influence a particular language has in determining the 
distribution of political power and economic resources; and fourth, that in order to 
understand how policies are created and perceived, further attention needs to be paid to 
the connection between policy and ideology. In the 21st century, Tollefson further posits, 
ongoing discussions of power, inequality, and the rights of linguistic minorities have 
expanded to include questions related to political and economic crises. He outlines six 
questions that have most recently emerged in the field of language policy in education:  
(1) How have the processes of global capitalism, such as migration, increasing 
economic inequality, widespread state violence, and the severe economic crisis of 
the system, affected language policies in schools? 
(2) What is the role of corporations and other non-governmental agents in 
language policy-making? 
(3) How have nationalist, anti-immigrant, and similar political movements 
affected language policies, and how can ethnolinguistic minorities and their 
progressive allies resist these movements? 
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(4) How has the spread of the discourse of human rights affected language 
policymaking? 
(5) How are newly emerging conceptions of identity linked with language policies 
in education? 
(6) What methodologies in language policy research are appropriate for the study 
of current issues in language policy? (4) 
Tollefson could not have predicted even three years ago what urgency his first and third 
questions would take on by the year 2016, as migration and increasing economic 
inequalities have led to quarrels among nations regarding how to meet the needs of waves 
of migrants fleeing such areas as Syria, Afghanistan, and Africa. Many nations, 
particularly in Europe, are struggling to meet the educational needs of students from a 
variety of linguistic backgrounds while addressing anti-immigrant policies within their 
own countries. At the same time, Tollefson’s fifth question, which addresses how newly 
emerging conceptions of identity are linked with language policies in education, is of 
particular relevance in Ukraine, where Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking citizens 
alike have embraced their identity as Ukrainian nationals and called for greater expansion 
of the Ukrainian language in schools.  
 Alidou (2004) discusses the role of the nation-state in language-in-education 
planning, making the important point that education in rural villages was carried out in 
local languages before the rise of the nation-state. Intense debates about the medium of 
instruction arose only after the introduction of state and/or colonial educational systems, 
a common pattern in acquisition planning. Before that, “there was no debate about 
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medium of instruction, as such education was linguistically and culturally contextualized 
in order to respond to the needs of the population” (197). Given that medium-of-
instruction policies emerged alongside nationalist projects, Tollefson states, “Language 
policies in education must be understood with reference to the aims and institutions of the 
nation-state and associated processes of nationalism, especially the fundamental state 
function of allocating among social groups access to economic resources and political 
power” (18).  
LANGUAGE POLICY AND EDUCATION IN UKRAINE 
 Under Soviet rule, Russian was a required course in all Ukrainian schools and was 
taught as the language of the educated elite. Knowledge of Russian was crucial for 
entrance to the university and for advancement in many careers. Today, Ukraine, like 
many other successor states to the Soviet Union, has attempted to expand the functions 
and raise the prestige of the titular language in all spheres, including education. Brown 
(2013) argues that even though post-Soviet states inherited schools with a Soviet-era 
commitment to multilingualism, these states—Ukraine included—have been challenged 
to transform these schools into new types of plurilingual institutions—ones that both 
promote the titular language and allow for instruction in minority languages (238). 
Indeed, Ukraine faces the same kinds of challenges that other nations face as they seek to 
strike a balance among languages. The ongoing discussion in Ukraine about the so-called 
language problem reflects an enduring debate in LPP research and practice: competing 
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ideologies of “one nation/one language” versus the value of individual and societal 
multilingualism (McCarty, 2011, p. 6).  
 While excellent scholarship has been published on both language policy (e.g., 
Arel, 2014; Bilaniuk, 2005; Kulyk, 2015) and education policy (e.g., Fimyar, 2008; 
Janmaat, 2000; Polese, 2010) in post-Soviet Ukraine, Brown (2013) argues that the nexus 
of language policy and education merits particular attention. She maintains that 
schooling, i.e., what Spolsky refers to as acquisition planning, is the primary state 
institution for influencing knowledge, and that language policy and use in schools 
influences the vitality of languages (239). She calls, therefore, for deeper research in 
language-in-education policy in post-Soviet states. Besters-Dilger (2007) also notes that 
language instruction in schools is a “crucial” area that “will decide the fate of the 
Ukrainian language, since as many are convinced, the use of the language…will have a 
decisive impact on the language preferences of Ukrainian youth” (258).  
 Research in language and education policy in post-Soviet states reveals strong ties 
between the Soviet past and post-Soviet present and posits that the Soviet experience 
“continues to play a formative role in current developments in language policy and 
education” (240-241). Like other post-Soviet states, Ukraine grapples with the enduring 
legacy of Soviet language policies in education, but unlike other states, it inherited 
schools that used not only Russian but also Hungarian, Polish, and Romanian/Moldovan 
as the medium of instruction (Kulyk, 2013), a practice that has facilitated the 
development of non-dominant language instruction in the post-Soviet period. In its 
attempts to address the historic asymmetries evident in the curriculum, the Ukrainian 
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government utilizes schools to promote language competencies both in Ukrainian and 
other minority languages (Brown 244), including Russian. Researchers working in post-
Soviet Ukraine have noted, for example, the dramatic increase in the percentage of 
schools using Ukrainian as the language of instruction—from 45% in 1991 to 78% in 
2005 (Bilaniuk and Melnyk, 2008). Yet, asymmetries persist in the availability and 
quality of instruction in Ukrainian. In the case of Ukraine, geography frequently dictates 
the availability of native-language instruction. Research (Besters-Dilger, 2007; 
Kalynovska, 2009) points to a regional underrepresentation of Ukrainian-language 
schools in the southern and eastern regions of the country as well as in Crimea. This 
imbalance led Besters-Dilger to suggest that one potential development in Ukraine could 
be a “west-east polarization (or Ukrainian-Russian segregation)” with an absence of 
Ukrainian-medium schools [what I refer to in this dissertation as Ukrainian-language 
schools] in the eastern part of the country and of Russian-language schools in the western 
region (Besters-Dilger, 2007, p. 282). 
Just as the ideal status of Russian in Ukraine as a whole is a matter of debate, so 
too is the role of Russian and other languages in Ukrainian schools. While Russian is 
taught as a native language in Russian-language schools, its role in Ukrainian-language 
schools differs from that of a foreign language. Bulajeva and Hogan-Brun (2010) noted 
that in Soviet times, Russian was considered a second rather than a foreign language, and 
even today, there is little consensus regarding what role it should play in Ukrainian 
schools. More than two decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Soviet-era 
language practices endure in Ukrainian schools and do not easily or quickly change with 
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new policies. Furthermore, evidence from Ukraine (Besters-Dilger, 2007; Bilaniuk and 
Melnyk, 2008; Kalynovska, 2009; Polese, 2010) suggests that the language of instruction 
in what is deemed a Ukrainian-language school can camouflage language dominance and 
practice within schools. Besters-Dilger (2007) identified a dynamic in Ukraine where 
some schools are categorized as Ukrainian-language institutions, when, in fact, Russian 
dominates as the language of instruction. Kalynovska (2009, p. 209) labeled the 
educational environment in some Ukrainian schools as “hidden bilingual,” with 
Ukrainian as the medium of instruction and Russian used for the language of 
communication outside of class, particularly in the eastern and southern regions.  
 Another theme being explored in language policy and education in Ukraine 
centers on the role of teachers as mediators of policy. In these research findings, teachers 
emerge as professionals who relax or enforce policies related to language use in their 
schools. Since teachers enjoy a certain amount of autonomy in the classroom, schools 
generally provide a relatively free space for making pedagogical and ideological 
decisions related to language. Polese (2010), for example, discusses the ways that 
teachers in Odesa act as “mediators” of national-level discourse on language (50). He 
found that in Odesa, educators experience relative freedom from complying “with official 
instructions, [which in turn] allows for the development of a Ukrainian identity in timing 
and modalities that vary from teacher to teacher, and from one student to another” (58). 
Recent research has confirmed that language ideologies and policies inform teachers’ 
pedagogical practices in the post-Soviet context. Friedman’s (2009) detailed ethnographic 
research in Ukraine concluded that an ideology of “pure language” influenced Ukrainian 
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teachers to the point of correcting their elementary-age students’ use of Russian forms 
when speaking Ukrainian (347). As students responded to teachers’ correction or self-
initiated corrective practices, they displayed allegiance to ideologically mediated 
standards of correctness that treat language mixing as a violation of the natural 
boundaries between languages, thereby reifying and naturalizing pure Ukrainian as the 
standard upon which all Ukrainian-language practices can be evaluated (364). 
ETHNOGRAPHIES IN LANGUAGE PLANNING AND POLICY 
A variety of methodological approaches may be employed in the study of 
language policy, including historical, ethnographic, linguistic, geolinguistic, and 
psychosociological (Ricento, 2006). This study seeks to present an ethnographic portrait 
of the state of Russian language education in Ukrainian schools, and as such, I provide an 
overview of research related to ethnographic approaches to language policy. 
Ethnography is “a way of seeing” (Wolcott, 2008, p. 69) that is situated and 
systematic, and a “way of looking” (43) that is grounded in long-term, in-depth, first-
hand accounts. Wolcott argues that at its core, an ethnographic analysis is a cultural 
analysis—a peeling back of layers of meaning to answer the question, “What is going on 
here?” (73). The primary methods used to conduct ethnographic research include 
participant observation, in-depth interviews, and document analysis. These methods can 
uncover the “situated logic” of implicit and explicit policymaking, offering insights into 
“why practice takes shape the way it does” (Stritikus and Wiese, 2006, p. 21). Indeed, 
ethnography “pushes beyond the study of language policies as abstract, disembodied 
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texts, putting policy in motion…by looking closely and critically at the human-built 
environments in which policy performs its social role” (McCarty, 2011, p. 17). In other 
words, ethnography examines layers of experience in order to analyze how official 
language policy actually affects teachers. The outer layers of the onion represent broader 
policy processes, whereas the inner layers represent local policy accommodations, 
resistance to the broader policy, and transformations as they occur in everyday practice 
(Ricento and Hornberger, 1996). By “slicing the onion ethnographically” (Hornberger 
and Johnson, 2007, p. 509), we can examine the nuances of each layer and observe how 
each layer works with others to make a whole. 
The use of ethnography in language policy research first emerged in the 1980s. 
Dell Hymes, a linguist, sociolinguist, anthropologist, and folklorist laid early groundwork 
for ethnography in language policy by establishing disciplinary foundations for 
ethnographic studies of language use. Johnson (2013) lists twenty-two ethnographies of 
language policy, beginning with Hornberger’s groundbreaking and often-cited study of 
Spanish-Quechua bilingual education and community norms of interaction in Peru 
(1988). While four significant ethnographies of language policy were published during 
the 1990s, the field of ethnography in language policy began to expand significantly only 
at the beginning of the 21st century, with Canagarajah (2005) noting “…the growing 
popularity of ethnographic approaches in LPP” (195). Canagarajah (2006) also discusses 
the rationale, development, and contributions of ethnographic methods in language 
planning, demonstrating the potential of ethnographic research as a starting point for 
language planning and policy model-building. He documents cases of language planning 
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from the bottom up, as does Hornberger (1997), and suggests that ethnographic research 
can counteract dominant paradigms and ideologies in LPP.  
 Hornberger and Johnson (2011) suggest that ethnographic research in language 
policy can: 
1) illuminate and inform the development of LPP in this various types—status, 
corpus, and acquisition—and across the various processes of the LPP cycle—
creation, interpretation, and appropriation; 
2) shed light on how official top-down LPP plays out in particular contexts, 
including its interaction with bottom-up LPP; 
3) uncover the indistinct voices, covert motivations, embedded ideologies, 
invisible instances, or unintended consequences of LPP (275) 
As Hornberger and Johnson suggest, this particular study uses ethnography to shed light 
on the differences between the policy issued by the Ministry of Education of Ukraine and 
what actually takes place in Ukrainian schools. By examining conversations with teachers 
as they discuss the impact of language policy on their work in schools, ethnography 
allows us to go beyond numbers and official reports of policy to uncover the 
consequences of LPP in Ukrainian schools. 
ETHNOGRAPHIC RESEARCH IN UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE PLANNING AND POLICY 
While ethnographic research is not unknown in Ukraine, only a small percentage 
of ethnographers publish studies based on data collected in Ukrainian educational 
institutions. Fournier (2007) focuses on citizenship education in Kyiv schools, whereas 
 
36 
Sovik (2007) examines motivation in language policy in Kharkiv. Finally, Peacock 
(2011) draws upon data collected at public schools in Ukraine in her exploration of 
identity construction among teenagers.  
Even among the small number of ethnographic studies that have been conducted 
in Ukrainian schools, only a few have focused specifically on language education. 
Bilaniuk (2005) touches on language education in her discussions of language politics 
and cultural correction in Ukraine. Friedman (2009) explores error correction as a 
language socialization practice in a pair of Ukrainian classrooms, and Goodman (2013) 
uses ethnographic fieldwork to explore the ecology of language at a university in 
Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine. While both Friedman and Goodman explore language 
education in Ukraine, there is a wide gap in ethnographic research focusing specifically 
on the teaching of Russian in that country.  
THE ETHNOGRAPHIC PORTRAIT 
 In 1983, Sara Lawrence-Lightfoot introduced the research community to a unique 
social science inquiry method that she had developed, which she called “portraiture.” 
Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis (1997, p. xv) define the portraiture method as follows:  
Portraiture is a method of qualitative research that blurs the boundaries of 
aesthetics and empiricism in an effort to capture the complexity, dynamics, and 
subtlety of human experience and organizational life. Portraitists seek to record 
and interpret the perspectives and experience of the people they are studying, 
documenting their voice and their visions—their authority, knowledge, and 
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wisdom. The drawing of the portrait is placed in social and cultural context and 
shaped through dialogue between the portraitist and the subject, each one 
negotiating the discourse and shaping the evolving image.  
The use of ethnographic portraiture is uniquely suited to this research study, in that 
portraiture allows for a more a nuanced understanding of a given phenomenon, in this 
case, the teaching of Russian in contemporary Ukraine. Using the methodology 
developed by Lawrence-Lightfoot, this study presents research results not only in facts 
and figures, but in the words of the very teachers most affected by policies related to 
Russian-language education in Ukraine. Like other approaches to qualitative research, 
portraiture can help draw attention to and unpack the intricacy of language, identity, and 
school categories. Given that in Ukraine, “identity and language labels that subsume a 
great deal of complexity” may not be captured in statistical data, the kind of attention to 
the “micro-sociolinguistic” context proposed by Lawrence-Lightfoot provides rich 
insights into “the forces that shape language use, and the social and political impact of 
language use” (Bilaniuk and Melnyk, 2008, p. 357). These insights fill an important gap 
in the literature by providing a unique perspective on the teaching of Russian in Ukraine 




Chapter 3: Language and Education Policy in Ukraine  
 A familiarity with the history and evolution of language policy in Ukraine allows 
for a deeper understanding of the contentious nature of language issues in that country. 
Language issues are not new to Ukraine; indeed, the country has undergone a series of 
changes in policy toward language use over the centuries, which has “created an 
atmosphere of hostility toward Russian in some places, and toward Ukrainian in others” 
(Grenoble, 2003, p. 82). An understanding of the “turbulent history” (Bilaniuk and 
Melnyk, 2008, p. 347) of the Ukrainian-Russian language issue is indispensable in 
placing the current language issues in context.  
LANGUAGE POLICY IN UKRAINE 
Eighteenth Century  
 There are relatively few sources on language policies and practices of the Russian 
empire prior to the 1917 Russian Revolution (Pavlenko, 2006). The Tsardom of Russia, 
which had claimed the lands of eastern Ukraine in the seventeenth century, had no 
consistent language policy until the eighteenth century (Belikov and Krysin, 2001; 
Weeks, 2001). Since the Russian government was accustomed to using translators to 
communicate with local populations within its vast, multilingual empire, Russification 
was not a priority among government officials at that time. Tsar Peter I (Peter the Great), 
who proclaimed the establishment of the Russian Empire when he took power in 1721, 
was the first to formulate consistent—and fairly liberal—policies with regard to ethnic 
and linguistic minorities (Belikov and Krysin, 2001).  
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Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
From 1804 until the 1917 Russian Revolution, the Ukrainian language was 
banned from schools in the Russian Empire, which encompassed the majority of 
Ukrainian territory at the time.16 Active repression of Ukrainian can be dated at least as 
far back as 1876, when an official proclamation of Tsar Alexander II, entitled Ems Ukaz, 
prohibited the use of Ukrainian in all schools, theaters, and public performances and 
banned the use of the Ukrainian language in print. This proclamation was part of a greater 
change in language policy in the direction of Russification under Alexander II, whose 
administration sought to unify the empire, in part through the spread of Russian. Five 
years later, Tsar Alexander III loosened the restrictions found in the proclamation by 
allowing limited use, with special permission, of Ukrainian in theaters and allowing the 
printing of Ukrainian dictionaries, provided that they used Russian Cyrillic, but he 
continued the previous tsar’s mandate that Ukrainian not be used in schools. Since 
Ukrainian-only theaters and troupes could not be established and performances of 
Ukrainian plays and humorous songs had to be approved by local authorities, Ukrainian 
cultural development practically ceased.  
                                                
16 At the time, 85% of the Ukrainian population lived in Ukrainian Russia. In Transcarpathia, where 3% of 
the Ukrainian population lived, the use of Ukrainian was severely restricted, and Hungarian was the sole 
official language. Only 13% of the Ukrainian population—those residing in Austrian Ukraine—were 
permitted free use of the Ukrainian language. There, a Ukrainian press was developed, and Ukrainian was 
used extensively in the schools. This freedom to use Ukrainian continued until 1916, with the exception of 
the time period of the Russian occupation during World War I (1914-1915), when the public use of 
Ukrainian was virtually outlawed and Ukrainian institutions were oppressed. Figures from Rusov (1916, 





During the beginning of the twentieth century, the results of the repression of the 
Ukrainian language became apparent. Since the use of Ukrainian was prohibited in 
education and in all official capacities, it was not spoken among the elite. Instead, the 
educated classes spoke Russian, and the Ukrainian language was held in very low 
prestige (Grenoble, 2003, p. 83). Two initial attempts (1917-18 and then 1919) at Soviet 
rule in the region immediately following the Revolution failed, largely due to an 
inadequate understanding of the nationalities issue there. Only in the summer of 1919, 
when the Soviet Ukrainian government was forced to seek asylum in Moscow twice that 
year, did the Bolshevik leadership comprehend the magnitude of the problem. A 
rethinking of policy resulted in Lenin’s Draft Resolution of the Central Committee of the 
Russian Communist Party on Soviet Rule in Ukraine, which mandated the “free 
development” of the Ukrainian language and culture and included instructions that 
employees of all state institutions should be conversant in Ukrainian (Grenoble, 83).  
In 1919, the Third Congress of Soviets issued a decree that mandated school 
instruction of Ukrainian language, history, and geography. The following year, the use of 
Ukrainian alongside Russian in all government institutions was mandated. The Council of 
People’s Commissars reinforced these decrees in two subsequent decisions in 1920 and 
1921. The status of Ukrainian was legally codified in 1922 in legislation that declared 
both Ukrainian and Russian to be of national significance as the majority languages (in 
villages and cities, respectively) and authorized their use in education. Despite these and 
other attempts to make Ukrainian and Russian official languages of Soviet Ukraine, such 
measures were defeated at the full plenary session of the Central Committee of the 
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Communist Party, which instead declared them to be “two generally used languages” 
(Grenoble, 84).  
In 1920, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee decreed Ukrainian to 
have equal status with Russian. In the summer of 1920, the Council of People’s 
Commissars ordered plans to make Ukrainian the language of instruction in all schools. 
Books and newspapers were to be published in Ukrainian, and language courses were to 
be organized by government officials. Change was slow but steady. In 1923, 61% of 
elementary schools were Ukrainian-language schools, while nearly 12% had both 
Russian and Ukrainian as languages of instruction. Two years later, 71% of schools 
offered instruction in Ukrainian, whereas 7% of the schools offered instruction in both 
languages (84).  
The Soviet indigenization policies of the 1920s, during the first years of 
Bolshevik rule, were part of a widespread Soviet policy of Korenizatsiya (literally 
“putting down roots”) that sought to undo the forced Russification of nations under the 
Russian empire and harmonize relationships among the nations of the Soviet Union by 
creating policies that would appeal to ethnic non-Russians. These policies were also 
aimed at strengthening Soviet power in the territory of Soviet Ukraine and across the 
Union as a whole. In Ukraine, the government began a campaign of Ukrainianization, a 
policy of increasing the use and facilitating the development of the Ukrainian language 
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and promoting other elements of Ukrainian culture, in various spheres of public life such 
as education, publishing, government, and religion.17 
While an official commitment to Ukrainianization continued throughout the 
1920s, Soviet policy toward the Ukrainian language changed abruptly in late 1932 and 
early 1933 with the termination of the policy of Ukrainianization. The following years 
were characterized by massive repression and discrimination against speakers of 
Ukrainian. At the same time, purges of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, including scholars, 
cultural leaders, and many of the leading figures in the pro-Ukrainian language 
movement, began in earnest. A concerted effort toward Russification was begun. 
Ukrainian lost its primary position in higher education and the media and was demoted to 
a language of secondary importance. The systematic assault on Ukrainian identity, 
culture, and education, combined with the effects of an artificial famine (Holodomor) 
upon the peasantry, the main bearers of Ukrainian culture, dealt the Ukrainian language 
and culture a crippling blow.  
Stalin’s death in 1953 heralded major changes in language policy in Ukraine and 
in the Soviet Union as a whole. The general political thaw under Khrushchev made it 
possible for Ukrainians to return to developing their language and culture. Ukrainian 
language journals were established, and a number of printed declarations of the 
importance of Ukrainian were published. At the same time, however, the status of 
                                                
17 Ukrainianization is often cited as a response and a means to address the consequences of previous 
policies aimed at suppressing or even eradicating the Ukrainian language and culture from many spheres of 
public life. Ukrainianization most frequently sought to correct the effects of Russification on the part of the 




Russian was in no way diminished, and Russification efforts continued in Ukraine and 
throughout the Soviet Union. For one, successful careers required a good command of 
Russian, which led parents to send their children to Russian-language schools. At the 
same time, a suppression of Ukrainian nationalism contributed to a lessening interest in 
Ukrainian. Although on paper, policies related to language use in Ukraine allowed for 
freedom of language choice during the Khrushchev era, in practice, a lack of protection 
against the expansion of the Russian language contributed to the continued lack of 
prestige of the Ukrainian language during this period.  
 From the early 1960s until the early 1970s, language policy in Ukraine again 
moved toward relative acceptance of the development of the Ukrainian language. The 
Communist Party leader Petro Shelest actively promoted the Ukrainian language and 
Ukraine’s interests as a whole. During his tenure as the First Secretary of the Communist 
party in the Ukrainian SSR, there was a brief resurgence of the Ukrainian national 
culture. He was forced into retirement by Brezhnev, however, for his Ukrainian 
nationalist tendencies. The new leader of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Volodymyr 
Shcherbystky, greatly expanded Russification policies and insisted that Russian be 
spoken at all official functions.  
As a result of Shcherbystky’s Russification policies and strong stance against 
dissent, Ukraine was slower to liberalize under Gorbachev’s reforms in the late 1980s 
than even Russia itself. Although Ukrainian persisted as the native language for the 
majority of the citizens of Ukraine on the eve of Ukrainian independence, the Russian 
language continued to dominate in the government, media, and commerce.  
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A significant symbolic step toward the reclamation of Ukrainian as a national 
language was the issuance of a law entitled “On languages in the Ukrainian SSR,” which 
was adopted in the fall of 1989 and declared Ukrainian to be the sole state language18 of 
Ukraine, a provision later embodied in the 1996 Constitution. The choice of Ukrainian as 
a single state language can be understood as a “strategy of resistance to the high level of 
Russification,” (Pavlenko, 2006, p. 86), motivated by factors including a strong 
nationalist movement; a high degree of titular language maintenance, particularly in 
western Ukraine; competence in the titular language among ethnic Russians who attended 
Ukrainian-language schools; and a relatively pro-Western orientation within the 
country’s administration (Bilaniuk, 2005; Kuzio, 1998; Savoskul, 2001; Wanner, 1998). 
The language law, as it is more commonly known (Solchanyk, 1998), also legalized the 
concept of “languages of international communication,” which were identified as 
“Ukrainian, Russian, and other languages” (541-2). The lawmakers did not specify what 
was to be understood by this designation, which leads to the conclusion that on a practical 
level, the status of Ukrainian as the sole state language is rendered largely meaningless 
by the fact that Russian and, indeed, all other languages used in Ukraine are granted 
broad privileges in the public sector.  
                                                
18 The term “state language” is what English-speakers generally refer to as an “official language”: one that 
is given a special legal status in a particular country, state, or other jurisdiction. The term “state language” 
does not typically refer to the language used by a people or country, but by its government.  
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Language Policy in Post-Soviet Ukraine (1991 - Present) 
Upon declaring independence in 1991, Ukraine found itself with the largest 
Russian diaspora of all the former Soviet republics, numbering 11.4 million out of 47 
million Ukrainian citizens (Pavlenko, 2006). In addition, 72% of citizens living in eastern 
Ukraine spoke Russian as their first language (Zevelev, 2001), as did many other ethnic 
minorities. The 1989 language law that had declared Ukrainian the sole state language of 
Ukraine remained in force, and, following independence, Ukraine maintained a single 
language policy with de facto bilingualism in the titular language and in Russian.  
  Both the 1992 Law on National Minorities and the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine 
supported the 1989 language law. Article 10 of the Constitution, adopted at the Fifth 
Session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 28 June 1996, states the following: 
1) The state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language. 
2)  The State ensures the comprehensive development and functioning of the 
Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life throughout the entire territory 
of Ukraine.  
3) In Ukraine, the free development, use and protection of Russian19 and other 
languages of national minorities of Ukraine is guaranteed. 
4) The State promotes the learning of languages of international communication. 
5) The use of languages in Ukraine is guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine 
and is determined by law. 
                                                
19 Bilaniuk and Melnyk  (2008) noted the privileged status of Russian compared to other minority 
languages, as it is the only minority language named.  
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The next major piece of language-related legislation, the European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages, came into effect in Ukraine in 2006. This treaty was 
adopted in 1992 to protect and promote historical regional and minority languages in 
Europe. When Ukraine ratified the treaty in 2005, it did so on behalf of the languages of 
what it had deemed to be ethnic minorities, including Russians. Following the ratification 
of the European Charter, pro-Russian legislators sought to secure recognition for Russian 
as a regional language in the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine or even in the 
country as a whole, allegedly in accordance with the charter. During the presidency 
(2005-2010) of Viktor Yushchenko, who supported the status of Ukrainian as sole state 
language, these attempts were unsuccessful. Following the election of Viktor 
Yanukovych, however, Russian-speaking areas rallied for an upgrade in the status of the 
Russian language in Ukraine. Two years later, in 2012, Yanukovych’s Party of Regions 
succeeded in adopting a new law, “On the principles of the state language policy,” that 
granted Russian the status of regional language20 on roughly half of Ukraine’s territory 
and legalized its use in many domains throughout the country. Opponents of the law said 
that it undermined and supplanted the role of the Ukrainian language and did not conform 
to Article 10 of the Constitution. The debate over adopting Russian as a regional 
language in Ukraine raised strong criticism, sparked protests, and led to fistfights in 
Parliament and to the resignation of one lawmaker in an attempt to block the bill. A 
                                                
20 By virtue of its being spoken by at least 10% of the population in those areas, Russian was, under this 
law, elevated to the status of regional language in seven oblasts and two cities in Ukraine. Achieving the 
status of regional language allowed Russian to become an accepted medium of communication in 
education, local government offices, courts, and official correspondence. Today, Russian is the regional 
language of the following oblasts: Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv (Kharkiv city only), Kherson, 
Luhansk (Luhansk city and Krasny Luch only), Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sevastopol City, and Zaporizhia. 
 
47 
proposal to repeal the law was approved by a majority vote in the Ukrainian parliament in 
2014 but was postponed by acting president Oleksandr Turchynov, who ordered a draft of 
a new law that would “accommodate the interests of both eastern and western Ukraine 
and of all ethnic groups and minorities” (TASS, 1 March 2014). Later in the year, newly 
elected president Petro Poroshenko declared that the language policy in Ukraine would be 
amended, but the bill to repeal the law has not been signed.  
Russian Rights Activists in Ukraine  
The policy of Ukrainianization carried out by Ukrainian authorities over the past 
two decades has been met with resistance in the traditionally Russian-speaking areas of 
Ukraine, particularly in Crimea, where educational establishments continued to teach in 
Russian after Ukrainian was declared the state language (Wanner, 1998). Champions of 
Russian have tried from the early years of independence to make Russian a second state 
language, while the supporters of wider use of Ukrainian have sought to maintain the 
status of Ukrainian as the sole state language. Efforts to create a unified nation under the 
titular language have, in some cases, led to charges of Ukrainianization on the part of 
some members of the Russian-speaking population. In western Ukraine, Russians 
complained that ultranationalist Ukrainian groups fostered ethnic hatred and that local 
authorities failed to take appropriate action in such cases, and by the late 1990s, the main 
complaint of Russian rights activists was that any language-related legislation issued by 
the central government was often vague and abstract enough to allow local officials to act 
however they desired (Solchanyk, 1998). Russians in Ukraine desired a language policy 
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that would specifically protect their rights to use Russian in all spheres. Given the 
roughly equal strengths of the two parties in the parliament, attempts to adopt a new 
language law have failed. In the meantime, pro-Russian political forces have tried to 
promote the rights of the Russian language by entitling it to official use in many 
predominantly Russian-speaking oblasts and cities where they controlled the 
regional/local councils.  
The 1998 conference on the “Dialogue of Ukrainian and Russian Cultures in 
Ukraine” adopted recommendations that referred to the “juridically and unjustified forced 
and illegal acceleration of eliminating the Russian language and culture…and the 
artificial demolition of the historical affinity of the Ukrainian-Russian linguistic and 
artistic cultures” (Shulga, 1998). The First Congress of Russians in Ukraine, which was 
convened in May 1999, accused the government of “establishing a policy directed at the 
massive expulsion of the Russian ethno-cultural factor from all aspects of society” 
(“Russian Orthodox”, 1999). 
Parties such as the Party of Regions, Communist Party of Ukraine, and the 
Progressive Socialist Party have enjoyed great popularity among Russophone Ukrainians 
and Russians in Crimea, southern, and southeastern regions of Ukraine. The Party of 
Regions came in first in the 2002, 2007, and 2012 parliamentary elections, winning the 
largest number of seats. In the 2014 parliamentary election, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc 
overtook the Party of Regions successor, Opposition Bloc, which finished fourth. This 
loss for the pro-Russian party may be explained by the fact that due to the annexation of 
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Crimea and the unrest in Donbas, elections were not held in those areas, which had been 
historic strongholds of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine. 
While many political parties and movements advocate a moderate pro-Russian 
policy, a few pro-Russian political organizations are considered radical by observers. 
While their numbers are numerically small, their activities generate extended media 
coverage and commentary from politicians at the highest levels. These movements 
openly state their mission as the disintegration of Ukraine and restoration of Russia 
within the borders of the former Russian Empire (“Radical Russian Outcasts”, 2006).  
In the wake of Euromaidan and the 2014 Ukrainian revolution, a new wave of 
Pro-Russian unrest broke out in Ukraine. Beginning at the end of February 2014, 
demonstrations by pro-Russian and anti-government groups were held in major cities in 
eastern and southern Ukraine. Protests in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts escalated into an 
armed separatist insurgency that led to a military counteroffensive against the insurgents 
and to the War in Donbas shortly thereafter. Pro-Russian activists also led protests in 
Crimea, Kharkiv, and Odesa. 
Given that the Ukrainian constitution protects the status of Ukrainian as the sole 
state language of Ukraine and that altering this status would require the support of a 
majority of 300 votes in Parliament and a nationwide referendum, efforts to change 
current policy related to the state language of Ukraine “would, in all likelihood, be 
doomed to fail” (Moser, 2013, p. 35). In light of this situation, advocates for the Russian 
language in Ukraine have cited the European Charter for Regional and Minority 
Languages in their efforts to promote the Russian language in Ukraine. Moser (2013), 
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however, argues that the Russian language “has never been under threat in Ukraine, but 
on the contrary tends to threaten the vitality of the Ukrainian language” (36). He also 
posits that all major language policy changes since the ratification of the European 
Charter have been based on a misreading of the Charter because “Russian is by definition 
neither a regional nor a minority language in Ukraine” (36).  
In 2016, Russian continues to be widely used in eastern Ukraine, and in particular 
in Kyiv, Donbas, and Crimea, where both Russians and Russophone Ukrainians living in 
these territories use Russian on a daily basis and favor Russian-language press, media, 
and literature; at the same time, linguistic competence in and prestige of Ukrainian have 
grown significantly in these areas (Arel, 1996, 2002; Bilaniuk, 2005; Melnyk, 2005; 
Pavlenko, 2006; Savoskul, 2001; Wanner, 1998). According to Savoskul’s (2001) survey, 
46% of the population of the country favor the idea of making Russian a second official 
language (see also Menshikov, 2003), and efforts in this direction continue to the time of 
this writing.  
Russia’s Reaction to Post-Soviet Language Policy in Ukraine 
Intergovernmental relations between Ukraine and Russia have been volatile since 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and have since affected attitudes toward the Russian 
language. The overall perception of relations with Russia has relied largely on regional 
factors, particularly prior to the February 2014 revolution. Historically, those in the 
Russian-speaking eastern and southern regions, which are home to the majority of the 
Russian diaspora in Ukraine, have desired closer relations with Russian. Central and 
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western regions of Ukraine have historically expressed greater interest in closer ties with 
Europe.  
While speakers of Russian in Ukraine have expressed concern over the years 
about policies related to language use, Russia, too, has long posited that Ukrainianization 
efforts have alienated Russian-speakers in Ukraine and trampled on their rights. For over 
two decades, relations between Ukraine and Russia have played a significant role in 
Ukraine’s ongoing struggle to solve the language issue and create a unified nation.  
On the eve of his visit to Kyiv in May 1997 to sign the Black Sea Fleet 
agreements, former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin publicly expressed his 
concern about “the line, which is increasingly manifesting itself in Ukraine towards 
restriction and actually ousting of the Russian language and culture from the state and 
intellectual life of the society” (Interfax-Ukraine, 27 May 1997). A top aide to Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin told journalists in Kyiv a few days later that restrictions on the 
rights of Russian-speakers to Russian-language education and information would be on 
the agenda of the upcoming presidential summit that was to result in the signing of a 
friendship treaty between the two countries. The Russian State Duma then delayed 
ratification of the treaty for more than a year. According to one Russian lawmaker, his 
colleagues objected first and foremost to the “artificial restrictions” on the Russian 
language and insisted that these concerns be taken into account by Ukraine (Interfax-
Ukraine, 22 January 1998). When the State Duma approved the treaty in December 1998, 
this approval was accompanied by a separate statement that referred to restrictions on the 
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rights of Russian-speakers in Ukraine as an issue that needed to be resolved by Kyiv.21 
Georgii Tikhonov, who at the time headed the State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs and 
Ties with Compatriots, argued that Kyiv’s policies amounted to a “total pogrom against 
Russian culture” in Ukraine.22 While Tikhonov exaggerated the issue, his views 
proceeded from a frame of reference shared, at least at the time, by most of Russia’s 
political class. 
 This frame of reference does not accommodate the notion of Russians in Ukraine 
as an “ordinary” national minority. In mid-December 1999, Ukraine’s Constitutional 
Court issued a ruling declaring Ukrainian the “obligatory language of instruction in all 
state educational institutions of the county.” It stipulated that the use and study of 
languages of the national minorities, including Russian, required authorization. The 
Ukrainian language was also declared obligatory “on the entire territory of Ukraine in 
implementing the authority of the organs of state power and the organs of local self-
administration and in other spheres of public life” (Den’ 2 February 2000). These new 
Ukrainianization measures elicited a negative response from the Russian government, 
with the two governments engaging in a heated exchange that was soon termed a 
linguistic war (Savoskul, 2001). A month after the Ukrainian government issued the 
proposal, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted with a message to the 
Ukrainian embassy in Moscow, expressing the hope that Ukraine would implement its 
policies with regard to Russian-speakers in the spirit of the Ukrainian-Russian friendship 
                                                
21 For the text, see Sobranie zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2 (11 January 1999): 316-17. 
22 Kievskie vedomosti, 21 July 1998. 
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treaty. At the same time, it issued a statement criticizing Kyiv’s moves as a violation of 
Ukraine’s constitution.  
Later, when the Council on Questions of Language Policy attached to Kuchma’s 
office approved a draft decree “On Additional Measures to Broaden the Functioning of 
Ukrainian as the State Language,” which foresaw, among other things, screening state 
officials at all levels with respect to their knowledge and use of Ukrainian in the 
performance of their duties and completing the process of bringing language instruction 
in schools in line with the country’s national composition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in Moscow issued a statement asserting that “certain forces in Ukraine seem determined 
to create a phenomenon unseen in Europe before—to make the native language of the 
overwhelming majority of the population [sic] an actual outcast, reduce its status to 
marginal, and possibly even squeeze it out” (Interfax, 9 February 2000). Russia’s Human 
Rights Commissioner urged international organizations to increase their monitoring of 
the situation in Ukraine (RFE/RL Newsline 11 February 2000). In Kyiv, Russian rights 
activists appealed to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to render 
assistance in the observation of the rights of all citizens of Ukraine regardless of their 
origin or language. 
In 2008, Russia unilaterally withdrew from the Ukrainian-Russian 
intergovernmental agreement signed in 1997, and relations between the two countries 
further deteriorated during the Russo-Georgian war later that year. After Ukraine 
launched a bid in 2008 to join NATO, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke of 
Russia’s responsibility to ethnic Russians residing in Ukraine and challenged the 
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territorial integrity of Ukraine. Russian leaders, adamantly opposed to NATO 
enlargement, made it clear that they would not stand by and idly accept Ukraine’s 
transformation into a “Western bastion” (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 77). Fights over the price 
of natural gas in 2009 further strained relations between the two governments, and 
Russian president Dmitry Medvedev criticized Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko 
for his role in the deteriorating Russia-Ukraine relations.  
In 2013, the Russian Customs Service stopped the import of all goods coming 
from Ukraine, a move that some politicians saw as the beginning of a trade war against 
Ukraine in an effort to prevent Ukraine from signing a trade agreement with the European 
Union. According to Sergey Glazyev, President Putin’s chief economic adviser, trade 
restrictions with Ukraine were a warning against the “suicidal” step of signing an 
association agreement with European Union (“Trading”, 2013). Russia, which considers 
Ukraine part of its sphere of influence, continues to express dissatisfaction with 
Ukraine’s interest in closer ties with the European Union.  
A major rift in Ukraine-Russia relations resulted from the 2014 Ukrainian 
revolution. While pro-European protesters were expressing outrage over Kremlin-leaning 
Ukrainian president Yanukovych’s decision not to sign legislation that was to strengthen 
eventual ties with Europe and ultimately lead to Ukraine’s membership in the European 
Union, other protests were staged by groups of mainly ethnic Russians who opposed the 
events in Kyiv and wanted closer ties or integration with Russia. For Russian President 
Putin, the overthrow of Ukraine’s pro-Russian president was “the final straw” 
(Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 77). He responded by seizing Crimea, a peninsula with the 
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potential of hosting a NATO naval base. Ukraine responded with sanctions against 
Russia, and Russia responded with similar measures against Ukraine. Later that year, 
newly elected Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko stated that bilateral relations with 
Russia could not be normalized unless Russia returned control of Crimea to Ukraine.23  
In early 2015, Ukraine’s parliament registered a draft decree on suspending 
diplomatic relations with Russia, but the suspension did not take place. Since then, 
however, Ukraine has suspended military cooperation with Russia, banned all direct 
flights between Ukraine and Russia, and closed its air space to Russian aircraft. Since that 
time, Russian media reports characterizing Ukrainians as anti-Russian nationalists have 
resulted in an increase in negative attitudes toward Ukraine on the part of many Russians, 
and Russian support of separatist troops in eastern Ukraine have led to increased hostility 
toward Russia on the part of many Ukrainians. To date, under the guise of protecting the 
interests of Russians in Ukraine, Russia maintains aggressive action toward Ukraine in 
the areas of diplomacy, dissemination of information, military intervention, and 
economic sanctions. During this year’s St. Petersburg International Economic Forum 
(June 16-18), Putin indirectly accused NATO of acting to “scare the Russian-speaking 
population of southeastern Ukraine and Crimea” and declared that Moscow “simply had 
to take measures to protect certain social groups” in Ukraine (“Plenary”). Such 
statements on the part of Russian leaders continue to inflame the anti-Russia sentiment 
that has grown among Ukrainians since Euromaidan, and this climate of mutual mistrust 
                                                
23 As an artifact of post-colonialism, Putin’s seizure of Crimea harkens back to Soviet empirism. Twenty-
five years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Putin still seeks to control neighboring Belarus and 
Ukraine. His annexation of Crimea and occupation of portions of eastern Ukraine are reminiscent of 
Soviet—particularly Stalinist—efforts to acquire lands in an effort to enlarge his “empire.” 
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and hostility has resulted in a worsening of attitudes toward the Russian language since 
that time. 
EDUCATION POLICY IN UKRAINE: AN INTRODUCTION 
Language policy and language use in schools play a vital role in the development 
and dissemination of languages. As Besters-Dilger (2007) noted, instruction is 
understood to be a “crucial area” that “will decide the fate of the Ukrainian language, 
since as many are convinced, the use of the language…will have a decisive impact on the 
language preferences of Ukrainian youth” (258). Language policy in Ukrainian schools 
affects not only the fate of the Ukrainian language, but also the future of Russian and 
other minority languages within Ukraine. The idea of language policy as a “legally 
backed mechanism to organize, manage or manipulate language behaviors” (Bulajeva 
and Hogan-Brun, 2010, p. 80) indicates the importance of understanding the vast 
potential impact of legislation related to languages in schools. A review of historical 
policies related to language use in Ukrainian schools provides a context for this study. 
Education Policy in Ukraine Under Late Tsarist and Soviet Rule 
Tsarist policy denied the existence of Ukrainian as a separate language and the 
Ukrainian people as a distinct nation, a notion that persists among some to this day. This 
view of Ukrainian as a dialect of Russian was reflected in Alexander I’s educational 
reform law of 1804, which allowed for the teaching of the non-Russian languages of the 
Empire but did not include Ukrainian as one of them (Krawchenko, 1985). Consequently, 
Ukrainian was banned from schools both as a language of instruction and as a subject. 
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The absence of Ukrainian-language schools most often denied the Ukrainian peasantry 
access to education, which resulted in lower literacy rates among Ukrainians compared 
with Russians (Arel, 1993).  
After emerging victorious from the devastating civil war, the Bolsheviks 
overturned the Russification efforts that had defined the Tsarist era and introduced a 
national policy that intended to make the non-Russian languages and peoples equal in 
status to Russian and the Russians. They aimed to stimulate the use of non-Russian 
languages by providing education in the titular language (Arel, 1993).  
The Education Laws of 1923 and 1924 were created as a direct result of 
Korenizatsiya efforts, referred to in Ukraine as Ukrainizatsiya, or Ukrainianization. 
These laws stipulated that in areas predominantly populated by ethnic Ukrainians, pupils 
were to be instructed in Ukrainian. They also mandated that both Ukrainian and Russian 
be made compulsory subjects in all schools, regardless of the language of instruction. 
Furthermore, national minorities in compact settlements were guaranteed instruction in 
their native language if it was not Russian or Ukrainian.  
Aided by these two laws, access to Ukrainian-language schools rose sharply. 
Despite significant shortages of Ukrainian-language teachers and textbooks, 94% of 
ethnically Ukrainian schoolchildren and 76% of all pupils were enrolled in Ukrainian-
language schools by 1927. The large-scale introduction of Ukrainian-language schools 
increased the overall literacy rates of Ukrainians from 24% in 1920 to 42% in 1926 
(Krawchenko, 1985).  
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Stalin’s rise to power at the beginning of the 1930s ushered in anti-Korenizatsiya 
policies that led to significant repression of the Ukrainian language in all spheres. The 
Ukrainian Bolshevik leader Mykola Skrypnyk, who, as the People’s Commissar of 
Education, had led the cultural Ukrainianization efforts from 1925 to 1933, was one of 
the first victims of Stalin’s massive purges of Ukrainian state and party officials. When 
the Soviet Union introduced a union-wide educational plan in 1934, the regime offered a 
unified, state-mandated curriculum that detailed what was to be taught and which 
textbooks were to be used (Stepanenko, 1999). The principal function of education for a 
totalitarian state like the Soviet Union was to inculcate students with Marxist-Leninist 
ideology (Janmaat, 2000). Teachers were not allowed to express their opinions freely, 
parents were not given a say in school-related matters, and the creation of private and 
parochial schools was banned.  
The 1936 revised constitution of the USSR guaranteed instruction in languages 
other than Russian, but this provision was not enforced. Instead, a 1938 decree making 
Russian a compulsory subject beginning in the second grade greatly increased the number 
of hours of Russian language instruction and introduced courses in Russian culture and 
literature in all schools (Anderson and Silver, 1989; Krawchenko, 1985). At the same 
time, the content of Ukrainian literature and history courses was thoroughly revised and 
in secondary schools, courses in Ukrainian history were remove from the curriculum 
altogether (Janmaat, 2000). The proportion of pupils enrolled in Ukrainian-language 
schools fell from 88.5% in 1933 to 79% in 1940. 
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Unlike the Bolsheviks in Soviet Ukraine, the Poles, who had been granted most of 
former Austro-Hungarian Ukraine after World War I, discouraged the use of Ukrainian. 
Due to bureaucratic obstacles to opening and maintaining Ukrainian schools (all local 
administrations were entirely in Polish hands), the number of Ukrainian-language 
elementary schools dropped sharply. After the western Ukrainian lands were united with 
Soviet Ukraine following World War II, these lands were subject to the centralization and 
Russification policies under which the rest of the country operated.  
In 1938, the central government declared the study of Russian to be obligatory in 
the national schools. A nearly identical decree was ratified a month later at the Fourteenth 
Party Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party, under the direction of its newly 
appointed leader, Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev declared that, as of that day, “all of the 
peoples will be studying Russian” (Grenoble, 2003, p. 84). In other words, Russian 
became a required course of study throughout Ukraine and in every Soviet school, 
regardless of the language of instruction. 
In addition to Khrushchev’s policies, another much-criticized political act of the 
late 1950s led to even greater Russification in schools: the Kremlin’s move to pressure 
individual republics into making the titular language an optional subject in Russian-
language schools, while at the same time retaining the compulsory status of Russian 
language and literature for titular schools (Krawchenko, 1985; Solchanyk, 1985).  
Yet, the 1958 school reform that allowed parents to choose the language of 
primary instruction for their children, unpopular among the national intelligentsia in parts 
of the USSR, meant that non-Russian languages would slowly give way to Russian in 
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light of the pressures of survival and advancement. The gains of the past, already largely 
reversed during the Stalin era, were offset by the liberal attitude towards the requirement 
to study the local languages. (The requirement to study Russian remained.) Parents were 
generally free to choose the language of study for their children, and they often chose 
Russian, which reinforced the resulting Russification. At the time, successful careers 
required a good command of Russian, while knowledge of Ukrainian was not vital, so it 
was common for Ukrainian parents to send their children to Russian-language schools, 
even though Ukrainian-language schools were usually available. While Ukrainian was 
supposed to be learned as a second language at a level comparable to Russian, the 
instruction of the remaining school subjects was in Russian and, as a result, students 
possessed a greater command of Russian than Ukrainian upon graduation.  
The complete suppression of all expressions of separatism or Ukrainian 
nationalism also contributed to lessening interest in the Ukrainian language. Some people 
who persistently used Ukrainian on a daily basis were often perceived as expressing 
sympathy towards, or even being members of, the political opposition. This perception, 
combined with advantages given by Russian fluency and usage, made Russian the 
primary language of choice for many Ukrainians. In any event, the mild liberalization in 
Ukraine and elsewhere was stifled by a new suppression of freedoms at the end of the 
Khrushchev era (1963) when a policy of gradually creeping suppression of Ukrainian was 
re-instituted. 
Legislation that limited the use of Ukrainian was frequently met with opposition 
from Ukrainian Party officials and writers. For example, the 1958 decision of the USSR 
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Council of Ministers to rescind obligatory mother-tongue instruction in native schools 
was looked upon unfavorably by high-ranking Communist Party officials in Ukraine. The 
two Ukrainian deputies who were involved in drafting the Supreme Soviet decision 
argued for maintaining mother-tongue study, an argument that was also voiced in the 
press by the secretary of the Kiev Region Party committee, published in the Party journal 
Komunist Ukrainy. Party members of the writers’ union in Kiev argued in favor of 
parental control over the language of instruction in schools. For many, this pressure was a 
sign not only of Russification, but also creeping centralization of the education system, a 
process that was formalized in the mid-1960s with the creation of a ministry of education 
at the Union level. This ministry took over many of the powers of the republican 
ministries and standardized the curricula of elementary and secondary schools throughout 
the Soviet Union (Bilinsky, 1968). In the 1970s, the USSR Ministry of Education took 
further steps to expand and improve the teaching of Russian in titular schools by, among 
other things, paying teachers of Russian fifteen percent more than they paid titular 
language teachers (Arel, 1993). 
In 1959, Khrushchev accelerated Russification by introducing a controversial law 
that granted parents the right to choose the language of instruction for their children. As a 
result, the Bolsheviks’ policy of making the language of instruction dependent on the 
ethnic composition of the local population was abandoned (Arel, 1993). Given that in 
Ukraine many vuzy24 functioned exclusively in Russian, the law had the intended effect 
                                                
24 Vuz is singular and vuzy is plural for institutions of higher education. From the Russian acronym вуз: 
“higher educational establishment.” 
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of encouraging Ukrainian parents to send their children to Russian-language schools. The 
proportion of Ukrainian-instructed pupils declined from 74% in 1956 to 47.5% in 1988, 
and the percentage of Russian-instructed pupils rose accordingly. This creeping 
Russification of the school system angered many nationally conscious Ukrainians in the 
Glasnost years (Janmaat, 2000). 
While glasnost and perestroika resulted in new demands for language equality on 
the part of Soviet citizens of non-Russian titular languages, in Ukraine, the opposition 
movement, Rukh, found it much more difficult to mobilize the titular population, as a 
large proportion of the population was Russian-speaking. Immediately following the 
retirement of the conservative First Secretary of the CPU in September 1989, the 
Ukrainian Supreme Soviet passed the “Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR,” which 
made Ukrainian the sole state language. In terms of education, the law established the 
following regulations: 
1. The free choice of the language of instruction is an inalienable right of the 
citizens of the Ukrainian SSR; 
2. The Ukrainian SSR guarantees each child the right to be brought up and to 
receive education in its national language; 
3. In the schools of the Ukrainian SSR, teaching will be done in Ukrainian. In 
places of compact settlements25 of civilians or other nationalities, schools can be 
established in which the language of teaching will be their national language or 
another language; 
                                                
25 The law did not specify what was meant by “compact settlement.” 
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4. In schools, separate classes can be created in which the language of teaching is 
Ukrainian or the language of people of a different nationality; 
5. In all schools, the study of the Ukrainian language and the Russian language is 
compulsory 
6. In institutions of special secondary, professional technical, and higher 
education of the Ukrainian SSR, Ukrainian is the language of teaching. In places 
of settlement of a majority of citizens of other nationalities, the language of 
teaching is in their national language, alongside Ukrainian; 
7. In the above-mentioned institutions, groups can also be created with the 
Russian language of instruction in cases determined by the appropriate organs of 
state administration; 
8. In all groups with the Russian language of instruction and in non-Ukrainian 
institutions, irrespective of their departmental subordination, the study of the 
Ukrainian language is guaranteed; 
9. Students wishing admission to an institution of higher or specialized secondary 
education have to take a Ukrainian-language entrance exam on a competitive 
basis. The manner in which entrance exams are taken by persons not having been 
attested in Ukrainian is determined by the Ministry of Higher and Specialized 
Secondary Education of the Ukrainian SSR.  
If we look closely at them, we see the contradictory nature of some of these regulations. 
For example, the first regulation is a reiteration of Khrushchev’s decree and implies that 
the amount of Ukrainian- and Russian-language instruction is determined by parental 
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need, whereas the three other principals state that nationality, not parental need, should 
determine the language of instruction. If rules number 2, 3 and 4 are enforced, it is 
possible that in areas that are predominantly Ukrainian-speaking, parental demands for 
Russian-language education may be denied, rendering the first regulation void. If the first 
regulation is followed, the share of Russian-language education in certain areas may far 
exceed the share of ethnic Russians in the local population, which runs counter to the 
other rules. According to Arel (1995), the first regulation, the one that guarantees the free 
choice of the language of instruction, was not a part of the draft version of the law and 
was added following parliamentary debates. Members of the Rukh movement were 
disappointed by this addition, because they specifically blamed the freedom-of-choice 
clause for the large numbers of Ukrainian pupils attending Russian-language schools in 
the south and east (Janmaat, 2000).  
Following the passage of the Law on Languages, implementing its regulations 
proved difficult, and little changed in terms of language use in education (Arel, 1995). 
Leading state and party officials feared a backlash both from ethnic Ukrainians and 
Russians, and not enough of the population of Ukraine was fully proficient in Ukrainian 
and able to implement the law. Furthermore, lawmakers had failed to outline penalties for 
non-compliance, which may have contributed to the slow execution of the law. Schools 
were granted a period of ten years to switch to Ukrainian. In the school year following 
the adoption of the law, the number of pupils instructed in Ukrainian increased by only 
0.4 percent nationwide when compared to the year before (Janmaat, 2000).  
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In 1991, per a decree from the increasingly nationalist Cabinet of Ministers, the 
State Program on the Development of the Ukrainian Language was implemented. 
Although the document served primarily to specify the terms of implementation of the 
Law on Languages, it also changed some regulations and added some new ones. For 
example, instead of repeating the freedom of choice principal, the program urged state 
organs to “create conditions to ensure the constitutional right of citizens to educate their 
children in their native language” (Article 21). According to Janmaat (2000), the word 
“native” was meant to be interpreted as “national,” because the next sentence calls for the 
introduction of a “network of educational institutions in accordance with the national 
composition and the needs of the population” (Article 22). In other words, this measure 
stipulated that the amount of Ukrainian-language and Russian-language education should 
correspond to the number of ethnic Ukrainians and Russians in the local population. The 
program offered a detailed timetable that specified when the optimal number of 
Ukrainian-language kindergartens and schools had to be reached in each oblast. Oblasts 
in the east and south were granted ten years to comply with the regulations, just as they 
had been by the Law on Languages. These measures were likely based on the idea that 
pupils should receive instruction in the language of their parents’ nationality in order to 
preserve their own national identity. One can safely argue, continues Janmaat (2000), that 
the real intent of these measures was to force the large group of Russian-speaking 
Ukrainians in the east and south to send their children to Ukrainian-language schools. 
Naturally, the principle of freedom of choice worked against this intention. In an effort to 
avoid having Ukrainians send their children to Russian-language schools, the Ministry of 
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Education sought to make Ukrainian-language education more appealing. Shortly after 
the adoption of the state program, Russian schools were directed to open Ukrainian 
classes—Ukrainian-language curricula for select groups of students—if they received 
eight to ten requests from parents to have their child instructed in Ukrainian. Given that 
the average size of classes was about thirty students, the Ministry clearly speculated that 
small classes would persuade parents to enroll their children in Ukrainian classes. 
Interestingly, the reverse did not hold; Ukrainian-language schools were not obligated to 
open Russian classes (Janmaat, 2000).  
In conjunction with the requirement to open Ukrainian classes in Russian-
language schools, the Ministry ordered all Russian-language schools that were formerly 
Ukrainian-language schools to open only Ukrainian first-grade classes as of the fall of 
1992. Although the measure appeared to be at odds with the principle of freedom of 
choice, education officials were able to justify the order by stating that the mandate did 
not forbid parents to choose the language of instruction for their child; the nearest 
Russian-language school might simply be farther away. This increased distance, Janmaat 
argues, could have acted as a powerful incentive for parents to consider sending their 
Russian-speaking children to a Ukrainian school, as many parents valued the proximity 
of their children’s school (64).  
Education Policy in Post-Soviet Ukraine 
After the failed coup attempt against Gorbachev’s reforms in Moscow in August 
1991, members of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet quickly cast off communist allegiances 
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and declared Ukraine an independent state. Their newly found patriotism did not lead to 
an insistence on the use of the Ukrainian language, however, as the country’s leadership 
did not wish to alienate the Russians and other minorities. In October 1991, the national 
parliament, renamed the Supreme Rada [Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy], adopted the Law on 
Ukrainian Citizenship, which made all residents of Ukraine state citizens and removed 
the line used to indicate nationality in internal passports. In basing nationality on 
geographical residence rather than ethnicity, the Ukrainian government drew praise from 
European human rights watchdog organizations (Deychakiwsky, 1994). Another piece of 
legislation designed to convince national minorities that the Ukrainian lawmakers 
embraced an inclusive concept of nationhood was the November 1991 Declaration of the 
Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine. It guaranteed all nations and national groups the right 
to use their mother tongue in all spheres of public life, including education. Liberal as 
this declaration may seem, however, it also made the nationality of a person and not his 
or her first language the criterion for the use of a language other than Ukrainian in public 
spheres. Thus, it recognized minorities on national grounds, not on linguistic ones. As 
such, the declaration tacitly approved the intention of the state program to encourage 
Russian-speaking Ukrainians to speak Ukrainian (Janmaat, 2000).  
While post-independence policy-making focused heavily on promoting the use of 
Ukrainian in the public domain, the most drastic measures by far to promote the use of 
Ukrainian over other languages were taken in the field of education (Arel, 1995), and as a 
result, the use of Ukrainian as the main language of instruction has increased dramatically 
since independence (Bilaniuk and Melnyk, 2008). Following Ukraine’s declaration of 
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independence, government authorities pledged to introduce sweeping reforms in the 
education system. In practice, however, the centralized education system, a relic of the 
Soviet era, kept school education almost totally in state hands. While the educational 
system saw a brief interlude in the 1990s when parents, teachers and regional school 
authorities were granted greater freedom in determining their own curricula, this 
temporary relaxation of the regime may have been a result of Kyiv’s inability to quickly 
restore central control, not a genuine desire to give schools more freedom of movement. 
Indeed, the Ministry of Education quickly resumed control of schools and regional 
authorities once it had prepared new programs and procured new textbooks in the mid-
nineties (Janmaat, 2000).  
Dissatisfied with the slow rate of growth of Ukrainian-language instruction, the 
Minister of Education, Petro Talunchuk, accused the heads of schools of ignoring the 
stipulations of the State Program and sought to find new ways to reach the goals outlined 
in the legislation. He decreed that the network of first-graders be brought in line with the 
national composition of the population in each region by 1 September 1993. By focusing 
on first-grade students instead of all students, he allowed students already enrolled in 
Russian classes to continue their Russian-language education. Using this gradual 
approach, Talunchuk hoped to persuade local educational authorities to comply with the 
legislation.  
Despite these measures, those in the Ministry of Education remained deeply 
dissatisfied with the results of their efforts to increase levels of Ukrainian-language 
instruction in schools. In July 1993, Talanchuk wrote a letter to schools in which he 
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complained that local educational authorities in the south and east were obstructing 
efforts to increase Ukrainian-language instruction by allowing too many Russian schools 
to declare themselves to be lyceums, gymnasiums or colleges26 (Zbirnyk Minosvity, 1993, 
No. 19). To end this practice, the Minister suggested that these new types of schools be 
opened with Ukrainian as the language of instruction. By permitting local authorities to 
open only Ukrainian-language lyceums and gymnasiums, the Ministry surely hoped to 
encourage Russian-language schools to switch to Ukrainian before applying for such 
higher-status designations (Arel, 1995). Another administrative incentive for Russian-
language schools to adopt Ukrainian as their language of instruction was Talanchuk’s 
order to give schools transferring to Ukrainian priority in receiving textbooks, a strong 
incentive considering the historic shortage of textbooks in Ukraine (Janmaat, 2000, p. 
67).  
Talanchuk further denounced what he perceived as bureaucratic obstacles for 
parents wishing to send their children to Ukrainian classes or Ukrainian-language 
schools. He forbade schools to demand official written requests from these parents. In his 
opinion, only parents wishing to enroll their children in schools that had languages of 
instruction other than Ukraine could be asked to write a special letter of application. With 
these measures, Talanchuk clearly wanted to indicate that Ukrainian-language schools 
and schools with other languages of instruction were not to be treated as equals; the 
former were to be the norm, the latter, the exception (Janmaat, 2000). For admittance to 
the former, there would be no obstacles whatsoever, and if parents did not apply for a 
                                                
26 Brief definitions of these various types of educational institutions can be found later in this chapter. 
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specific language of instruction, their children would automatically be assigned to a 
Ukrainian-language school. Obviously, posits Janmaat (2000), the Ministry hoped that 
parental passivity would result in many children being enrolled in Ukrainian-language 
schools.  
Evolving education policies affected not only the language of classroom 
instruction in Ukraine but also the school curricula, including the teaching of Russian 
language and literature. In January 1993, the First Deputy Minister of Education 
informed educational authorities that as of the beginning of the 1993-1994 school year, 
Russian literature would cease to be taught as a separate subject in Ukrainian schools 
(Zbirnyk Minosvity, 1993, No. 5). Certain works of Russian literature would instead be 
included in the course entitled “World Literature” and would make up no more than one-
fourth of the total curriculum of the course. Ukrainian-language schools were further 
allowed to cease offering courses in Russian language altogether, in violation of the 
Language Law, which held that Russian was a compulsory subject in all schools.  
Russian language and literature had been prominent subjects in Soviet-era 
Ukrainian schools, but following Ukrainian independence, the teaching of Russian began 
to decline. While certain municipalities had begun removing Russian language and 
literature from their curricula several years earlier, the subjects were removed altogether 
from the 1997-1998 curriculum for all Ukrainian-language schools. The removal of these 
subjects from the curriculum did not mean, however, that the Russian language was 
banned from Ukrainian-language schools. Instead, Ukrainian-language schools had three 
options for continuing with Russian-language education: 1) as a compulsory foreign 
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language, 2) as an optional subject chosen by the school, or 3) as an optional subject 
chosen by individual students (Janmaat, 2000).  
Education Policy in the Self-Proclaimed People’s Republics and Crimea 
Three geographical areas of Ukraine that fell under Ukrainian jurisdiction until 
the spring of 2014 and are still considered by the Ukrainian government to be Ukrainian 
territory include the Donetsk People’s Republic, the Luhansk People’s Republic, and 
Crimea. Although the official status of these territories is disputed, the Ukrainian 
government considers these lands to be Ukrainian territories, so information about 
Russian-language education in these areas is included in this dissertation.  
The Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) is a self-proclaimed state in eastern 
Ukraine, bordering the Russian Federation, the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), and 
Ukraine. It declared independence from Ukraine in May of 2014. The Luhansk People’s 
Republic has its own government and ministry of education. The northern portion of 
Luhansk Oblast, which is predominantly Ukrainian-speaking, has remained under 
Ukrainian control.  
The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is a self-proclaimed state in the Donetsk 
Oblast of Ukraine that declared independence from Ukraine in April of 2014. Although 
the DPR receives humanitarian aid and military support from Russia, the state is not 
recognized by Russia or Ukraine. In fact, no entities other than the Republic of South 
Ossetia recognize the sovereignty of the Donetsk People’s Republic. Like the Luhansk 
People’s Republic, the DPR has its own government and ministries, including a ministry 
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of education. By the beginning of the 2015-2016 academic year, the ministry of 
education had overhauled the curriculum, decreasing the number of hours per week 
devoted to the study of Ukrainian from around eight hours a week to two, while at the 
same time increasing the number of hours devoted to Russian language and literature.  
The grading system was changed from Ukraine’s twelve-point system to Russia’s five-
point system. According to an August 2015 article in The Guardian, graduates of schools 
in the DPR receive diplomas that are supposed to allow them to enter universities in 
Russia (“Rebel-Held”). However, in an e-mail to the author in June of 2016, the director 
of a school in the non-occupied area of the Donetsk Oblast reported that students in the 
DPR earn diplomas that are recognized neither by Ukraine nor by Russia. According to 
this director, the Ukrainian government has created opportunities for children in occupied 
territories to obtain a diploma and enroll in institutions of higher education in Ukraine, 
but the authorities within the occupied territories strictly monitor these students and take 
measures to prevent such activities.  
According to its Law on Education, the DPR guarantees education in state 
languages and a choice of language of instruction within the capabilities of the 
educational system. Citizens of the DPR have the right to be educated in their native 
language, provided the language is that of a recognized ethnic group living within the 
territory of the DPR.  
Like the Ukrainian-controlled northern areas of the Luhansk Oblast, only the 
eastern territory of the Donetsk Oblast is occupied by separatist troops. In areas that are 
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not occupied, the governmental system, including the education system and language 
curriculum, has not changed.  
Crimea, administered de facto by the Russian Federation and de jure by Ukraine, 
was annexed by Russia in 2014 following the ousting of the Ukrainian president and the 
subsequent takeover of the region by pro-Russian separatists and Russian special forces. 
Russia incorporated Crimea as two federal subjects: the Republic of Crimea and the 
federal city of Sevastopol. Although Russia has control over Crimea, sovereignty over the 
Peninsula remains disputed as Ukraine and the majority of the international community 
view the annexation as having been illegal.  
EDUCATION SYSTEM IN UKRAINE 
In order to contextualize language policy in Ukraine, it is helpful to understand 
the current structure of the Ukrainian education system and the content of the language 
curricula. 
Structure  
According to the Ukrainian law “On Education,” children in Ukraine are required 
to attend eleven years of schooling. Elementary education—accreditation level I—
comprises grades one through four. Basic (lower secondary) education—accreditation 
level II—includes grades five through nine. Senior (upper secondary) education—
accreditation level III—includes grades ten and eleven. 
Children start school at the age of six or seven, generally depending on when their 
birthday falls in the year. The option to complete primary education in three years is 
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provided by law, and it is not uncommon for some children—particularly gifted 
children—to be admitted directly into the second grade. 
Basic compulsory general secondary education lasts five years (grades five 
through nine) and is provided by basic secondary schools. After finishing ninth grade and 
passing final examinations, students are awarded the Certificate of Basic General 
Secondary Education. This certificate allows graduates to either continue education at the 
senior (upper) secondary school level or pursue further education in professional trade 
schools, technical schools, or vocational schools. 
At the end of grade eleven, successful graduates receive the Certificate of 
Complete General Secondary Education. Those students receiving a complete secondary 
education integrated with vocational training can be issued a Diploma of Qualified 
Worker or Junior Specialist in addition to a Certificate of Complete General Secondary 
Education. 
Types of Schools 
There are several types of public educational institutions in Ukraine, including 
middle schools of general education; lyceums, which carried the name tekhnikum under 
the Soviet system, and gymnasiums. There are also boarding schools, which are referred 
to as school-internats or lyceum-internats. Educational institutions provide one, two, or 
all three levels of education. Students generally study in the same school throughout their 
primary and secondary education. 
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The term middle school [zahal'noosvitnya shkola], or ZOSh, refers to institutions 
that combine primary and secondary education. As such, most middle schools offer all 
three levels of education (grades one through eleven). Some remote schools meet only the 
minimum requirement for education in Ukraine: first and second levels of accreditation 
(grades one through nine).  
General schools with intensive programs in certain subjects such as foreign 
languages, science, fine arts, and music are referred to as specialized schools. 
Gymnasiums are level II-III elite schools with intensive programs in a particular subject 
or subjects in accordance with the school’s specialization. Lyceums are level III elite 
schools providing specialized education and pre-vocational training.  
Private schools began operating in Ukraine in the early 1990s (1992-1993). By 
the late 1990s, rates of private education in Ukraine remained insignificant, with private 
schools enrolling less than 1 percent of all students in 1998-1999. The number of students 
attending private schools increased significantly in the beginning of the 2000s and 
reached 23,700 students in 2007-2008.  
Curriculum  
Since 1991, the basic curriculum in Ukrainian schools has consisted of two main 
types of courses: state-mandated and school-mandated. The state-mandated component of 
the curriculum is determined by the Ministry of Education and Science (MoES) of 
Ukraine and is obligatory for all secondary educational institutions. In consultation with 
parents and community organizations, individual institutions develop the school-
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mandated components of the curriculum, which are designed to meet the needs of the 
individual objectives of the school. All curricula include approximately three to ten of 
these school-mandated hours per week. All students in a given school attend both state-
mandated and school-mandated courses, and if there are more than twenty-seven students 
in a group, the group may be divided into two for state-mandated courses and language 
courses. Elective and extra-curricular courses are offered in addition to state-mandated 
and school-mandated courses.  
LANGUAGE EDUCATION IN UKRAINE 
While the majority of Ukrainian students attend schools in which Ukrainian is the 
primary language of instruction, schooling is also offered in Russian and other minority 
languages (Romanian, Hungarian, Moldovan, and Polish). These so-called minority-
language schools are located in areas where those languages have been declared to be 
regional languages per the 2012 law that stipulates that a language spoken by at least 
10% of an oblast's population may be elevated to the status of regional language. 
Ukrainian Language 
Changes in language and education policy in post-Soviet Ukraine have resulted in 
a significant increase in the percentage of Ukrainian schoolchildren studying in 
Ukrainian-language schools. As the sole state language of Ukraine, Ukrainian is a 
required subject in all Ukrainian schools, including those in which instruction takes place 
in a regional language. Due to the fact that students in Ukraine take exit exams in 
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Ukrainian, there is a significant incentive for parents to send their children to Ukrainian-
language schools.  
Russian Language 
Just as the ideal status of Russian in Ukraine as a whole is a matter of debate, so 
too is the role of Russian in Ukrainian schools. While Russian is taught as a native 
language in Russian-language schools and classes, its role in Ukrainian-language schools 
differs from that of a foreign language. Bulajeva and Hogan-Brun (2010) noted that in 
Soviet times, Russian was considered a second rather than a foreign language. This 
phenomenon laid the expectation and curricular space for an alternative foreign language, 
like English, to take the place of Russian after 1991.  
As a minority language in Ukraine, Russian may be a language of instruction or 
be studied as a school-mandated, elective, or extracurricular course, depending on the 
school. Russian was a required course in all Ukrainian schools from 1938 until Ukraine 
gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, but now Russian is a required 
course only in Russian-language schools, for students in Russian-language classes within 
Ukrainian-language schools, and for students in schools that have opted to include 
Russian within their school-mandated curricula.  
Foreign Languages 
Four foreign languages are commonly taught in Ukrainian schools: English, 
German, French, and Spanish. The most commonly taught foreign language is English. In 
terms of a second foreign language, the most common languages offered are English, 
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German, French, Spanish, and Chinese. Students who study in Ukrainian-language 
schools study both a foreign language and a second foreign language beginning in fifth 
grade. In schools specializing in foreign languages, compulsory foreign language 
education begins in the first grade and a second foreign language is introduced in the fifth 
grade. 
World Literature 
In Ukrainian-language schools, World Literature (zarubizhna/zarubezhnaya 
literatura) courses include not only works of Russian literature, but also literature from 
other countries. Russian literature makes up no more than 10-13% of the literature 
offered in these courses (e-mail message to author, April 16, 2016). During the study of 
Russian-language works, the use of Russian is allowed, just as English may be used when 
discussing American and British works, and German may be heard during discussions of 
German works, depending on the level of language proficiency of the teachers and their 
students. Teachers work with texts translated into Ukrainian, but to understand the works 
better, teachers occasionally refer to them in their original language. In Russian-language 
schools, World Literature is replaced with an integrated course entitled Literature, in 
which students focus primarily on the works of Russian writers in Russian.  
 
Given Ukraine’s history of ethnic, political, and social conflict, language policy 
plays a pivotal role in education, in that language and education policy have the potential 
to unite or divide the next generation of Ukrainian citizens. Pavlenko (“I Never Knew,” 
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2003) argues that “classroom discourses play an important role in shaping students’ 
membership in […] communities and legitimizing new identity options” (266), and these 
new options include those that strengthen a sense of national unity among Ukrainians. 
Indeed, classrooms “can either reproduce existing power structures and narrowly defined 
identity categories or create conditions for challenging and reimagining them” (Friedman 
2016, p. 166). As such, policies related to language and education can be powerful tools 




Chapter 4: Methodology and Description of Study 
Just two months after undertaking this project in September 2013, a wave of 
demonstrations and civil unrest broke out in Ukraine in response to unexpected actions 
on the part of then-President Viktor Yanukovych: his decision to suspend preparations to 
sign the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement. This agreement had been 
created in an effort to establish a political and economic association between Ukraine, the 
European Union, and The European Atomic Energy Community, and proponents of the 
alliance had heralded it as a step toward closer European integration. Although Ukraine 
had appeared to be moving closer to a democratic model following the Orange 
Revolution of 2004-2005, corruption and political infighting continued to plague 
independent Ukraine in the years that followed. Although continued internal political 
issues garnered less international attention in the wake of the Orange Revolution, the 
public protests of 2013 again thrust the nation into the world’s spotlight and brought 
attention to the “stark deterioration of democracy and the rule of law” that had prevented 
it from achieving integration into the European Union (“EU Leaders”). These protests 
ultimately led to the 2014 Ukrainian revolution, the flight of President Yanukovych and 
other high government officials from the country, and the removal of Yanukovych from 
office. The unrest also led, in March of 2014, to two major events: Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea and the beginning of an armed conflict with pro-Russian forces in the Donbas 
region of Ukraine that has continued into 2016. The ongoing ramifications of this 
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political turmoil and the significant destabilization of the nation of Ukraine as a whole 
greatly affected the research methodology for this dissertation. 
The original plan was to collect data via face-to-face interviews with teachers of 
Russian in Ukraine during the fall of 2015. In 2014, however, major funding for research 
in Ukraine was suspended by the United States Department of State, and Ukraine was 
added to the University of Texas restricted regions list. Since travel to the country as a 
whole was deemed a “medium” risk, and travel to warring regions in the eastern part of 
the country was assigned a risk rating of “extreme,” the likelihood of obtaining special 
authorization to conduct research in Ukraine was slim. As such, plans to conduct research 
in-country were abandoned, and research was conducted remotely from the United States.  
While data could not be gathered on the ground in Ukraine in 2015, the urgency 
to report on the unique perspectives and experiences of teachers grew even stronger as a 
result of the fast-changing political climate. The goal was that ultimately, the voice of 
language teachers during this time of turmoil in Ukraine would add an important human 
dimension to this research and set it apart from faceless lists of statistics, declarations 
posted on social media, and carefully composed sound bites broadcast on news programs 
throughout the world. It was hoped that reporting these teachers’ experiences would lead 
to a more nuanced understanding of the impact of politics on the status of Russian and 
Russian-language education in Ukraine, in essence, an ethnographic portrait and critical 
description of how political turmoil has impacted teachers of Russian and the teaching of 
Russian during a time of internal conflict and upheaval. So while conducting research 
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remotely presented certain challenges during the process of collecting data, every effort 
was made to reach teachers and collect as much valuable information as possible.   
PRE-DISSERTATION BETA STUDY 
In the fall of 2014, a beta study was conducted to test potential questions being 
considered for inclusion in the dissertation research. The purpose of the beta study was to 
analyze data collected from teachers of Russian in Ukraine by means of a five-page 
questionnaire (see Appendices 1 and 2). The questionnaire, distributed in Russian, 
gathered information about teachers’ educational backgrounds and work experience, 
language preparation, the schools where they taught and their working conditions, the 
challenges they faced in their work as teachers of Russian, and their personal opinions 
regarding the status of Russian in Ukraine and the future of the Russian language within 
the Ukrainian educational system. Due to the relatively small number of respondents—
thirty-three—it was understood that the data offered a window into the experiences of a 
small group of teachers of Russian in Ukraine but did not pretend to describe fully and 
accurately the experiences of Russian-language teachers in Ukraine as a whole. 
Responses to the questionnaire informed the shape and scope of the interview questions 
later used to gather primary data for the dissertation.   
Knowledge gained while conducting the beta study led to greater overall 
preparation for, and execution of, the research study itself. First, many areas of interest 
related to Russian-language education in Ukraine could not be explored within the scope 
of a single study, so preparing for and conducting the beta study helped narrow the focus 
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of the research. Second, analyzing the responses gathered from teachers in the beta study 
led to greater insight into how best to phrase interview questions in order to elicit 
successfully the data needed to address the research questions for the study. Questions 
that did not elicit appropriate or relevant data were not included in the final interview 
protocol. Third, the format and content of the questionnaire, which was carefully 
constructed and revised based on feedback received from native speakers of Russian, was 
easily adapted for later transformation into the pre-interview questionnaire designed to 
gather demographic information from interviewees. Fourth, optional contact information 
provided by participants in the beta study served as a starting point in the recruitment of 
teachers for the actual dissertation research study.  
Distribution of Beta Study Questionnaires  
After the final version of the beta study questionnaire was completed, electronic 
copies were e-mailed to contacts in Ukraine for distribution to teachers of Russian. 
Copies of the questionnaire were also e-mailed directly to schools whose addresses were 
found through Internet searches. A letter of introduction and support from the faculty 
advisor for this study accompanied each copy of the questionnaire. In total, the 
questionnaire was distributed to 320 teachers of Russian in fifteen Ukrainian cities. 
Thirty-three completed questionnaires, or approximately 10% of those originally sent out, 
were returned. A variety of factors contributed to a relatively low response rate: the 
researcher’s not being in Ukraine to distribute the questionnaires personally and instead 
having to rely on contacts there to help distribute them; a lack of personal contacts 
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outside of a handful of cities; little incentive for teachers to complete the questionnaire; a 
general distrust of requests for help received through unsolicited e-mail; the lack of 
complete anonymity for teachers, as completed questionnaires had to be returned by e-
mail; the extra steps that were required to print out, complete, scan and return the 
questionnaires; a largely older population of Russian teachers lacking access to 
technology or not being as familiar and comfortable with technology as younger 
generations; hesitation to express opinions or to put them in writing; the sensitive nature 
of language issues in Ukraine; and a general tension in Ukraine related to recent political 
unrest and the ongoing civil war being fought in the eastern part of that country.  
Beta Study Findings 
Of the thirty-three teachers who returned questionnaires to the researcher, nine of 
the respondents, or 27%, taught at schools where Russian was the language of instruction, 
whereas twenty-four, or 73%, taught at schools where Ukrainian was the language of 
instruction. Due to a strong movement toward more Ukrainian-language instruction in 
schools following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it was not surprising that more 
than twice as many respondents to the questionnaire taught at schools with Ukrainian as 
the language of instruction as did those who taught in schools where Russian was the 
medium of instruction.  
In terms of geographical representation, responses were received from teachers 
from across Ukraine, primarily from urban areas. Thirteen responses came from teachers 
in Kyiv, the nation’s capital, which lies in the north and falls roughly on the dividing line 
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between what is historically considered eastern and western Ukraine. Five responses were 
received from Odesa, a largely Russian-speaking city in southern Ukraine; four from 
Kharkiv in the north, two from Dnipropetrovsk in south-central Ukraine, and one from 
Donetsk in eastern Ukraine, all Russian-speaking areas; four from Lutsk and one from 
Vinnytsia, largely Ukrainian-speaking cities in western Ukraine; and three from the 
villages of Velyka Volytsya and Liubar, also in the Ukrainian-speaking western part of 
the country. 
Russian was a required course in two-thirds of the schools where the respondents 
taught, and an elective course in one-third of the schools. Ukrainian was the language of 
instruction in all but four of the schools represented. In the four non-Ukrainian-language 
schools—of which two were located in Kyiv, one in Odesa, and one in Kharkiv—Russian 
was the language of instruction. Of the thirty-three teachers surveyed, ten taught Russian 
as a native language, and eleven taught it as a second foreign language (five beginning in 
first grade, one beginning in second grade, one beginning in third grade, and four 
beginning in fifth grade). The multi-layered status of the Russian language in Ukraine, 
however, complicated the question of whether Russian was taught as a first, second, or 
foreign language, and twelve teachers wrote in their own descriptions of the status of the 
Russian language within their schools. Seven teachers specified that they taught Russian 
as an elective course. Three teachers indicated that they taught Russian as a national 
minority language. One teacher explained that she taught in a bilingual setting, with 
Ukrainian as the state language and Russian as a regional language. And one teacher, 
who teaches at a school that offers instruction to some students in Ukrainian and to others 
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in Russian, indicated that she taught Russian as both a native and a second language. 
Notably, two teachers from the same Ukrainian-language school offered differing 
descriptions of the role of Russian in their institution, which, together with commentary 
provided by teachers, indicates that even two decades after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and the Soviet-era education system in Ukraine, the status of Russian in Ukrainian 
schools remains unresolved. 
An average of four teachers of Russian worked at the schools where respondents 
taught. All but four teachers of the thirty-three respondents taught other courses as well, 
including math, Ukrainian language and literature, world literature, natural science, 
health, art, industrial arts, and literacy. Only elementary-school teachers taught such a 
wide variety of courses, because for them, Russian language was just one of many 
subjects they taught. The teachers taught Russian an average of eight hours per week, and 
their overall teaching load averaged seventeen hours per week. One teacher, the director 
of a Russian-language school in Kyiv, did not teach Russian language at all; she taught 
Russian literature eight hours a week. In addition to teaching Russian, six of the thirty-
three teachers—about 16%—taught elective courses as well: two taught basic courses in 
Christian ethics, another taught courses in world art and classical literature, a fourth 
taught a course entitled “Literary Mosaic” to sixth-graders, a fifth taught a special course 
entitled “Images of World Literature Within the Musical Arts,” and a sixth teacher led a 
course related to the literary museum housed at her school.  
Other information solicited in the beta study questionnaires included teachers’ 
opinions about the textbooks used in Russian classes. The names and publishers of the 
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textbooks were collected, along with teachers’ ratings and commentaries about them. On 
a scale of one to ten, with ten being the highest score, teachers gave an average rating of 
8 to their Russian-language textbooks in terms of how they corresponded to the academic 
programs of their schools. They rated their textbooks slightly lower, an average of 7.7, 
with regard to how they met the needs of their students. The advantages teachers cited 
regarding their textbooks included the inclusion of good texts for the development of 
conversation skills, the presence of theoretical material, large print (this from a teacher 
who had taught Russian for forty-eight years), good exercises for pair or group work, 
color illustrations, and an overall feeling, particularly among teachers in Kyiv, that the 
textbooks adhered to the guidelines of the academic program in Russian. It is unclear 
whether the teachers in Kyiv were referring to school-specific or national Russian-
language curricula, because contrary to teachers in Kyiv, teachers in Lutsk, in western 
Ukraine, felt that their textbooks did not align with the academic programs of their 
schools at all. In terms of negative feedback about the textbooks, teachers mentioned a 
lack of explicit grammar instruction, “boring” texts, insufficient time to cover the 
material, not enough theoretical background, and not enough quality exercises, 
particularly in grammar, spelling and punctuation.  
Teachers were also surveyed about the supplementary materials used in class, the 
technology available to them in the classroom and which kinds they used, how well their 
students spoke Russian, what specific difficulties their students experienced as they 
learned Russian, and what kinds of Russian-language-related extracurricular events their 
students participated in. 
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Following questions about their schools and working conditions, teachers were 
asked to share their personal opinions about the status of the Russian language in 
Ukraine. One contact in central Ukraine—a teacher of middle- and high-school English 
who helped recruit research subjects for this study—recommended omitting questions 
related to the status of Russian and suggested that inquiries containing political overtones 
be removed in favor of questions that would instead elicit impersonal quantitative data. 
Due to the policy-related focus of this dissertation, however, questions about teachers’ 
opinions regarding the state of the Russian language in Ukraine were key to answering 
the research questions associated with this study. To this end, the following questions 
were asked:  
One: In your opinion, should Russian be a required course in all Ukrainian 
schools? Nine of the thirty-three teachers strongly agreed that Russian should be a 
required course, fifteen teachers agreed, and seven teachers expressed a neutral opinion. 
So 75% of respondents agreed that Russian should be a required course in all Ukrainian 
schools, and an additional 22% expressed a neutral opinion. Only one respondent 
disagreed that Russian should be a required course. So even though a majority of 
respondents--81%--considered themselves Ukrainian, three-quarters of all respondents 
felt that Russian language should be a required course in all Ukrainian schools.  
The second Russian-language-related question asked was the following: what 
should be the status of the Russian language in Ukraine? The responses were quite evenly 
divided among three of the four available options. No respondent reported feeling that 
Russian should be the sole state language of Ukraine (instead of Ukrainian). Nine 
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teachers felt Russian should be a second official language (alongside Ukrainian), the 
same number of teachers thought it should be a recognized second language, and a 
slightly larger number of teachers—thirteen versus nine for the other two options—felt it 
should remain a protected minority language, as it is today. One respondent chose “other” 
and expressed the following: “Russian should be a foreign language (and, consequently, 
be studied as a foreign language, on the same level as English and French, but not as a 
national minority language, because a very large number of Ukrainian citizens speak it, 
even though those in power fight against it, whether openly or not).” 
The third question was about the status of the Russian language within the 
educational system, and more than half of the respondents—66%—felt that Russian had 
lost importance within the educational system following Ukrainian independence. Less 
than 1% of respondents felt that Russian had grown in importance since Ukraine gained 
independence, and a quarter of respondents felt its significance had not changed. One 
teacher wrote in response: “They make Russian unnecessary and indoctrinate a new 
generation into thinking that Russian isn’t necessary—and not unsuccessfully.” 
The fourth language-related question was about the role of Russian-language 
schools in Ukraine. Many Russian-language schools—schools where Russian is the 
language of instruction—closed after the fall of the Soviet Union due partly to a decline 
in birthrates and partly to a significant shift toward Ukrainian as the language of 
instruction. Even though more than two-thirds of those who completed the questionnaire 
for the beta study taught at Ukrainian-language schools, nearly three-quarters of the 
teachers agreed or strongly agreed that Russian-language schools still played an 
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important role in the Ukrainian educational system, and a further 20% expressed a neutral 
opinion. Less than 1% of respondents felt that Russian-language schools did not play an 
important role in the educational system in Ukraine. Significantly, three-quarters of the 
teachers agreed that Russian-language schools played an important role in Ukraine, even 
though two-thirds of the respondents were teachers in Ukrainian-language schools. 
The final question in this section of the questionnaire asked teachers to share what 
they considered to be the most pressing issues facing the educational system in Ukraine 
in terms of the teaching of Russian. The three issues most often raised were: 1) too few 
hours allotted to Russian-language study, 2) the unclear status of the Russian language in 
Ukraine, and 3) insufficient and outdated teaching materials. Below is a sample of the 
responses received: 
• Too few hours of Russian taught in general and at the high-school level in 
particular; 
• An insufficient theoretical base of knowledge among the students; 
• Teachers not given enough leeway to use literature in the classroom or to choose 
their own textbooks; 
• The removal of dictation exercises from the curriculum; 
• New textbooks are needed to meet the new curriculum requirements in grades five 
and six; 
• The study of Russian needs to be obligatory; 
• A more pleasant learning environment for the students needs to be fostered; 
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• Moral education needs to be a required subject; 
• There is a lack of contemporary Russian literary texts; 
• There are too few Russian-language schools and too few hours in the day devoted 
to the Russian language; 
• Continued uncertainty about the status of Russian in Ukraine; 
• Russian-speaking children are not required to learn Russian; 
• Not enough qualified teachers of Russian; 
• Teaching materials have become out of date; 
• Very low teacher pay; 
• Poor teacher-training and a lack of motivation among teachers; 
• The high average age of teachers. (The teacher who mentioned this said that the 
average age of Russian-language teachers at her school in Kyiv was 59.) 
The third and final section of the questionnaire included questions about teachers’ 
language and educational backgrounds, how they had learned Russian, the number of 
years they had taught, and whether they lived in a predominantly Russian-speaking or 
Ukrainian-speaking area of the country. In terms of teaching experience, only three 
respondents had taught fewer than ten years. The teacher with the least experience 
teaching Russian was a first-year teacher, whereas the teacher with the most experience 
had taught the language for forty-eight years. On average, the teachers had twenty-five 
years of experience teaching Russian and twenty-seven years of teaching experience in 
general. 81% of the teachers considered themselves Ukrainian, and the other 19% of 
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teachers considered themselves Russian. One-third of the teachers considered Ukrainian 
to be their native language, just over half considered Russian their native language, and 
12% cited both of them as their native languages. So even though more than 80% of the 
respondents considered themselves Ukrainian, 65% considered Russian to be their native 
or one of their native languages. 
Conclusions 
The results of the beta study indicated that rich quantitative and qualitative data 
could be collected from teachers by means of a carefully constructed questionnaire. Due 
to the fluid political and social situation in Ukraine, qualitative data seemed to provide a 
richer context for understanding the current state of the teaching of Russian in Ukraine. 
The experience of conducting the beta study and analyzing the data collected during the 
study ultimately shaped the content and scope of the research questions, the content and 
format of the demographic questionnaire, and the content and structure of the participant 
interviews.  
THE RESEARCH STUDY 
Research Questions 
The research questions for this study were the following: 
1) How have policies related to the role and status of the Russian language in 
Ukraine evolved since Ukraine became an independent nation, and how has this 
evolution in language policy affected the teaching of Russian there?  
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2) How do geography and political conditions in contemporary Ukraine affect 
language policy, attitudes toward the Russian language, and the teaching of Russian?  
3) How has the geopolitical relationship between Ukraine and Russia affected the 
status of, and attitudes toward, the Russian language and the study of Russian in Ukraine? 
Hypotheses 
Several major themes emerged from the data collected during the beta study. The 
results of the beta study led to the formation of the following hypotheses: 
1) Changes in language policy in post-Soviet Ukraine have negatively affected the 
status of, and attitudes toward, the Russian language both in general and within the 
education system. Changes in language policy have led to a significant decrease in the 
number of Russian-language schools in Ukraine, a drop in prestige of the Russian 
language within the education system, and a sharp decline in the number of hours 
devoted to Russian language studies in school where Ukrainian is the language of 
instruction.  
2) Both politics and geography have a significant effect on policies and attitudes 
toward the Russian language and the teaching of Russian in Ukraine. Those who live in 
western Ukraine feel most strongly about maintaining the status of Ukrainian as the sole 
state language, whereas those in the east argue a need to preserve the rights of Russian-
speakers in Ukraine. The political climate also affects attitudes toward the Russian 
language and the teaching of Russian in Ukraine, as the passage of new language policies 
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and ongoing political tensions lead to discontent on both sides of the language debate 
between Ukrainian and Russian.   
4) Political tensions between Ukraine and Russia since 2014 have led to a 
worsening of attitudes toward the study of Russian in Ukrainian schools and led to a 
decline in interest in studying the language. Russia’s ongoing support of the war in 
Donbas has led to an increase in negative attitudes toward Russia, which has resulted in 
an increase in negative attitudes toward the Russian language.  
Recruitment and Interview Processes 
Interviews for the research study were conducted via Skype, an application that 
allows users to video chat with others around the world, provided both parties have an 
Internet-enabled device and a webcam. In addition to Skype, a third-party software 
application called Call Recorder, which automatically records and saves audio and video 
files during Skype calls, was implemented. Video files were then converted to audio-only 
files, which were professionally transcribed by a native speaker of Russian and returned 
in Microsoft Word formatting for subsequent coding and analysis. 
Gathering Data Remotely 
While conducting participant interviews in Ukraine rather than remotely would 
have been the ideal, conducting interviews via Skype did present a few minor 
conveniences. First, the Call Recorder software automatically recorded the interviews 
with teachers, virtually eliminating the possibility of human error: that of forgetting to 
turn on the recorder. Second, the Call Recorder software saved each file directly to cloud 
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storage, eliminating the need to upload the file from a handheld recording device. Finally, 
reliable and widespread Internet access here in the United States allowed for convenient 
Internet-based research and frequent electronic contact with interviewees.  
Despite a small handful of logistical advantages to conducting research remotely, 
the disadvantages of conducting research from outside Ukraine greatly outweighed the 
advantages. Locating policy-related data, for one, proved problematic. While a limited 
amount of policy-related information was available through Internet sources and contacts 
in Ukraine, certain data remained elusive. Ukraine does not have the same tradition of 
open access to information that we have in the United States, statistics are generally not 
well kept, and there is little reliable information published online. While the Ukrainian 
Parliament gave preliminary approval in March of 2015 to a law that would make more 
public information available online (“Ukraine Advances Bill”), a 2016 progress report 
published by the Open Government Partnership confirms that Ukraine has not yet met its 
legislative commitments to provide open data (6) and establish rules on processing 
official information (8).  
In addition to difficulties gathering policy-related information online, the remote 
coordination of interviews to collect the qualitative data needed for this study also proved 
challenging. First, conducting interviews remotely made it more difficult to recruit 
teachers who did not have access to the technology required to take part in the study. 
Conducting research from the United States made it virtually impossible to locate and 




Second, I had to rely on others to help recruit research subjects. Personal efforts 
from the United States to reach school principals and teachers resulted in relatively few 
interviews. In Ukraine, personal connections smooth the way when meeting others, and 
personal relationships are essential for conducting business in Ukraine (McCarthy et al., 
2008). So-called “cold calls” in Ukraine are comparatively less likely to be successful, 
which proved to be the case in efforts to reach out to schools through their websites. Even 
when addressed by name, which was in nearly every single case, efforts to connect with 
school principals through their websites resulted in very few contacts that led to 
interviews. Had research been conducted in Ukraine, the research proposal could have 
been presented to groups of teachers in order to generate interest in the project, and 
interested teachers could have then spoken with colleagues in other schools and 
introduced them to the project.  
Finally, relying on contact by e-mail and not being able to speak with potential 
research participants face-to-face created conditions that made it easier for teachers to 
disregard requests for interviews. Teachers could choose not to respond to the 
communications sent to them by e-mail, and doing so led to no negative repercussions.   
During the beta study for this project, which had been conducted in the months 
leading up to Euromaidan,27 one could not have anticipated the political tensions that 
would soon grip Ukraine and hinder efforts to recruit research subjects for the 
dissertation itself. While data was eventually collected from seventeen teachers, 
                                                
27 Euromaidan was the name given to the demonstrations and civil unrest in Ukraine that began in 
November 2013 with public protests in Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kyiv. 
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arranging and conducting these interviews required significantly more time and effort 
than had initially been anticipated. The five months that had been budgeted for 
recruitment and interviews stretched out to ten months by the time of completion of the 
final interview. Despite the extended time needed to recruit and interview teachers, 
however, there is no evidence to suggest that remote interviews adversely affected the 
quality of the data gathered. Although the interviews were conducted via Skype, they still 
took place face-to-face, allowing for natural conversation that featured personal 
connections, eye contact, and opportunities to ask teachers to elaborate on topics and 
clarify statements being made. 
While one could argue that people the world over are wary of responding to 
unsolicited requests for information, those living in Ukraine, particularly during times of 
political unrest and uncertainty, have even more reason to shun requests for contact from 
strangers. After all, some interview questions related directly to politics, and their 
responses could have gotten them in trouble with officials from their school or 
government. Several teachers who eventually agreed to participate in the research still 
chose not to answer the questions related to politics. For example, when asked toward the 
end of her interview what she felt the status of Russian should be in Ukraine, one teacher, 
Olga, with whom the researcher had established significant rapport during the seven 
months leading up to the interview, politely responded, “May I not answer that 
question?” Based on her age (66), the fact that she was born and raised in Russia, and her 
responses to other language-related questions that had been asked, the researcher 
surmised that Olga would like Russian to enjoy equal status with Ukrainian. Perhaps 
 
98 
Olga’s unwillingness to go on record to express what may be a rather common but 
largely unspoken and politically incorrect opinion among Russian-speakers living in 
Ukraine, even with the understanding that her remarks would remain anonymous, spoke 
both to current political tensions and to a legacy of fear cultivated during decades of 
living under Soviet power. A different research subject, Vera, who did not agree to an 
interview but did answer questions in written form, chose not to respond to any of the 
queries related to politics and refused requests for follow-up information via e-mail or 
Skype. Another contact, Vladimir, offered his own explanation for people’s fears. He had 
returned completed questionnaires for the beta study from two teachers in the fall of 
2014. Since these teachers had not provided their contact information, Vladimir was 
asked in the fall of 2015 to find out if those same two teachers would be willing to be 
interviewed. He responded thus: “Unfortunately, I am no longer able to help you. Due to 
the grave sociopolitical situation and the threat to human life, I had to leave Ukraine. I 
can only add that in the context of permanent terror, both through the media and through 
state support of the permanent presence of neo-Nazi symbolism and organizations, not 
only teachers, but the population as a whole, is in a state of depression, with a high level 
of mistrust and suspicion. This has been caused, to a large extent, by the widespread 
practice of denunciations by pupils, students, their parents, and their colleagues, who are 
seeking to settle political or personal scores. I doubt that people in such a state will offer 
sincere answers to your questions or even agree to be interviewed at all. There is a fear of 
wiretapping and of the monitoring of electronic communications by members of the 
Ukrainian secret service” (e-mail message to author, October 22, 2015). 
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Other contacts who agreed to help recruit research subjects reported similar 
difficulties finding teachers willing to be interviewed. Yeva, an ethnic Ukrainian living in 
the United States who had been born, raised and educated in western Ukraine sent e-
mails to teachers who were personal friends and acquaintances and asked them to take 
part in my research study. When Yeva initially reported that she had been unable to 
recruit any research subjects, she was asked whether the teachers she had contacted had 
simply not responded to her requests or had actually responded but refused to participate. 
She responded, “They flat refused. There were five altogether... actually, six, because 
one of my contacts used to be a teacher of Russian himself. He refused and gave no 
reason except ‘he doesn't want to talk about it.’ No one else in Lviv that I asked knew of 
anybody….I can try to ask somebody in Ivano-Frankivsk to locate me a teacher; no 
guarantee though. There seems to be a major trauma with these people. The Hungarian 
woman [from Berehove] never responded; I wrote twice and she saw the messages, so I 
dare not write again” (e-mail message to author, October 18, 2015).  
Just as Yeva was not able to recruit research subjects from among her own friends 
and acquaintances in Ukraine, a professor in Kharkiv who had recruited teachers to 
complete the questionnaire for the beta study reported similar difficulties finding teachers 
who would agree to be interviewed. Following an appeal to her by e-mail, she responded: 
“About your request.... I really want to help you. Alas, in the present political situation, 
no one would take part in the survey and fill out the form. I am very sorry about it. I 
cannot do anything” (e-mail message to author, October 23, 2015). 
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A further example of the fear expressed by potential research subjects was 
uncovered during attempts to recruit one particular teacher of Russian from Kryvyi Rih, a 
city in south-central Ukraine. This teacher, by the name of Marina, was the friend of an 
acquaintance. The acquaintance, Anna, felt fairly certain that based on her friendship 
with Marina and the fact that Anna could vouch for the research study, Marina would 
agree to be interviewed. Anna contacted Marina and let her know that she would soon be 
contacted by the researcher. After four unsuccessful attempts to schedule an interview 
with Marina, Anna herself intervened. Marina refused to take part in the research study, 
explaining that she was “afraid [the researcher] would try to brainwash her” (e-mail 
message to author, April 7, 2016). Such anecdotal evidence demonstrates that even 
educators in Ukraine with personal/professional contacts there had a difficult time finding 
colleagues willing to be interviewed, including those colleagues who had earlier 
completed questionnaires for the beta study. When pressed for an explanation, political 
tensions or other mitigating factors, such as fear of reprisals at work, were most 
frequently cited.  
Technology Used to Conduct Interviews 
In addition to difficulties recruiting research subjects, another disadvantage of 
conducting research remotely stemmed from the reliance on technology to conduct 
interviews. Several potential research subjects were hesitant to be interviewed on Skype, 
citing that they were unfamiliar with the program, had never used it, or did not have a 
Skype account. While two such research subjects were eventually persuaded to seek help 
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logging onto Skype for an interview, most research subjects who were not familiar with 
Skype, even those who had previously expressed interest in participating in the study, 
refused to be interviewed. Perhaps they did not want to take the time to learn to use an 
unfamiliar application, or risk downloading malware to do so. Furthermore, due to a lack 
of physical proximity, an interview via Skype can feel less personal than an interview 
conducted face to face. Interviewing subjects in person allows researchers and 
interviewees to be implicitly connected through non-verbal communication that is more 
difficult to detect through a digital medium such as Skype. Although Skype is superior to 
telephone contact for communication through non-verbal cues, the medium is still 
inferior to face-to-face contact for reasons that include inconsistent upload and download 
speeds and unpredictable video and sound quality. Furthermore, through neuroception 
(Fosha, Siegel, and Solomon, 2009, p. 28), a person’s nervous system detects the state of 
another person’s nervous system below the level of conscious awareness and makes 
adjustments accordingly. It is reasonable to consider that an interviewee might feel 
nervous during the interview, and during face-to-face communication, it would be much 
easier to put that person at ease due to the implicit connection and neuroception taking 
place between them. Even among those participants familiar with Skype, therefore, the 
less personal nature of an interview conducted over the Internet may have led to greater 
hesitation to participate in the study.  
In addition to a lack of familiarity with Skype, access to a reliable Internet 
connection during interviews presented occasional difficulties. During portions of several 
interviews, poor sound quality made it challenging to hear and understand the research 
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subjects and led to difficulties during the process of transcribing the interviews. In 
addition to issues of sound quality, two of the research participants who had previously 
had access to reliable Internet connections faced difficulties when it came time to be 
interviewed. A teacher in eastern Ukraine who was interviewed during the war in Donbas 
explained that due to frequent, unannounced power outages, she could not promise to be 
able to connect at the appointed time. The teacher from Crimea expressed similar 
uncertainty over her ability to take part in the interview as planned, because Crimea was 
experiencing rolling blackouts at the time (December 2015). In three other cases, Skype 
calls were dropped due to irregularities in Internet connectivity among the interviewees, 
which necessitated reconnection in order to complete the interviews. In one of those 
cases, the connection failed completely and could not be reestablished, so a continuation 
of the interview had to be scheduled for two weeks later. 
In addition to technology-related disadvantages to conducting research remotely, 
the effort required on the part of the teachers to participate in the study proved to be an 
obstacle to recruitment. Research subjects could not simply appear at the appointed time, 
sign a consent form, and take part in an interview. Instead, teachers had to download and 
print the consent form and three-page questionnaire, fill them out, sign the consent form, 
scan or photograph the consent form and questionnaire, return the scans or photos of 
these forms to the researcher by e-mail, arrange for a date and time for the interview by e-
mail, familiarize themselves with Skype, and take time out of a busy day to take part in 
the interview. These activities required significant time and effort on the part of research 
subjects, who received nothing tangible in return for their efforts—no financial 
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compensation, no opportunity to converse with the interviewer over a cup of coffee 
before or after the interview, and no positive recognition from others for their 
participations. Not all teachers were willing or able to commit such time and energy to 
the study. If anything, given the politically charged climate at the time, those teachers 
who agreed to speak about their experiences did so at the risk—whether real or 
perceived—of unfavorable reactions from school administrators, colleagues and others. 
This potential for negative repercussions, coupled with long work hours, low wages and 
other hardships already faced by teachers in Ukraine, may have served as a disincentive 
to participate.  
Another disadvantage to conducting research remotely was that the inability to 
meet with research subjects in person made it more difficult to secure original signatures 
on consent forms and even deterred potential research subjects from participating in the 
study. Research subjects needed to fill out consent forms, sign them, and return scans or 
photographs of the forms before interviews could be conducted. Not all of the research 
subjects had access to a scanner, and the time required to locate one frequently delayed 
the scheduling of interviews. In the case of four potential research subjects who had 
agreed to be interviewed and who had submitted their completed pre-interview 
questionnaires, only a lack of signed, written consent prevented the scheduling of 
interviews. It is possible that the requirement to either scan or photograph the signed 
consent form, attach it to an e-mail message and return it to the researcher discouraged 
these particular subjects from following through on their earlier agreement to take part in 
the study.    
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Further disadvantages encountered while conducting research remotely included 
the following: the inability to deepen relationships with teachers through face-to-face 
contact; missed opportunities to visit schools and to observe research subjects in their 
own environment; the inability to collect literature such as handouts, worksheets and 
printed materials about Russian programs that then could have been coded and analyzed; 
and an inability to examine language textbooks and materials used in the Russian-
language classroom in order to discuss the quality of those materials as part of this study.  
Recruitment of Research Subjects 
Participants were recruited through school websites, teachers’ blogs, messages on 
the social media site VK28 and with the help of prior contacts and acquaintances in 
Ukraine. In total, eleven months (June 2015 through April 2016) were spent recruiting 
and interviewing a total of seventeen research subjects. Approximately 170 individual 
teachers and an additional 57 school principals were addressed by name via e-mail, and 
by the time interviews were arranged, a total of 450 e-mails had been sent to potential 
research participants.  
Those research subjects who eventually participated in the study were recruited 
through a variety of means. Six teachers agreed to be interviewed in response to e-mails 
addressed to their school principals. Four other teachers, all of whom had returned 
questionnaires during the beta study and expressed interest in taking part in related 
dissertation research, also participated in the study. Direct contact with teachers through 
                                                
28 VK (originally VKontakte) is an online social networking service. Similar to Facebook in structure and 
layout, VK is especially popular among Russian-speaking users. 
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their blogs, which had been found during Internet searches, resulted in one interview, and 
the rest of the teachers were recruited through contacts both in the United States and 
Ukraine or recruited by other interviewees. Whereas the questionnaires sent out for the 
beta study were returned at a rate of approximately ten percent, finding teachers willing 
to be interviewed about their thoughts and opinions proved even more difficult. 
Unfortunately, in the time between the distribution of beta study questionnaires and the 
recruitment of research subjects for the dissertation itself, the political situation in 
Ukraine had continued to deteriorate. As a result, only seven of the thirty-three teachers 
who had returned questionnaires as part of the beta study ultimately agreed to be 
interviewed for the research study. Of the individuals contacted directly, eight percent of 
them were eventually interviewed. The figure of eight percent, however, does not include 
attempts made by others, including contacts both in the United States and in Ukraine, to 
recruit teachers. The low response to requests for interviews, coupled with 
correspondence from teachers that expressed discomfort surrounding the topic of the 
study, indicate that the ongoing political strife and unrest in Ukraine have rendered 
language policy and the status of the Russian language even more delicate topics for 
Ukrainians at the moment.  
Collection of Demographic Questionnaire Data 
In order to collect demographic data and background information about the 
research subjects prior to the interviews, teachers were asked to complete a three-page 
questionnaire (see Appendices 3 and 4). By means of this questionnaire, the following 
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information was gathered about the subjects: age; place and date of birth; contact 
information; years of teaching experience (both general and Russian-language); rank and 
title; how and where they acquired their Russian-language skills; where they completed 
their higher education; their native language and how they identify themselves;	which 
language(s) they speak at home; the name, location, and type of institution where they 
work; whether Russian is taught as a native language, second or foreign language, or 
other variation, at the educational institution where they work; how many teachers of 
Russian work at their school; whether Russian is a required course at their school and if 
so, for which students; the number of hours per week that students at each grade level 
study Russian; number of teaching hours per week (total and Russian-language); and 
other courses taught in addition to Russian.  
 Advance collection of basic information about research subjects and the schools 
where they worked allowed for interview questions to be tailored to each teacher and 
ensured that the desired demographic information would be easily accessible for later 
analysis. Furthermore, collecting demographic information in advance of the interviews 
allowed for valuable face-to-face time to be spent clarifying the information they had 
provided and asking in-depth questions to elicit qualitative data. All questionnaires were 
returned before interviews were scheduled, ensuring that the researcher had 




Prior to each interview, signed, written consent was obtained from teachers (see 
Appendices 5 and 6). Following receipt of the signed consent form and completed 
questionnaire, Skype contact information was exchanged and interview dates and times 
were arranged. As part of the interview process, certain questions were asked of every 
research subject, whereas other inquiries were unique to each teacher based on the 
responses provided on the questionnaire.  
The interviews themselves opened with a series of questions about the teachers’ 
places of work: how long they had worked at their schools, how they had decided to 
become teachers, which languages were taught at their schools, whether Russian was 
taught as a native or foreign language, how many hours they taught per week and how 
their teaching load compared to the teaching loads of other language teachers at their 
schools, and about the ethnic and linguistic make-up of their students. After gathering 
information about their experiences as teachers and about the role of Russian-language 
studies in their schools, the line of questioning turned to how Russian-language teaching 
methodologies had changed since the interviewees themselves had studied in school, how 
the role of the Russian language within the Ukrainian education system had changed 
since the fall of the Soviet Union, whether they thought that Russian should be a required 
course for all students in Ukraine, whether there was still a need for Russian-language 
schools in Ukraine, and if so, what role they played, how the current political situation in 
Ukraine affected the status of Russian and the study of Russian in Ukraine, how the 
geopolitical relationships between Russia and Ukraine affected the teaching of Russian in 
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Ukraine, and what the status of the Russian language should be in Ukraine. I completed 
my line of questioning by asking about the most pressing challenges facing teachers of 
Russian in Ukraine today. This question was asked last in order to provide a final 
opportunity for teachers to express concerns that might not have come up earlier in the 
interview. 
Interviews lasted approximately one hour, with the average interview lasting 
sixty-one minutes. According to Glesne (2011), an hour of steady conversation is 
generally an appropriate length of time for an interview conducted as part of a qualitative 
research study (114), so the interview protocol for this study was created with Glesne’s 
suggestion in mind. In total, interviews ranged from thirty-six minutes to one hour and 
fifty-four minutes. While the content and quantity of questions remained uniform across 
the interviews, some teachers provided more detailed information and extended 
anecdotes, which accounted for the difference in length of interviews.   
Research Participants 
The initial plan for the study was to collect and analyze data from ten to fifteen 
teachers of Russian from various regions of Ukraine and from communities of various 
sizes. The goal was to collect as representative a sample of participants as possible in 
terms of demographics: sex, years of teaching experience, and types of schools (general-
education schools, lyceums, gymnasiums and boarding schools). Ultimately, seventeen 
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teachers of Russian—sixteen female and one male—were interviewed.29 In addition to 
teachers of Russian in Ukraine, one teacher from Crimea, which was annexed from 
Ukraine by Russia in March of 2014, was also interviewed. This interview took place 
after the annexation. 
Due to the fact that villages do not enjoy the same Internet connectivity as urban 
areas, contacting teachers from communities with populations below 10,000 proved 
difficult. The most widespread recruitment of teachers from rural areas took place with 
the help of an acquaintance at a district board of education west-central Ukraine. The 
methodologist for Russian-language studies in that district provided the e-mail addresses 
of all of the rural schools in the area. Even accompanied by a letter of introduction from 
the dissertation advisor and an explanation that the methodologist for the district had 
provided consent for this research, the thirty-one e-mails sent to rural schools did not 
result in a single interview. Only one response from a teacher was received, and that was 
from a teacher who had returned a questionnaire for the beta study and also, eventually, a 
pre-interview questionnaire. After she returned the pre-interview questionnaire, two 
requests for an interview were sent, and the teacher responded that she couldn’t help 
because she did not have Skype. Over the course of four months, four more requests were 
made, including the suggestion that she respond in written form. These requests went 
unacknowledged.  
                                                
29 In Ukraine, the vast majority of schoolteachers are female. Teachers’ explanations for this disparity can 
be found later in this chapter. 
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A second significant effort to recruit teachers from rural areas was made through 
a contact who teaches English in a village, who was asked if she would help recruit one 
or both of the teachers who taught Russian at the school where she worked. Within days, 
consent forms and pre-interview questionnaires were received from both teachers. The 
first teacher refused an interview. The second teacher, who received requests for 
interviews several times over the course of three months, remained silent. The English-
teacher contact was asked for help in encouraging this teacher to participate in the study. 
When the teacher mentioned not having Skype, the contact suggested she answer 
questions by e-mail. The questions were prepared and sent to the teacher, but they were 
never returned, and follow-up e-mails went unanswered. Two months later, with the help 
of the English teacher at that school, an interview was finally arranged. As a result of 
securing this interview, not only do the research subjects for this study represent Ukraine 
well geographically, the responses of a teacher in a rural area are included as well.    
Geographical Representation 
In terms of geographical representation, three of the seventeen teachers were from 
western Ukraine: two from the far west and one from the northwest. Eight teachers were 
from central regions: one from the west central region, three from the north central 
region, three from the mid-central region, and one from the south central region. Four 
teachers were from the east: one from the northeast and three from the southeast. There 
were also two teachers from the south: one from southern Ukraine and one from Crimea, 
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formerly part of Ukraine. For a breakdown of the geographical representation of the 
research subjects, see the table in Appendix 7 and map in Appendix 8. 
In addition to encompassing a wide range of geographical areas within Ukraine, 
the research participants represent communities of varying sizes. In addition to the village 
teacher, who lives in a community of approximately 2,000 people, interviews were 
conducted with research participants from cities that fell well below the largest twenty in 
Ukraine in terms of population: three cities with populations in the 200,000 range; two 
cities between 80,000 and 120,000, and a small city of approximately 16,000.  
In addition to teachers from rural areas and smaller cities, teachers were recruited 
from the largest cities in Ukraine in order to represent the voice of urban teachers in their 
respective regions. Teachers were interviewed from four of the five largest cities in 
Ukraine: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Odesa.  
Gender Representation 
In 2014, 98.9% of primary education teachers and 88.2% of secondary education 
teachers in Ukraine were female.30 Reasons cited for this high proportion of female 
teachers and recent “male teachers’ exodus from the classroom” (Magno, 2007, p. 654) 
are a decline in the prestige of the teaching profession in Ukraine and other post-Soviet 
republics and a decrease in teacher salaries. 
                                                




While data from both male and female teachers were sought for this study, only 
one male teacher of Russian was located for an interview. When asked to help recruit 
male colleagues to be interviewed, teachers responded without exception that there 
weren’t any male teachers of Russian in Ukraine or that they didn’t know any. In follow-
up e-mails, interviewees who were asked to share their thoughts about why there were so 
few male teachers of Russian language and literature in Ukraine explained that in Soviet 
times when teacher pay was higher, there were many more male teachers, but that today, 
low pay is a serious deterrent. They also suggested that men are traditionally drawn to 
other fields such as history and the hard sciences. Valentina, a teacher from central 
Ukraine, provided three reasons for the low numbers of male teachers in her field, 
reasons that were cited by other teachers who participated in the study: 
1) Men are more interested in technology and engineering; 2) Correcting 
homework is not prestigious work for men; 3) There is a connection between low 
pay and the lack of male teachers: recent graduates earn about 2,000 hryvnias 
[80.6 U.S. dollars per the exchange rate August 10, 2016] per month, so they 
can’t support a family….Ukrainian philologists can earn money on the side as 
tutors, but Russian-language tutoring does not enjoy such demand. 
Valentina’s assertions partly mirror those of Kutsyuruba (2011), who also credits 
“unfavorable economic and social transformations” (294) for the overall decrease of male 
teachers in post-Soviet Ukraine. Given the low numbers of males in the teaching 
profession over all and in the humanities in particular, the ratio of male to female 
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research subjects for this study reflects the actual gender demographics of teachers in 
Ukrainian schools. 
Age of Research Participants 
According to a 2010 report issued by the World Bank, the average age of teachers 
in Ukraine and other CIS countries is rapidly rising. This rise in the average age of 
teachers is cited as evidence that the teaching profession is becoming less attractive in 
these countries (248). Of the seventeen teachers of Russian interviewed for this study, 
three were in their thirties, nine in their forties, three in their fifties, and two in their 
sixties. The average age of the teachers, which was forty-eight, and the median age, forty-
five, suggest that teachers of Russian in Ukraine as a whole are older than workers 
employed in other fields. Since relatively fewer university graduates in Ukraine enter the 
teaching field, even without data from young teachers, the sample of research subjects is 
still representative of the teaching population as a whole, i.e., with an average age 
approaching fifty.   
Place of Birth versus Ethnic Identification 
In Ukraine, citizenship and nationality are treated separately, with the term 
“nationality” traditionally referring to ethnicity. The custom of separating citizenship and 
nationality became deeply rooted in society during Soviet times, when the state 
maintained information about nationality in many administrative records and when 
citizenship (hromadianstvo/grazhdanstvo) and ethnicity/nationality 
(natsional'nist'/natsional'nost') were indicated separately in Soviet passports. For 
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example, a person could live in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and at the same 
time indicate Polish, Czech, Georgian or Russian nationality. As explained Mikhailo, a 
history teacher in western Ukraine: 
This obviously makes us different from the United States, which operates under 
the concept of a melting pot, whereby those who come to the United States 
become Americans. In the Soviet Union, too, the obvious goal was to erode 
national differences and make everyone into one “Soviet people,” but they were 
not able to do this.  
The fact that the term “Ukrainian” refers to both citizenship and ethnicity complicates the 
question of how those living in Ukraine identify themselves. Therefore, rather than being 
prompted to indicate their ethnicity or nationality, participants in this study were asked, 
“Whom do you consider yourself to be?” This question offered teachers the opportunity 
to describe themselves based either on national self-perception or on their identification 
with an ethnic group. This approach to self-identification was based on a research study 
discussed in Zalizniak’s “Language Orientations and the Civilisation Choice for 
Ukrainians” (2009, p. 161). For further discussion of ethnicity versus nationality, see 
Chapter 3. 
While there was some correlation between the research subjects’ place of birth 
and how they identified themselves, having been born in Ukraine did not consistently 
equate to teachers’ identification of themselves as Ukrainian. Of the seventeen research 
subjects, twelve were born in Ukraine, two in Russia, and one each in Kazakhstan, 
Belarus and Bessarabia, a historical region in southern Ukraine belonging partly to 
 
115 
Moldova and partly to Ukraine. Of the twelve teachers who had been born in Ukraine, 
eight of them considered themselves Ukrainian, and four considered themselves Russian. 
All eight teachers who considered themselves Ukrainian had been born in central or 
western Ukraine; indeed, every teacher who had been born in central or western Ukraine, 
regardless of native language, considered himself or herself to be Ukrainian. Of those 
born in Ukraine who identified themselves as Russian, three had been born in eastern 
Ukraine, and one had been born in Crimea. As with those who identified themselves as 
Ukrainian, every teacher interviewed who had been born in eastern Ukraine or Crimea 
considered himself or herself to be Russian.  
Of the five research subjects born outside of Ukraine, three considered themselves 
Russian: the teacher who had been born in Bessarabia—a largely Russian-speaking 
area—and both of the teachers who had been born in Russia. The teachers who had been 
born in Kazakhstan and Belarus, however, both considered themselves Ukrainian.  
Language  
A distinctive feature of Ukraine’s language situation and a legacy of Soviet 
language policy is a lack of consistent correlation between ethnicity and language in 
Ukraine (Kulyk, 2013). Answers to questions related to one’s native language in Ukraine 
can differ significantly from those related to ethnic identification (Masenko, 2009). 
Likewise, many ethnic Ukrainians speak Russian as their primary language (Arel, 1996, 
2002; Bilniuk, 2005; Pavlenko, 2006; Bilaniuk and Melnyk, 2008), and Russian is widely 
used as a language of communication by those of a variety of ethnic backgrounds, 
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particularly in urban areas. Due to this “vast discrepancy between ethnic and language 
identities on one hand and between language identity and practice on the other” (Kulyk, 
2013, p. 282), research subjects were asked to identify not only their native language, but 
also the languages spoken at home and around them. This data was gathered in order to 
allow for analysis of the relationships between subjects’ native languages, the languages 
spoken at home, and the languages spoken around them.  
Native Language and Language Spoken at Home 
Of the seventeen research subjects, seven cited Ukrainian as their native language, 
and ten cited Russian. All seven teachers who cited Ukrainian as their native language 
also considered themselves Ukrainian. All seven teachers who considered themselves 
Russian, as well as three who considered themselves Ukrainian, cited Russian as their 
native language. All ten subjects who cited Russian as their native language spoke 
predominantly Russian at home.  
Predominant Language of the Area  
The research subjects can be divided into three roughly equal-sized groups in 
terms of the dominant language spoken where they live: five indicated that they lived in a 
predominantly Ukrainian-speaking area of Ukraine, six indicated residence in an area 
where Ukrainian and Russian were spoken equally, and six—including the teacher in 
Crimea— reported living in a predominantly Russian-speaking area of the country.  
Of the five teachers who claimed to live in a predominantly Ukrainian-speaking 
area of Ukraine, four considered themselves Ukrainian and cited Ukrainian as their native 
 
117 
language, whereas one considered herself Russian and cited Russian as her native 
language. (This teacher had been born in Russia.) Of these five teachers living in 
predominantly Ukrainian-speaking areas, two spoke Ukrainian in the home, two spoke 
equal amounts of Ukrainian and Russian at home, and one spoke predominantly Russian 
at home. 
Five teachers of the six who claimed to live in an area where Ukrainian and 
Russian were spoken equally considered themselves Ukrainian and cited Ukrainian as 
their native language, whereas one, born in Bessarabia, considered herself Russian and 
cited Russian as her native language. Among these six teachers, two spoke equal amounts 
of Ukrainian and Russian at home, and four spoke predominantly in Russian. 
All six teachers who claimed to live in predominantly Russian-speaking areas of 
the country cited Russian as their native language and spoke Russian at home. Five 
considered themselves Russian, and one, who had been born in Kazakhstan, considered 
herself Ukrainian.  
Types of Schools  
Of the seventeen teachers of Russian who were interviewed for this study, six 
teach exclusively at gymnasiums (himnazii/gimnazii),31 four teach at lyceums (litsei), one 
teaches at an academic-educational complex (navchal'no-vikhovnyi kompleks/uchebno-
vospitatel'nyi kompleks) that offers specialized instruction in the humanities, one teaches 
at a middle school of general education, or ZOSh (zahal'noosvitnia shkoka I-III 
                                                
31 For a short explanation of the three main types of government-funded educational institutions for 
children in Ukraine— gymnasiums, lyceums, and schools— see chapter three.  
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stupeniv/obshcheobrazovatel'naia shkola I-III stupenei), which combines primary and 
secondary levels of education, and two teach in specialized schools (spetsializovani 
shkoly/spetsializirovannye shkoly), i.e., secondary schools with enhanced coverage of 
certain subjects that constitute the specialization of the school. A total of three teachers 
teach Russian at two different educational institutions: one teaches at a specialized 
boarding school (spetsializovana/spetsalizirovannaya shkola-internat) and a teachers 
college (pedahohichnyi koledzh/pedagogicheskoe uchilishche), another teaches at a 
teachers college and the lyceum associated with that college, and a third teaches at both a 
boarding school a general-education school. In this study, which focuses on Russian-
language education in government-funded educational institutions for students in grades 
one through eleven, data related to the teachers colleges are not included. 
Russian as a Required or Elective Language  
Data was collected from seventeen teachers of Russian in fifteen educational 
institutions across Ukraine, including Crimea. Of these fifteen institutions, Russian is 
taught as a required course in ten of them and as an elective course in five. Of the ten 
institutions where Russian is taught as a required course, it is taught as a native language 
(ridna mova/rodnoi iazyk) in five: in the Russian-language schools in western Ukraine, 
Kyiv and Crimea, and in a Ukrainian-language school in eastern Ukraine. Of the other 
five schools that teach Russian as a required course, it is required per administrative 
mandate in two, is taught as a second foreign language (druha inozemna mova/vtoroi 
inostrannyi iazyk) beginning in fifth grade in two others, is taught as a second foreign 
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language beginning in first grade in one school, and is taught as a national minority 
language (mova natsional'nykh menshyn/iazyk natsional'nykh men'shinstv) in another 
school. In the five schools where Russian is not a required course, it is taught as an 
elective course (fakul'tatyvnyi/fakul'tativnyi predmet) in one, as a national minority 
language in another, and as a second foreign language beginning in fifth grade—either 
for all students or for select groups of students—in three others. In one school in western 
Ukraine where Russian is no longer offered to incoming students, Russian is taught only 
to those three groups of students, who are currently in grades seven, eight and nine, who 
began studying it in fifth grade.  
To underscore the difficulty in categorizing the ever-changing role of the Russian 
language in schools in post-Soviet Ukraine, it should be noted that two teachers of 
Russian who work in the same school characterized the study of the Russian language at 
their school in different ways. One teacher indicated that Russian was taught as a third 
foreign language (tretia inozemna mova/tretii inostrannyi iazyk) language beginning in 
the sixth grade, whereas the other identified Russian as a second foreign language 
beginning in fifth grade and as an elective course. A closer look at what was said during 
interviews with these teachers indicates that prior to the 2015-2016 academic year, 
Russian had been taught to all students beginning in fifth grade, whereas this year, per 
government mandate, incoming fifth-graders do not study Russian.  
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Hours of Russian Language Instruction 
The number of hours per week of Russian language instruction in Ukrainian 
schools is determined by the Ministry of Education and varies depending on the type, 
specialization, and language of instruction of the school. Detailed information about the 
various Russian language curricula can be found in chapter 3. 
Of the schools represented in this study, three of them offer Russian in the 
primary grades, and in all three schools, Russian is taught as a native language and is the 
language of instruction. In two of the schools, first-and second-graders study Russian six 
hours per week, and third- and fourth-graders study Russian five hours per week. In the 
other school, students in grades one through four study Russian five hours per week.  
In the secondary schools where Russian is taught as a native language, students 
study Russian between two and six hours a week, with the number of hours per week of 
study declining as the students move into higher grades. In schools where Russian is not 
taught as a native language, students study Russian between zero and two hours a week.  
Profiles of Research Participants 
The following are profiles of the participants who took part in this empirical 
study, presented in the order in which they were interviewed. For the purposes of this 
study, a village [vyselok/prysilok/selishche/selo/selishche mis'kogo typu] refers to a 
geographical area with a population under 10,000, a town [mistechko] refers to an area 
with a population of 10,000 to 75,000 residents, a city [misto] refers to an area with a 
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population between 75,000 and 300,000 residents, and a large city [velike misto] refers to 
an area with a population of 300,000 or more residents.  
The information provided in the profiles below was gathered from questionnaires 
and interviews.  
1. Kostya, 38, lives and works in a mid-size industrial city, in which both Russian and 
Ukrainian are spoken, in central Ukraine. He teaches Russian at two institutions: a 
regional specialized boarding school and a teachers college. Ukrainian is the language of 
instruction at both institutions. Students in grades eight through eleven study at the 
boarding school, which is affiliated with the local teachers college and serves gifted 
children from rural areas. Per a decision made by the administration of the boarding 
school, which has chosen to use elective hours for Russian study, all students at the 
school study Russian as a required course one hour per week. Kostya has thirteen years’ 
teaching experience and has taught Russian throughout his teaching career. While he 
identifies himself as Ukrainian and as a native speaker of Ukrainian, Kostya speaks 
Russian at home and reports having learned Russian while growing up in a Russian-
speaking environment. At the boarding school where he works, Kostya teaches a total of 
twelve hours per week: four hours of Russian and eight hours of world literature.  
2. Katya, 42, teaches Russian at a gymnasium in a mid-size Russian- and Ukrainian-
speaking city in central Ukraine. Ukrainian is the language of instruction at her 
institution, which is open to students in grades five through eleven. Russian is taught as a 
second foreign language there beginning in the fifth grade and is a required course for 
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students specializing in math and in history and law. Katya has a total of seventeen years’ 
teaching experience, including fifteen years teaching foreign literature and two years 
teaching Russian. Born in Belarus, Katya moved to Ukraine as a young child. She 
considers herself Ukrainian and cites Ukrainian as her native language. At home, Katya 
speaks both Ukrainian and Russian. She reports having learned Russian both in school, 
where Russian was the language of instruction, and at the institute. Katya teaches a total 
of eighteen hours a week: six hours of Russian and twelve hours of world literature. She 
also supervises the Young Journalists’ Club and the Intellectual Games Club at the 
gymnasium where she works.  
3. Galina, 49, teaches Russian literature and works as the director of a Russian-language 
gymnasium in a large Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking city in central Ukraine. Russian 
is taught as a native language and is a required course for all students (grades one through 
eleven) at the gymnasium. While she considers herself Ukrainian, she cites Russian as 
her native language and speaks Russian at home. Galina has thirty-two years’ teaching 
experience and has taught Russian for twenty-seven years. She currently teaches Russian 
literature eight hours per week.  
4. Tanya, 44, teaches Russian at a Russian-language gymnasium in a large Russian- and 
Ukrainian-speaking city in central Ukraine. At her gymnasium, Russian is taught as a 
native language and is a required course for all students (grades one through eleven). 
While she considers herself Ukrainian, she cites Russian as her native language and 
speaks Russian at home. Tanya has twenty-five years’ teaching experience and has taught 
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Russian throughout her teaching career. She teaches twelve hours per week: six hours of 
Russian and six hours of world literature. She also oversees the Museum Club, which 
organizes literature-related activities and excursions of the museum located in her 
gymnasium.  
5. Valentina, 57, teaches Russian at two institutions: a teachers college and the lyceum 
affiliated with it. She lives and works in a mid-size industrial city in central Ukraine 
where both Russian and Ukrainian are spoken widely. Ukrainian is the language of 
instruction at both institutions. At the lyceum, which is open to students in grades eight 
through eleven, all students study Russian one hour per week per administrative 
discretion. Valentina has thirty years’ experience teaching Russian and has taught a total 
of thirty-eight years. While she identifies herself as Ukrainian and cites Ukrainian as her 
native language, Valentina speaks both Ukrainian and Russian at home. She reports 
having learned Russian as a child in a bilingual environment, during her studies in school 
and at a teachers college, and through Russian classics and contemporary literature. 
Valentina teaches a total of twenty-two hours per week, including seven hours of 
Russian. In addition to Russian, Valentina teaches foreign literature and two elective 
courses: Russian Orthography and a course that prepares students to defend research 
papers at the Minor Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.32 
                                                
32 The Minor Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, which has operated in its current form since 1993 based on 
roots dating back nearly seventy years, is a governmental organization that supports high-school student 
research activities in Ukraine. For further information, see http://man.gov.ua. 
 
124 
6. Lyuba, 42, teaches at a lyceum in a small, central, predominantly Ukrainian-speaking 
town. Ukrainian is the language of instruction at her lyceum, which specializes in 
economics and mathematics. Russian is offered to students of all grades (eight through 
eleven) at the lyceum but is not a required course. Lyuba identifies herself as Ukrainian 
and as a native speaker of Ukrainian. She learned to speak Russian in her family growing 
up, and as an adult, she speaks both Ukrainian and Russian at home. Lyuba has been 
teaching Russian for fifteen years and has a total of seventeen years’ teaching experience. 
She teaches a total of nine hours per week. In addition to two hours of Russian per week, 
she teaches two elective courses: foreign literature and Ukrainian language and literature. 
7. Tamara, 63, teaches Russian at a specialized school in a mid-size Ukrainian-speaking 
city in western Ukraine. Her school, which specializes in intensive English language 
study in all grades (one through eleven), is the only one of its kind in the oblast that 
features Russian as the general language of instruction. Tamara was born and raised in 
Russia and settled in western Ukraine at the age of twenty-two. She considers herself 
Russian and considers Russian her native language. She has been teaching Russian 
throughout her thirty-four-year teaching career. From 1981 until 1995, she taught Russian 
language and Russian and foreign literature to students in the upper grades. In 1995, 
when Russian ceased to be a required course in Ukrainian schools, she began teaching 
students in the elementary grades. She teaches a total of thirteen hours per week, 
including five hours of Russian.  
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8. Yana, 43, teaches foreign literature and Ukrainian language and literature in a small 
Ukrainian-speaking city in western Ukraine. She has twenty years’ teaching experience. 
Students in grades one through eleven study at her school. Russian is not a required 
course in her school, and the study of Russian is only offered to those students who began 
learning it in fifth grade, i.e., students in grades seven through nine during the 2015-2016 
academic year. These students study Russian two hours per week. While Yana identifies 
herself as Ukrainian and as a native speaker of Ukrainian, she speaks both Ukrainian and 
Russian at home, and she learned to speak Russian in school. Like all of the teachers of 
Russian interviewed for this study, Yana studied to become a teacher of Russian language 
and literature. She also earned credentials in Ukrainian philology.33 When Russian was 
withdrawn from the curriculum in the schools in her city in 2014, she began teaching 
Ukrainian. She currently teaches twenty hours per week.  
9. Oksana, 49, is the only teacher of Russian at a school that specializes in information 
technology in a large Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking city in central Ukraine. Ukrainian 
is the language of instruction at her school, which serves students in grades one through 
eleven. Russian, an elective course, is offered as a second foreign language two hours per 
week in grades five through nine. Oksana was born and raised in Bessarabia, a historical 
region whose territory includes parts of Moldova and southern Ukraine. She considers 
herself Russian, cites Russian as her native language, and speaks Russian at home. She 
                                                
33 Philology is the study of language in written historical sources. It is a combination of literary criticism, 
history, and linguistics. Philology is more commonly defined as the study of literary texts and written 
records, the establishment of their authenticity and their original form, and the determination of their 
meaning. Philology can also refer more generically to linguistics—especially those of ancient, dead 
languages—and historical and comparative linguistics. 
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has taught Russian a total of twenty-eight years: twenty-four years at a large school in the 
Odesa region, and then, after moving to central Ukraine, four years at the school where 
she now teaches. Oksana teaches Russian exclusively for a total of twenty hours per 
week. 
10. Nadya, 48, teaches Russian at a lyceum in a large Russian-speaking city in eastern 
Ukraine. In addition to being a candidate of pedagogical sciences,34 she has been 
recognized by the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine for excellence in the 
sphere of education, and she bears the honorary title Honored Teacher of Ukraine that 
was awarded to her by the president of Ukraine. Although she was born in Ukraine, she 
considers herself Russian and speaks Russian at home and as a native language. She has 
been teaching for twenty-six years and has taught Russian throughout her career. Russian 
is the language of instruction and a required course for all students at the lyceum where 
she teaches, which is open to students in grades five through eleven. Nadya teaches 
Russian a total of twenty-four hours a week. She also teaches an elective course entitled 
Basics of Christian Ethics.  
11. Alexandra, 35, teaches Russian at a lyceum in a large Russian-speaking city in 
eastern Ukraine. Although she was born in Ukraine, she considers herself Russian and 
speaks Russian at home and as a native language. She has six years’ teaching experience 
and has taught Russian throughout these six years. Russian is the language of instruction 
                                                
34 The Candidate of Sciences [kandidat nauk] degree is a post-graduate academic degree in the Soviet 
Union and in some former Eastern Bloc countries, including Ukraine, that is awarded for completion of 
original research that constitutes a significant contribution to the field of specialization. This degree is 
usually deemed equivalent to the Ph.D. in the United States, depending on the quality of the dissertation. 
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and is a required course for all students, who are in grades five through eleven, at the 
lyceum where she works. Alexandra’s total teaching load is twenty-four hours per week. 
She teaches Russian fifteen hours a week and literature nine hours per week.  
12. Olena, 45, teaches Russian at a gymnasium in a mid-size Ukrainian-speaking city in 
northwestern Ukraine. She considers herself Ukrainian and speaks Ukrainian as a native 
language and at home. She learned Russian in school and while studying at the institute. 
She has twenty-one years’ teaching experience and has taught Russian throughout her 
teaching career. While Ukrainian is the language of instruction at her gymnasium, 
Russian is a required course that is taught as a second foreign language beginning in 
grade five. Olena teaches eighteen hours per week, including six hours of Russian and 
twelve hours of foreign literature. 
13. Svetlana, 57, teaches Russian at a lyceum offering specialized and college-
preparatory training in a large Russian-speaking city in northeastern Ukraine. She was 
born in Kazakhstan but considers herself Ukrainian. She considers Russian, which she 
speaks at home, her native language. She has taught Russian throughout her thirty-two-
year teaching career. At her lyceum, Russian is the language of instruction, is taught as a 
national minority language, and is a required course for students of all grades (one 
through eleven). Svetlana teaches twenty hours per week, including six hours of Russian 
and fourteen hours of literature (Russian and foreign).  
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14. Natasha, 43, teaches Russian at two schools in a large Russian-speaking city in 
Crimea.35 Natasha considers herself Russian and speaks Russian as her native language 
and at home. She has sixteen years’ teaching experience and has taught Russian since the 
beginning of her teaching career. Russian is the language of instruction at the schools 
where she teaches, which now, like all other public schools in Crimea, fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation. Russian 
is taught as a native language and as a required course in all grades (one through eleven) 
at the main school where Natasha teaches fives days per week. In total, she teaches 
twenty-four hours per week, including eight hours of Russian, in grades five and nine. 
She also teaches literature and an area studies course that focuses on the history of her 
city.  
15. Olga, 66, has taught Russian for thirty-eight years at a specialized school in a large 
Russian-speaking city in southern Ukraine. At the school where Olga teaches, which 
serves students in grades one through eleven, Ukrainian is the language of instruction for 
just over two-thirds of the students, while Russian is the language of instruction for the 
remaining one-third. Russian is a required course at Olga’s school and is taught as a 
second foreign language beginning in the first grade. Olga was born and raised in Russia 
and moved to southern Ukraine at the age of twenty-three. Russian is Olga’s native 
language, and she identifies herself as Russian. She has been teaching Russian throughout 
                                                
35 As a result of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution and subsequent annexation of Crimea by the Russian 
Federation, the political status of Crimea is the subject of a political and territorial dispute between Ukraine 
and the Russian Federation. Crimea was part of Ukraine during the early stages of this study, and Natasha 




her forty-one-year teaching career in Ukraine. She teaches Russian exclusively, a total of 
eighteen hours per week. The number of hours per week that students study Russian at 
her school varies from one hour to five and a half, depending on grade level and area of 
specialization (music, English philology, Ukrainian philology, information technology, 
etc.).  
16. Vera, 43, teaches Russian at a gymnasium in a large Russian-speaking city in eastern 
Ukraine. Although she was born in Ukraine, she considers herself Russian and speaks 
Russian at home and as a native language. At the gymnasium where Vera teaches, 
Ukrainian is the language of instruction for all students (grades one through eleven). 
Russian is taught as a national minority language36 at her gymnasium but is not a required 
course. Vera teaches a total of twenty-five hours per week—ten hours of Russian plus 
four other courses: foreign literature, economics, music and an integrative literature 
course. Vera has been teaching Russian throughout her nineteen-year teaching career.  
17. Lyudmyla, 56, teaches Russian at a gymnasium in a Ukrainian-speaking village 
[selishche mis'kogo typu] in west-central Ukraine. While she considers herself Ukrainian 
and speaks Ukrainian as a native language and at home, she studied Russian in middle 
and high school. Ukrainian is the language of instruction at the gymnasium where 
Lyudmyla works, which educates children in grades one through eleven. Although 
Russian is a national minority language in the region where the gymnasium is located, 
Russian is not a required course and is currently being taught to two groups of students 
                                                
36 For a discussion of the status of the Russian language in Ukraine, see chapter 3. 
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only—those who are in the seventh and eighth grades this year—who happen to study 
under a curriculum that offers Russian in grades five through nine. Although students in 
grades three and four are also budgeted one hour of Russian instruction per week at her 
gymnasium, teachers informally have the option to use this hour for other purposes. 
Lyudmyla teaches Russian a total of eighteen hours per week. She has been teaching 




Chapter 5: Data Presentation and Analysis  
POLICY AND THE TEACHING OF RUSSIAN 
The first research question for this study focused on how policies related to the 
role and status of the Russian language in Ukraine have evolved since Ukraine became an 
independent nation, and how this evolution in language policy has affected the teaching 
of Russian there. The hypothesis was that changes in language policy in post-Soviet 
Ukraine have negatively affected the status of, and attitudes toward, the Russian language 
in general and within the education system and have led to decreased hours devoted to 
Russian language studies in the curriculum. The question of how language policies have 
evolved in post-Soviet Ukraine was answered in chapter 3, which presented a detailed 
summary of these changes. The question of how the evolution of language policy has 
affected the teaching of Russian in Ukraine will be answered based on an analysis of data 
collected in response to four related questions posed during interviews with the research 
subjects.  
Should Russian be a Required Course in Ukrainian Schools? 
One of the most significant changes in language policy following Ukraine’s 
independence from the Soviet Union was the end of compulsory Russian-language study 
in Ukrainian schools in which Russian was not the language of instruction. Considering 
that Russian, which had been a required course in Ukrainian schools for over fifty years, 
has been phased out of the curricula of many types of schools altogether, teachers were 
asked whether they believed Russian should be a required course for all schoolchildren in 
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Ukraine. Responses were analyzed based on where the teachers lived, their self-
identification, and the language of instruction of the schools in which they worked. 
Given that Russian has historically been either a dominant language or a 
widespread second language in Ukraine, one might expect that teachers of Russian would 
prefer that the language be taught in all Ukrainian schools. On the contrary, a slight 
majority of teachers interviewed for this study—ten of seventeen—responded that 
Russian should not be a required course in all Ukrainian schools.  
Of the three teachers from predominantly Ukrainian-speaking western Ukraine, 
all expressed that Russian should not be a required course. Of the ten teachers from 
historically bilingual central and southern Ukraine, exactly half—five teachers—posited 
that Russian should not be a required course in Ukrainian schools, and the other half 
expressed that Russian should, indeed, be a required course for all pre-university students 
in Ukraine. Of the three teachers interviewed from predominantly Russian-speaking 
eastern Ukraine, one stated that Russian should not be taught as a required course, 
whereas two insisted it should be. These responses provide evidence that the historic 
political and linguistic divide between eastern and western Ukraine does influence 
opinions related to language policy in Ukraine in predictable ways, with teachers in 
western Ukraine demonstrating a greater interest in advancing the Ukrainian language, 
teachers in central regions being divided in their opinions, and teachers in eastern regions 
siding with efforts to maintain the linguistic rights of native speakers of Russian.  
One might expect a correlation between ethnicity and opinions regarding the 
status of Russian in Ukrainian schools among teachers interviewed for this study, with 
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teachers who identify themselves as Russian expressing greater interest in a return of 
Russian as a compulsory language. The data indicated that among those teachers who 
expressed that Russian should be a required course in all Ukrainian school, three 
identified themselves as Ukrainian, and four self-identified as Russian. Among teachers 
who were of the opinion that Russian should not be a required course, seven identified 
themselves as Ukrainian, and three identified themselves as Russian. In other words, a 
higher number of those who identified themselves as Ukrainian were of the opinion that 
Russian should not be a required course, whereas a higher number of those who 
identified themselves as Russian expressed that Russian should be a required course. The 
data, therefore, demonstrate a loose correlation between ethnic self-identification and 
opinions about whether Russian should be a required course in schools. This correlation, 
however, is not absolute: three teachers who self-identified as Russian and three who 
self-identified as Ukrainian expressed the opposite view of what might have been 
expected. This lack of a consistent correlation between ethnicity and opinions about 
language study in Ukrainian schools suggests that factors other than ethnicity also affect 
opinions related to language use in Ukraine.  
In terms of responses to the question of whether Russian should be a required 
course in all Ukrainian schools, no clear pattern emerged based on the language of 
instruction of the schools where respondents taught. While one might expect teachers 
from Russian-language schools to be most interested in preserving Russian language 
studies in all Ukrainian schools, one might also conjecture that as the number of hours 
devoted to the study of Russian decreases in Ukrainian-language schools, the teachers in 
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those schools might be even more troubled by the decline in Russian language studies 
than those teachers who work in schools where Russian is taught as a required course. 
The data demonstrate that a slight majority of teachers at both Ukrainian-language 
schools (six of ten) and Russian-language schools (four of seven) were of the opinion that 
Russian should not be a compulsory subject. Thus, not only are a majority of teachers—
ten of seventeen—against the compulsory study of Russian in all Ukrainian schools; the 
majority of teachers in both Ukrainian- and Russian-language schools are of this opinion. 
These findings suggest that the language of instruction of the schools where teachers in 
this study work does not influence their opinions regarding whether Russian language 
studies should be compulsory in all Ukrainian schools.  
As to reasons why Russian should not be taught as a required course in Ukrainian 
schools, teachers most frequently cited a belief that parents, not the Ukrainian Ministry of 
Education, should choose which languages children study. A total of six teachers out of 
ten expressed this view. Lyuba, like several of her colleagues, suggested that the choice 
of language study should depend on the region and on parental input. Tamara stated that 
Russian should be available as an elective course for all students but should not be a 
required course. Tanya, like Tamara, suggested that even though there were few Russian 
speakers in western Ukraine, Russian could still be offered as a foreign language. Oksana 
expressed overall dislike for a common standard for all students and thought that students 
should have more of a say in what they study in general.  
Kostya expressed mixed feelings about whether Russian should be taught as a 
required course. At first he declared that Russian should be a required course and then 
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later suggested, as did the teachers above, that it would be best if there were a choice. He 
expressed his thoughts this way: 
It’s good to learn Russian. For us, learning Russian is simple and easy; we all 
know how to speak it anyway. But I don’t think it should be a required course. I 
think there should be a choice. To be honest, this is a hard question to answer. It 
doesn’t depend on us, on teachers of Russian, or even on the people. It all depends 
on politics. 
Like Kostya, Natasha at first declared that Russian should be a mandatory subject 
in Ukrainian schools, but then changed her mind: 
Maybe it would be better to split the country. Southern Ukraine should study 
Russian, while western Ukraine should study Polish or Hungarian. They are 
closer to Poland and Hungary, and they go there to make money to supplement 
their incomes. Russian is, however, a language of international communication, so 
maybe they should still study it a little bit, at least so that they can speak it. Well, 
they should decide for themselves. 
Several teachers suggested that languages other than Russian could be required 
courses of study in certain regions, but that no languages other than Ukrainian should be 
compulsory nationwide. Olena, for example, offered that Polish would be the best choice 
for a required language. “These days,” she explained, “our students go to Poland to study. 
They study in Europe, in Germany, in England…. No one goes to Russia to study 
anymore.” “They all stay in Ukraine or go to Europe,” added Tanya. Yana offered her 
own ideas about language requirements, suggesting that in her region (Zakarpattia), 
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Hungarian or Slovenian should be a required language. Upon further reflection, however, 
she declared that she would like to remove language requirements altogether. “People 
should be able to decide what they want to study and what they feel they need to study. 
But definitely not Russian.”  
Several teachers cited the current political tensions between Russia and Ukraine 
as reasons that Russian should not be a required course in Ukrainian schools. Tanya, for 
example, said that, given the current situation, it would be “wrong to force students to 
study Russian.” “To this day,” she explained, “there is irreconcilable hostility toward 
Russia dating back to when Soviet troops occupied western Ukraine. Our country is now 
united by the patriotic idea of opposition to Russia.”37 Olena expressed a similar opinion: 
“Why should Russian be a required course? We can do without Russian these days. All 
economic relations with Russia have been broken off.” 
In her explanation for why Russian should not be a required course, Galina, the 
director of a Russian-language gymnasium in central Ukraine, did not cite politics or a 
desire for students to have a choice of which languages they study. Instead, she reported 
that since she worked in a Russian-language institution, she felt obligated to declare that 
all children in Ukraine should learn Russian, but that she didn’t, personally, hold that 
belief. Instead, she suggested that at the very least, in order to be part of the working 
class, knowledge of Ukrainian is enough. “In principle,” she said, “the official language 
is Ukrainian, and Ukrainian is also the language of business. Therefore, people can make 
                                                
37 Evidence of continued support of close political ties with Russia on the part of many Ukrainian citizens 
in eastern Ukraine contradicts Tanya’s assertion that Ukraine is “united by the patriotic idea of opposition 
to Russia.” Tanya, who lives in central Ukraine, may be expressing the sentiments she has heard expressed 
by those around her.  
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do with Ukrainian alone.” Galina’s commentary suggests that the need to promote 
Russian as part of her job as director of a Russian-language institution goes against her 
personal beliefs related to the relative importance of the Russian language in Ukraine. 
Given that her elite gymnasium educates college-prep students who would benefit from 
knowledge of several languages, it appears that her claim that people can “make do with 
Ukrainian alone” does not apply to her own students.   
While more than half of the teachers interviewed thought that Russian should not 
be a required course in Ukraine, six teachers expressed the opposite view: that Russian 
should be a required course in all Ukrainian schools. The reasons behind this belief 
varied considerably, with teachers citing, for example, the beauty of the Russian language 
and the practicality of knowing a language that has enjoyed a long history in Ukraine. 
Katya, who teaches in central Ukraine, explained her thoughts this way: 
Should Russian be a required course for all students in Ukraine? I think so, yes. 
You know, of course, that there is a war going on, that we are experiencing 
aggression on the part of Russia, and that Crimea has been annexed. Many 
children don’t want to study Russian. Some children said that they did not want to 
study the language of the aggressor. Many of them have fathers who are fighting 
in the war. I responded, ‘Children, look. In Nazi Germany, there was Hitler, but 
we still study German, we read Goethe, we enjoy the works of Schiller. And in 
Italy there was Mussolini, but we still study Dante.’ Russian is a beautiful 
language with exquisite literature, and if you learn another language, if you learn 
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it well and speak it beautifully, that can only be a positive thing. I feel that the 
language is necessary. 
Alexandra expressed a sentiment frequently echoed by other teachers, particularly 
teachers in eastern Ukraine: “[Should] all students in Ukraine [study Russian]? Of course, 
because we are Slavs.” She believes that as a language of international communication in 
the sciences and as a “spiritual repository of Russian culture,” the Russian language 
“should not, under any circumstances, be rejected or forgotten by anyone.” 
Lyudmyla, who described herself as “a great patriot of Ukraine,” expressed more 
practical reasons why Russian should be a required course in Ukrainian schools.  
The Ukrainian government overcompensated when they removed the Russian-
language requirement in schools, because Russian is a necessity in a multinational 
country such as Ukraine, where almost everyone speaks Russian in the east, in the 
south, and in cities. [The presence of] Russian does not degrade the prestige of the 
Ukrainian language.  
Nadya listed several reasons why Russian should be a required course in 
Ukrainian schools: Russia is the largest country in the world; hundreds of millions of 
people speak Russian; the Russian culture is, as she put it, one of the most fascinating 
cultures; Russian goes hand in hand with the study of business, science, political science, 
engineering, and other languages; and Russian leads to spiritual self-awareness on the 
part of students. She believes that Russian offers a unique opportunity for spiritual 
growth within the educational system. Echoing Alexandra’s words, Nadya specifically 
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cited the importance of Russian in the scientific world, pointing out that Russian is the 
language of publication for many scientific journals. 
Of the teachers who believed that Russian should be a required course in 
Ukrainian schools, Olga expressed her opinion most passionately.  
Russian should be a required course not only in Ukraine, but worldwide. The 
nineteenth century was the golden age of Russian literature. How can you study it 
in an English translation or French or German? How? You can only do it in 
Russian! The humanities should only be taught in Russian, not only in Ukraine, 
but around the world. It is such a beautiful language. It is filled with such feeling, 
so much ecstasy, charm, compassion… How could it not be a required language? 
It must be! 
While Olga expresses deep affection for the Russian language, her opinion that it should 
be a required course for all students in Ukraine raises important questions, including 
those related to the value of reading works in translation and, moreover, those regarding 
the determination of required versus elective courses.  
The data demonstrate that, in spite of Ukraine’s long relationship with Russia and 
their language and a decades-long tradition of compulsory Russian language education in 
Soviet schools during the twentieth century, teachers do not appear to embrace a 
nostalgic or historic mandate to keep the Russian language in Ukrainian schools. While a 
clear majority of the teachers—ten of seventeen—are of the opinion that Russian should 
not be a required language, their responses demonstrate new allegiances to Ukraine as an 
independent state that transcend traditional ethnic and regional lines. 
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Russian-Language Schools in Independent Ukraine (1991 - Present) 
Another change in language policy in post-Soviet Ukraine that had a significant 
impact on the teaching of Russian in that country was the mandate to increase the 
percentage of students studying in Ukrainian-language schools. The closure of Russian-
language schools or their conversion to schools offering Ukrainian as the language of 
instruction led to a significant decrease in the number of Russian-language schools in 
Ukraine and in the percentage of schoolchildren studying in them. Given the efforts in 
post-Soviet Ukraine to counteract decades of Russification, an analysis of discussions 
regarding the place and status of Russian-language schools in post-Soviet Ukraine will 
help answer the question of how the evolution of language policy has affected the 
teaching of Russian in that country.  
When asked to share their thoughts about the role of Russian-language schools 
and whether a need for them persists in post-Soviet Ukraine, teachers responded nearly 
unanimously: sixteen out of seventeen teachers stated that there was still a place and need 
for Russian-language schools in Ukraine. Only one teacher, Katya, was of the opinion 
that there is no need for Russian-language schools. She said: 
What is the point of having them now, when Ukrainian is the state language? If 
Muslims came to America, would you build Arabic-language schools for them? 
Any self-respecting country or nation […] must insist that if you come to live 
here, you live among us. For that reason, we need to quietly get rid of Russian-
language schools. Should we study Russian? Yes. Should there be Russian-
language schools? No. 
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Perhaps rather than a reference to the construction of Arabic-language schools in the 
United States, a closer parallel would be the support of Spanish-language schools in 
places where Spanish had once been a primary language, e.g., Texas. Many people 
believe there should be Spanish-language schools in these places, although pushback is 
evident from many English-speakers. A similar parallel can be found in issues related to 
French-language schools in Quebec. So while Katya was alone in her opinion that there 
was no longer a place in Ukraine for Russian-language schools, her response does raise 
relevant issues related to the coexistence of Russian and Ukrainian in her country, 
particularly whether continuing to offer Russian-language schools in Ukraine hinders 
national unity by allowing Russian-speakers to maintain a monolingual environment and 
not integrate into Ukrainian society as a whole. Katya’s unease reflects Kulyk’s (2013)  
concern that Russian-speakers who seek to raise the status of Russian in Ukraine actually 
wish to do so in order to remain unilingual. 
Regarding their support of Russian-language schools, seven of the seventeen 
teachers interviewed cited an overall need for such schools in Ukraine. Natasha sees a 
need for Russian-language schools in Ukraine but doesn’t think those in power will allow 
those schools to develop further. She said, “As long as [President] Poroshenko is in 
power…he will do everything to try to suppress it [Russian]. But people will speak in the 
language they want…. You can’t destroy a language, no matter how hard you try, but 
they will try to suppress Russian.” Vera added that Russian-language schools are 
important for the Russian-speaking population, because “Russian is their language, their 
culture, and the language of their ancestors.” 
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Olena expressed that Russian-language schools were needed in the regions that 
border Russia, such as Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk, but at the same time she 
questions why the languages of other neighboring countries such as Belarus are less 
studied in Ukraine. Like Olena, Svetlana does not see a need for Russian-language 
schools in western Ukraine but recognizes a need for them in the east. She explained her 
thoughts this way: “There is a huge number of Russian-speakers in Ukraine. Like any 
diaspora, even overseas ones, they are trying not to forget their language. Of course, they 
should study their language. In areas where Russian is heard everywhere, it would be 
unnatural not to teach Russian.” 
Three teachers, two from central Ukraine and one from western Ukraine, cited a 
need for Russian-language schools based on the patterns of migration to their areas. 
Kostya declared that there was “definitely a need” for Russian-language schools, citing 
the large number of families settling in his area not only from eastern Ukraine but also 
from the Caucasus. He indicated that because those families do not know Ukrainian very 
well, it is easier for their children to study in schools where Russian is the language of 
instruction. Valentina cited the same need for Russian-language schools as Kostya: for 
students of other nationalities. She explained that in her city, there is a Russian-language 
school just for students whose parents have come to the city on business or on a mission. 
Lyudmyla said that even though there is only one Russian-language school left in the 
administrative center of her oblast, which used to offer five or six, she still sees a need, 
especially for those who have migrated from eastern Ukraine. She said, “If they migrate 
to a large city, why shouldn’t they be able to send their children to a Russian-language 
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school? In our village, we don’t need one. There is simply no need for one; who would 
send their child to study there? But in cities, there should at least be one, especially now 
that we have migrants.” 
Two teachers cited a need to maintain Russian-language schools as a show of 
support for minority language needs, with Lyuba summing up such thoughts this way: 
A lot of Russians live here—a lot of people who are ethnically Russian. We have 
Hungarian-language schools, Polish-language schools, and schools where 
students study Hebrew and take all of their classes in Hebrew. And since there is 
such a large number of Russians here, it’s absolutely necessary for there to be 
Russian-language schools in order not to infringe on the unique national character 
of these people.  
Other reasons cited for Russian-language schools include a necessity to maintain 
a high level of literacy among speakers of Russian—a concern also expressed by 
Bilaniuk (2008) and the same issue that prompted this study; the belief that parents have 
the right to educate their children in their native language; and a need to counterbalance 
“an overcorrection of twentieth-century language policy” and “protect the Russian 
language” (Nadya).  
While one might conjecture that attitudes toward Russian-language schools in 
Ukraine would be divided across ethnic or geographical lines, the data demonstrate the 
opposite: nearly unanimous support for such schools. Regardless of their ethnic 
identification, all of the teachers who were born in Ukraine expressed support for 
Russian-language schools in their country. Geography did not appear to play a role in 
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attitudes, either. For example, all of the teachers from western Ukraine, which is 
predominantly Ukrainian-speaking, expressed support for Russian-language schools in 
their country. No expressions of resentment were evident regarding earlier Soviet-era 
Russification efforts in Ukraine, nor were suggestions to eliminate Russian-language 
schools to make up for the previous suppression of the Ukrainian language. Instead, 
teachers expressed willingness and a desire to accommodate not only the largely Russian-
speaking population in eastern Ukraine, but also Russian-speaking migrants from eastern 
Ukraine, Russia, and the Caucasus.  
For their part, teachers from eastern Ukraine, all of whom also expressed support 
for Russian-language schools, cited a need for such schools from a strictly practical 
standpoint: such schools meet the needs of the Russian-speaking population. No teacher 
expressed a belief that the Russian language was superior to Ukrainian or should be 
taught out of a sense of tradition or nostalgia for a time when Russian-language schools 
were the norm and not the exception. In their commentary about Russian-language 
schools in Ukraine, teachers across the country, with the exception of a single teacher in 
central Ukraine, expressed not only tolerance toward Russian-language schools, but 
genuine support for native-language instruction for speakers of Russian and of other 
minority languages. These data suggest that in spite of the ongoing Ukrainian-versus-
Russian debate and the contentious language policy rhetoric offered by politicians on 
both sides of this divide, the language educators who participated in this study embrace 
Ukraine’s historical tolerance as a multilingual nation. The open-minded attitudes 
expressed by these teachers toward native-language instruction for all children in Ukraine 
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coincide neatly with a common argument cited by more than one of the teachers and also 
by Kulyk (2013): that “there is no genuine language problem in Ukraine, and politicians 
keep creating it artificially for their own purposes— or that there would be no problem if 
it were not for politicians” (286). These attitudes also reflect Kulyk’s (2015) later 
findings: that even in post-Euromaidan Ukraine, Ukrainians “largely support the 
uninhibited use of Russian” (2). 
The Status of the Russian Language in Ukraine 
Another major change in language policy that has affected the teaching of Russian 
in Ukraine was the adoption of Ukrainian as the sole state language in 1989. This 
declaration marked the beginning of efforts to foster national unity under a single 
language and ushered in a time of uncertainty regarding the status and future of the 
Russian language in Ukraine. Since that time, the use and status of the Russian language 
has been a subject of political disputes within the Ukrainian government and in society as 
a whole. While Russian is recognized as a national minority language throughout Ukraine 
and, as of 2012, as a regional language in several southern and eastern oblasts and cities, 
questions related to the ideal status of Russian and whether Russian should be granted the 
status of state language alongside Ukrainian continue to be a topic of debate in Ukraine. 
Given that language policy plays a significant role in education policy by influencing 
decisions related to languages of instruction, languages offered in schools, and the status 
of languages within schools, the seventeen teachers interviewed were asked what they 
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thought the status of Russian should be in their country. Teachers were free to articulate 
their thoughts using whatever terminology they wished.  
 
Suggested Status of Russian in Ukraine Number of Responses 
Sole state language 0 
Second state language 4 
Regional language 2 
National minority language 5 
Language of international communication 2 
Foreign language 2 
No answer 2 
 
Suggested Status of Russian in Ukraine and Number of Responses  
 
Although no teacher suggested that Russian should be the sole state language of 
Ukraine, four teachers were of the opinion that Russian should be a second state language 
alongside Ukrainian. Two teachers expressed that Russian should be a regional language 
only, i.e., should be allowed to have official status only in those regions that have 
declared it to be a regional language based on the percentage of Russian-speakers in those 
areas. The largest number of teachers—five—thought Russian should retain its current 
status, that of a national minority language. Two teachers suggested that Russian should 
be recognized according to its former unofficial status, that of a language of international 
communication.38 Two other teachers thought that Russian should have the same status as 
any other foreign language in Ukraine, i.e., Russian should not enjoy any official status. 
                                                
38 The term “language of international communication” is not an official status granted by a legislature. 
Instead, the term refers to what is commonly known as an international auxiliary language. An auxiliary 
language is primarily a second language meant to facilitate communication among peoples of various 
nations who do not share a common first language. Within the Soviet Union, Russian was promoted as an 
auxiliary language. Since auxiliary languages are generally associated with a dominant, elite culture, they 
are frequently met with resistance by those wishing to preserve their national cultures and languages.  
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Finally, one teacher requested not to share her opinion about the status of Russian, and 
another refused to answer the question. 
Second State Language 
Among the four teachers who thought Russian should be a state language 
alongside Ukrainian, two of them live in southeastern Ukraine, in the historically 
Russian-speaking region of Donbas; one lives in Kyiv but was raised in a Russian-
speaking area of Bessarabia; and one lives in Crimea. All four of these teachers consider 
themselves Russian and cited Russian as their native language. They expressed a desire 
for the Russian language to have full legal status alongside Ukrainian for historical and 
practical reasons.  
Alexandra, Oksana, and Natasha suggested that since Russian is a majority39 [sic] 
language, it should enjoy the status of a state language. Alexandra declared that Russian 
should be a second state language due to the large percentage of Ukrainian citizens who 
are ethnically Russian. “As a rule,” she said, “no matter where you go, no matter where 
you look, you see Russians.” Oksana expressed her thoughts this way: “I think…Russian 
as a majority language—it truly is the language of the majority—should have some kind 
of special status. Almost everyone who lives in Ukraine speaks this language. I mean, 
even on television we see that the deputies in the Verkhovna Rada40 speak Russian.” 
Oksana, who suggested twice that Russian was deserving of special status, also lamented 
                                                
39 While Ukrainian is the majority language in Ukraine as a whole, Russian is the majority language in the 
areas where these four teachers grew up and where three of them still live.  
40 Composed of 450 deputies, the Verhovna Rada of Ukraine (literally Supreme Council of Ukraine) is the 
unicameral parliament of Ukraine and the sole body of legislative power in that country.  
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that many schools were dropping Russian from the curriculum. This reaction reflects 
what Chinn and Kaiser (1996) expressed: that Russian populations outside of Russia have 
faced a dramatic decline in status since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. According to 
these authors, Russians’ protests regarding the status of Russian revolve around their 
dominant status being downgraded to a simple minority status in the post-Soviet states. 
Nadya cited historical reasons why Russian should be a second state language in 
Ukraine. “Since Donbas has always been a bilingual region, we fought over which 
language should be our main regional language: Ukrainian or Russian. Seventy or eighty 
percent of us consider Russian our native language, but we have always respected the 
Ukrainian language. Ukrainian and Russian have always existed side by side.”  
Regional Language 
Of the seventeen teachers interviewed, two teachers expressed that Russian 
should be a regional language, but both hesitated to answer the question and expressed 
uncertainty as to the ideal status of Russian. Kostya agreed with the decision to make 
Russian a regional language in some oblasts, but since the language was already widely 
spoken, he did not believe that the status of regional language made any difference. 
Kostya expressed that the status of Russian didn’t matter to him, as long as a decision 
about its status—some sort of compromise—ended the confrontation and promoted 
peace. He explained his thoughts this way: 
Russian is in a category of its own, sort of separate. You have foreign 
languages—you have English, German, French—but Russian is sort of…not a 
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foreign language, not a state language, but simply…. Well, the Russian language 
stands alone! I would like it to have whatever status it needs in order for the 
confrontation to end.  
Katya, however, expressed that Russian should be a regional language or simply a 
language in which some people choose to communicate, but stressed that in either case, 
there was no need to protect the Russian language in Ukraine. “We don’t protect English 
in Ukraine. Ukrainian should be protected in Ukraine, and English in England, and 
Russian in Russia. We should protect our Ukrainian language and not Russian. Let 
Russia protect Russian.”  
National Minority Language 
The largest number of teachers in the study—five of seventeen—expressed 
satisfaction with the current status of Russian as a protected national minority language.  
Yana’s response best summed up these teachers’ thoughts: “There are a lot of national 
minority languages in Ukraine, including Russian. But we aren’t looking to make 
Hungarian or Polish a second state language, so Russian should be on the same level as 
they are.”  
One of the five teachers, Tanya, who teaches at a Russian-language school, 
expressed that she had once thought Russian and Ukrainian could be state languages 
alongside each other, but that she no longer held that view. She expressed very mixed 
feelings about the protected national minority status of Russian, sharing her thoughts 
about the current status of Russian this way: “We can’t call Russian a national minority 
 
150 
language. It’s incorrect to call our school a national minority school. But in the current 
political situation, I don’t even know what kind of status [Russian] should be granted. 
[…] This conflict [the war] wouldn’t be taking place were it not for Russia.” 
Language of International Communication 
Two teachers responded that in Ukraine, Russian should enjoy the status that it 
used have: that of a language of national and international communication. Valentina 
articulated her thoughts this way: “Russian-speakers should be allowed to communicate 
in this language [Russian]. Books should be published, they should allow television 
programs in the language. I don’t think the language is going to bother anyone.” 
Lyudmyla, in turn, explained her choice: “We can’t learn Hebrew, after all, or 
Hungarian…so in order to communicate, Russian is an option. Ukrainian could also be 
learned by Hungarians and Jews, or, well, by anyone, but given the current situation, I 
think Russian should be a language of communication.” Given efforts by Ukraine to 
foster closer relations with its European neighbors to the west, the teachers who suggest 
that Russian should receive greater recognition as a language of international 
communication may recognize the importance of protecting the Russian language in 
accordance with the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992) and 
may also see the protection of language rights in Ukraine as a way to fulfill one of the 
requirements for Ukraine to become a member of the European Union in the future.41 
                                                
41 The Russian language, like other minority languages in Ukraine, is protected under the Ukrainian 
Constitution. This protection is in place to ensure the linguistic rights of speakers of minority languages, 




Two other teachers, both of whom expressly stated their opposition to making 
Russian a state language in Ukraine, expressed their desire for Russian to be considered a 
second language or foreign language like any other. Olena stated that even though 
Ukraine has a large Russian-speaking population and many people wish Russian were a 
state language, it should have the status of a foreign language, because there should be 
only one state language. Svetlana expressed that raising Russian to the level of a state 
language would be too much of a promotion, whereas its current status as a national 
minority language is too low. “They have reduced it [Russian] to the level of Hungarian,” 
she explained, and continued: 
I don’t know how many Hungarian-language schools there are in Ukraine, if there 
are any or not. But why should Russian be a state language? In principal, if there 
weren’t so many heated political debates around it, for God’s sake, let it be a 
second state language. But right now, particularly in light of the current 
situation… we don’t need it. Let Ukrainian be the sole state language of Ukraine. 
But Russian is a language of education, a language of communication, maybe, 
because it will still remain one of the world languages. You can’t get around that. 
No Response 
Of the two teachers who did not answer the question regarding the status of 
Russian in Ukraine, Olga asked if she could refuse to answer the question and then 
suggested that I guess her opinion myself. Based on what I know about her—her location 
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in southern Ukraine, that she was born and raised in Russia, and that she considers herself 
Russian and cites Russian as her native language—I am led to believe that Olga would 
like Russian to be a second state language but that she felt uncomfortable expressing this 
opinion. Her discomfort could stem from not wanting to admit on record to views that are 
contrary to the currently language policy in her country.  
Vera, who lives in Donbas and agreed to answer questions only in written form, 
refused to answer this and other policy-related questions that were posed to her. Given 
the tense political situation and ongoing war in her area of the country between the 
Ukrainian military and pro-Russian separatists, I speculate that Vera felt uncomfortable 
or unsafe going on record with her opinions related to politics.  
Over all, the data demonstrate that while teachers of Russian hold a variety of 
views regarding the official status of the Russian language in Ukraine, a solid majority of 
them—thirteen of seventeen—believe that Ukrainian should retain the status of sole state 
language. However, nearly the same number of teachers (four) reported that they would 
like the status of Russian to be elevated to that of a state language, as did those who were 
content with Russian’s current status as a protected minority language (five). The fact 
that all four teachers who reported that they would like Russian to be a state language 
identified themselves as Russian, and four out of five of the teachers who were content 
with Russian’s current status as a protected minority language identified themselves as 
Ukrainian, reveals a correlation between ethnic identification and opinions regarding 
official recognition of the two languages. While ethnic Ukrainian and ethnic Russian 
teachers were united in their opinions regarding acceptance of Russian-language schools 
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in Ukraine, the ethnic Ukrainians’ tolerance toward Russian did not extend as far as 
accepting equal state status for the two languages. This finding is in line with Kulyk’s 
(2015) assertion that “while Ukrainians largely support the uninhibited use of Russian, 
they also want the state to promote Ukrainian” (2). 
Changes in the Role of Russian in Ukrainian Schools  
The changes in language policy that Ukraine has experienced over the past two 
decades have led to significant changes in education policy related to the study of 
Russian. Given the end of compulsory Russian studies, the decline in the number of 
schools offering Russian as the language of instruction, and the rise in the status of the 
Ukrainian language in both policy and practice, one would expect that the role of Russian 
in Ukrainian schools has changed significantly. In order to provide a more detailed and 
nuanced answer to the first research question for this study—regarding how changes in 
language policy have affected the teaching of Russian in Ukraine—teachers were asked 
to describe how the role of the Russian language has changed within the Ukrainian 
education system in post-Soviet Ukraine.  
In general, teachers interviewed reported significant changes in the role of the 
Russian language in the Ukrainian school system in post-Soviet Ukraine, with the most 
abrupt changes beginning in 2014, following Euromaidan. Their responses focus on two 




Teachers cited the following policy changes affecting the teaching of Russian in 
general and their own teaching experiences in particular: 1) fewer hours devoted to 
Russian language studies; 2) the closure of Russian-language schools or their conversion 
to Ukrainian-language schools; 3) a change in status of the Russian language within the 
curriculum—a transition from a compulsory course to an elective course or to one that 
has been dropped altogether; 4) the fact that all curricula and correspondence from the 
Ukrainian Ministry of Education are issued in Ukrainian, and the expectation that all 
work-related documents created by teachers will be written in Ukrainian; 5) the 
elimination of Russian literature as a course in the curriculum of Ukrainian-language 
schools; 6) the elimination of university entrance exams in Russian; 7) fewer Russian-
language classes (groups of students who study in Russian); 8) a lack of availability of 
professional-development and classroom materials in Russian due to lower demand; and 
9) the status of Russian as minority language, as opposed to its prior status as a language 
of international communication.  
Teachers most frequently cited changes in language policy that were related to the 
status of the Russian language in Ukrainian schools, i.e., its place in the curriculum. Five 
teachers mentioned that in Soviet times, Russian had been taught as a language of 
international communication, whereas now, it is taught as a national minority language. 
Nadya, who lives in Donbas, takes particular exception to the national minority language 
status of Russian: “For the Russian language as a living entity, this is a very painful topic. 
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Russian is gone. Russian was deemed a minority language. From a political standpoint, it 
is very difficult to understand this…. Our two languages used to exist side by side.”  
In terms of the changing role of Russian in the education system, five teachers 
reported that their work had been affected by changes in policies related to the language 
of instruction. Katya witnessed a drastic change in terms of languages of instruction in 
her city: “There was a single Ukrainian-language school in the city where I studied, right 
here in the geographic center of Ukraine. Is that proper? No, it’s not proper. And now we 
have two Russian-language schools out of thirty-seven schools, and the Ukrainian-
language schools have started, well, to dominate.” Yana, too, has seen a significant 
transformation in terms of Russian language education in her city: “We had a Russian-
language school in our city, and this year [2015], they didn’t open a single Russian-
language class for incoming first-graders. They only opened Ukrainian-language 
classes.” 
Oksana witnessed firsthand how changes in the language of instruction affected 
teachers in her school: “[When we became a Ukrainian-only school], they gave us a very 
short time to learn Ukrainian, so many teachers either left, or stayed and continued to use 
Russian in the classroom. There were not enough teachers of Ukrainian in our region, so 
we were a Ukrainian-language school, but [instruction was conducted] in Russian.” 
Oksana’s description of the widespread use of Russian in her Ukrainian-language school 
reflects Besters-Dilger’s (2007) assertion that the language of instruction in what is 




Attitudes toward the Russian Language 
In addition to affecting curriculum, language policies related to the teaching of 
Russian have also led to changes in attitudes toward the Russian language, which have in 
turn affected teachers’ work as language instructors. In response to questions regarding 
the changing role of Russian in the Ukrainian education system, nearly all teachers 
discussed changes in attitudes toward the Russian language. Teachers cited more 
difficulty motivating students to study Russian, a worsening of attitudes toward the 
Russian language, teachers being labeled as separatists, people connecting the Russian 
language to the “enemy,” and a drop in the status of Russian.  
Seven teachers specifically reported a worsening of attitudes toward the Russian 
language in the education system, particularly since 2014. Tanya, from central Ukraine, 
summed up this worsening of attitudes when she reported the following: “Beginning in 
2014, the attitude changed abruptly. Now the attitude is that Ukrainian is the main 
language, and people are turning away from Russian. Many people say that Russian is the 
language of the aggressor.”  
Although the overwhelming majority of teachers reported that changes in policy 
had affected their work life in a negative way, two teachers out of seventeen reported no 
changes in the role of the Russian language in Ukrainian schools. Galina, a teacher of 
Russian literature and director of a Russian-language school in central Ukraine, reported 
the following: “Since I work in a Russian-language school, and Russian-speaking 
families come here, I can’t say that the status of Russian has dropped. It’s just that the 
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status of Ukrainian has risen.” Alexandra, who teaches in Donbas, also reported that in 
her region, nothing had changed in terms of attitudes toward Russian. 
Galina’s and Alexandra’s suggestion that the role of Russian in Ukrainian schools 
has not changed can be explained by the fact that they both teach in prestigious Russian-
language institutions where Russian is still a compulsory subject. Furthermore, their 
institutions have remained Russian-only; they have not had to open Ukrainian-language 
classes. In essence, these two teachers have not witnessed firsthand the changes in 
curriculum that teachers of Russian have had to follow in Ukrainian-language schools, 
which may partly explain their assertions that attitudes toward the Russian language have 
not changed.  
 Over all, the data collected in response to these four questions support the 
hypothesis that changes in language policy in post-Soviet Ukraine have negatively 
affected the status of, and attitudes toward, the Russian language both in general and 
within the education system. The teachers’ descriptions of the negative impact of policy 
changes include, among other things, the closure of Russian-language schools, a drop in 
the status of the Russian language, the elimination of Russian literature in Ukrainian-
language schools, a lack of availability of professional-development and classroom 
materials in Russian, and a worsening of attitudes toward the Russian language.  
UKRAINIAN POLITICS AND THE TEACHING OF RUSSIAN 
Throughout recent history, political conditions and governmental policies in 
Ukraine have affected the teaching of Russian. The second research question, therefore, 
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asks how geography and political conditions in contemporary Ukraine affect language 
policy, attitudes toward the Russian language, and the teaching of Russian. The 
hypothesis was that the political, linguistic, and cultural divide between eastern and 
western Ukraine affects attitudes toward the Russian language. In chapter 3, information 
was presented about how geography has traditionally influenced language policy and 
attitudes toward the Russian language. Data are presented here to test the other part of the 
hypothesis: whether the political climate in Ukraine affects attitudes toward the Russian 
language. 
Questions related to how the current political situation in Ukraine affects attitudes 
toward the Russian language and the teaching of Russian elicited very strong opinions 
among teachers, who reported that politics affected not only the status and teaching of 
Russian in Ukraine, but also relationships and daily life. Even those teachers who 
claimed lack of interest in politics were quick to volunteer information about its influence 
on their lives. Given traditional regional differences in political leanings and attitudes 
toward the Russian language, answers to this research question are grouped based on 





Map of the four regions referenced in the section entitled “Ukrainian Politics and 
 the Teaching of Russian”  
Central Regions 
The eight teachers interviewed from central Ukraine were equally divided in their 
views regarding how Ukrainian politics affect the status and teaching of Russian, with 
half of them expressing that politics had a significant effect on attitudes toward the 
Russian language and the teaching of Russian, and the other half reporting that politics 
had little to no effect on attitudes toward the Russian language and the teaching of 
Russian. 
Among the explanations provided for why politics had little to no effect on 
attitudes toward the Russian language, the main reason cited was that if the people do not 
accept the decisions made by politicians, the policy will not work. “We as a people are 
very difficult to budge if we have already made a decision. Go ahead; just try to reassure 
us that we don’t need Russian. We will fight for it. We will defend it…. No matter what 
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politicians decide, if the people and society do not accept their decision, it won’t work, 
and that’s what leads to protests” (Valentina). 
In terms of the teaching of Russian, Kostya also related that he had seen no 
changes due to politics. He reported that the curriculum had remained the same, that 
students studied Russian the same number of hours per week as before, that Russian-
language competitions had been planned for that year [2015-2016], that students would 
prepare and defend research papers in Russian at the Minor Academy of Sciences of 
Ukraine and, if he was not mistaken, that the title of Teacher of the Year would go to a 
teacher of Russian that year.  
Galina, like Kostya, had not seen that Russian had been reduced or removed from 
schools.  
We don’t feel anyone is prejudiced against us as a Russian-language school…so I 
really can’t say anything negative about the current political climate. Furthermore, 
the Ukrainian government has begun to emphasize the achievements of national 
minority schools to promote an understanding of the importance of Russian to 
those in the east, the importance of Ukrainian to those in the west, and the fact 
that those in the middle support both sides.  
While four of the teachers in central Ukraine indicated little to no influence of 
politics on their work or the status of the Russian language, four other teachers in that 
region reported that politics in Ukraine “greatly affect language policy and attitudes 
toward Russian” (Katya). Lyudmyla reported:  
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We have serious language issues.... I am a patriot. I love Ukraine very much. And 
ethnically, I’m Ukrainian. But we don’t need to inflame the situation. A lot of 
people speak Russian, and we don’t need to pit people against one another. We 
don’t have a language problem; the problem is thrown at us from above.  
[…] It all has to do with politics, of course.  
Lyuba believes that due to the current political situation in Ukraine, fewer people 
wish to study Russian. “Take my foreign literature class as an example. Students may 
choose whether to study Russian poetry in Russian or in a Ukrainian translation. They 
used to all choose the Russian version, and now they choose the Ukrainian translation.”  
Oksana reported that politics affected the creation of textbooks and had crept into 
the working environment of schools, creating “Ukrainian Only” spaces: 
The political situation is leading to the end of Russian language studies. They 
want to remove everything that is Russian, just close up shop and not speak it at 
all anymore. Korsakov, an author of textbooks for Ukrainian-language schools, 
spoke to us [as part of a roundtable discussion]. They have forbidden him to 
publish textbooks containing the word “Moscow” and anything else connected 
with Russia. […] Now everything has gotten worse. Worse and worse. In our 
faculty lounge there is an announcement hanging on the wall that stipulates that 
we must all speak Ukrainian in class. In other words, it’s a requirement. […]All 
paperwork has to be completed in Ukrainian. All of the journals [i.e., lesson plans 
and reports] have to be in Ukrainian, and so do announcements, for example, that 




Of all of the teachers interviewed, those in western Ukraine, which is a 
traditionally pro-Europe and anti-Russian area of the country, reported the greatest 
changes in attitudes toward the Russian language due to politics.  
Yana, who teaches at a Ukrainian-language school, reported significant changes 
in the Russian-language curriculum in her city. She reported that the 2015-2016 school 
year was the second year that Russian was no longer taught to new groups of students in 
her school, but only to those students who had begun studying Russian in fifth grade. 
“Russian is no longer taught [in my city],” she said. She also reported that in the only 
Russian-language school in her city, no Russian-language classes were opened for 
incoming first-graders in 2015. The school opened Ukrainian-language classes instead.42 
In Yana’s school, the students who began seventh grade in the fall of 2015 studied 
under a new curriculum, a new state standard. Yana reported: 
A second foreign language is included in the new state standard, and parents 
decide which language will be offered. Here in our school, the administration 
decided that the parents would choose German. Teachers don’t have a say in the 
matter. But on the other hand, we should be happy about this situation, happy that 
they are allowing the seventh-, eighth- and ninth-graders to continue studying 
Russian. Because I know that other schools removed Russian from the curriculum 
                                                
42 It is not uncommon in Ukrainian schools to have one or more groups of students study in Russian while 
other students in the same grade study in Ukrainian. In schools where curricula are offered in both 
Ukrainian and Russian, students, together with their parents, choose whether to study content material in 
Ukrainian or in Russian, and students follow the prescribed course of study chosen when they first enroll in 
school. Changes to the curriculum issued by the Ukrainian Ministry of Education apply to new incoming 
students only.  
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altogether. They didn’t even allow students who were supposed to study Russian 
in grades five through nine to complete their Russian studies. But our school is 
letting them finish. So we need to be glad, especially since there are three of us 
[teachers of Russian]. For that reason, I left [my position as a teacher of Russian], 
because I understood that there weren’t going to be enough teaching hours for all 
three of us.43 
Olena, who also teaches in western Ukraine, chose to compare current politics 
with the politics from thirty years ago, during the era of Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms: 
When I graduated from high school in 1987, Russian was very prestigious. Our 
government provided us certain privileges. In our Russian classes, we as a group 
were divided into two half-groups, just as students today study Ukrainian and 
English [in half-size groups]. When I was in school, though, we studied Russian 
more than Ukrainian. Now we consider that to be genocide [of the Ukrainian 
language], but you can’t escape history. In our city, […] the parents are against 
studying Russian, and so are their children. They distributed a public opinion poll, 
and that’s it; the children don’t study [Russian] anymore.  
Southern Ukraine 
The cities in southern Ukraine are predominantly Russian-speaking. Olga, who 
has taught Russian for thirty-eight years at a specialized school in a large Russian-
                                                
43 In Ukrainian schools, teachers are paid according not only to their rank and title, but also to the number 
of hours they teach per week.  
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speaking city in southern Ukraine, has witnessed significant changes in attitudes toward 
the Russian language over the years.  
[Our city] is a very tolerant one. More than one hundred thirty-one nationalities 
live in our oblast alone. So we live together, rejoice in one another’s culture, and 
we communicate with one another. For example, five years ago, a teacher of 
Ukrainian and I prepared a program entitled ‘Christmas Holidays.’ Part of the 
script was written in Ukrainian, and the other part was written in Russian. I spoke 
in Russian, and she spoke in Ukrainian. We didn’t duplicate what the other was 
saying; we just spoke our own parts in our own languages. It was great! I say to 
others, ‘Speak to me in Ukrainian, because my job is to learn Ukrainian. I already 
know Russian.’ I didn’t study Ukrainian, but I want to learn it. I never studied 
Ukrainian [in Russia], but I’d like to learn it. I’d like to learn to speak it, and I 
even try a little.  
Crimea 
The very fact that the Russian Federation annexed Crimea in the spring of 2014 
indicates that politics plays an enormous role in language policy and affects attitudes 
toward the Russian language and the teaching of Russian in this region. When Russia 
seized control of Crimea, the status of the Russian language changed in that territory 
from a national minority language to one of three state languages, together with 
Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar.  
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Natasha, who has lived in Crimea since birth, began her career as a teacher of 
Russian in what was at the time Ukraine and is now the Russian Federation. Natasha, 
therefore, is in a unique position to speak about how her life as a teacher of Russian has 
changed not only since the beginning of her career seventeen years ago, but particularly 
during the two years she has taught since Crimea was annexed by the Russian Federation.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia became a foreign language in 
Ukraine. The hours devoted to Russian were reduced under [Ukrainian President] 
Yushchenko.44 Then under Yanukovych45 everything somehow stabilized, they 
started leaving the language issue alone, and our salaries were even enough to live 
on. But there were no huge changes. Russian was considered a foreign language, 
and that was how it remained. But they did allow us to fill out our journals in 
Russian.  
Under the Ukrainian education system, Russian was taught as a foreign language 
in Crimea, the same way English, for example, was taught: at a conversational 
level. Under the Russian system, however, Russian is taught as a native language, 
so we teach the students how to write correctly. December 2nd [2015], our 
eleventh-graders took the Unified State Exam.46 These students, who had studied 
                                                
44 Viktor Yushchenko served as the third president of Ukraine from 23 January 2005 to 25 February 2010. 
Yushchenko was one of the two main candidates in the 2004 presidential election and won the presidency 
after a repeat runoff election against Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. Public protests prompted by 
alleged electoral fraud led to Ukraine’s so-called Orange Revolution in late 2004. 
45 Viktor Yanukovych served as the fourth president of Ukraine from 25 February 2010 until he was ousted 
on 22 February 2014. 
46 The Unified State Exam [Yediniy gosudarstvenniy ekzamen, EGE] is a series of exams that students in 




in Ukraine and hadn’t done a lot of writing in Russian, had to catch up to the 
Russian curriculum and learn it in a year and a half or two years. Our students 
have been frantically… learning how to write compositions. So that’s the first 
difference: the oral teaching of Russian in Ukraine versus in-depth writing in 
Russia. Also, in Ukraine, they tried to push the Russian language into the 
background.  
According to Natasha, other differences in the education system between Ukraine 
and Russia that affect her work as a teacher of Russian include the following: in Ukraine-
controlled Crimea, courses in both Russian and foreign literature were offered. Now they 
study only Russian literature. Also, Ukraine used a twelve-point grading system, whereas 
the Russian system is based on a five-point scale. Another difference Natasha reported 
was that in Russia, students are expected to acquire knowledge themselves during class.  
Our students [in Ukraine] were used to acquiring knowledge through the teacher. 
In other words, I speak, and the students listen. But here they are expected to learn 
on their own. And advanced technology is everywhere here: computers, 
interactive whiteboards, presentations, projects, research—this is still all a little 
bit tricky for us. …I recently took a group of Moscow schoolchildren on a seven-
day excursion around Crimea. I had always had the impression that any child 
from Moscow was some kind of child prodigy. But I found out that the kids are 
exactly like ours here. I wouldn’t say that they are smarter than our kids. They 
may be more technologically savvy; not every child here can have a computer or 
laptop. And some of our parents try to limit their children’s access to technology. 
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I’ll tell you what: [technology-wise] it’s as if those kids from Moscow were from 
another country. What kinds of changes we’ll see in the future, I don’t know.  
Another difference between the Ukrainian education system and the Russian 
system is that, according to Natasha, the curriculum handed down by the Russian 
Ministry of Education is more complex in terms of expectations of teachers for the 
completion of more paperwork and more in-depth documentation of the content of daily 
lessons. 
I teach, for example, the same number of hours in ninth grade [as I used to]: five 
hours per week. But under the Russian system, I also have to record my lesson 
plans. What we used to call in Ukraine ‘planning’ is called a ‘program of work’ in 
Russia. We have to write what we have planned for each lesson—that is, 
immediately—the children’s abilities and skills, what the results should be, what 
homework will be assigned, the goals of the lesson, what type of lesson it is… In 
Ukraine, of course, it was easier, even though we had to do our planning in 
Ukrainian. In Russia, everything is complicated. The curriculum isn’t bad. I just 
don’t like all the paperwork. 
Natasha went on to add some comments about her compensation:  
Our education system here is a madhouse. There are so many problems—I can’t 
even begin to tell you. […] And, of course, pay. Salaries are something else. I get 
paid less now. I don’t know why. They allocate a lot of money to…Crimea and 
Sevastopol, but we only hear about it. In the summer, I can make that extra money 
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in a single day.47 Also, in Russia, you have to create a teaching portfolio. This is 
new for us. And in it, you have to demonstrate how smart, beautiful, and 
wonderful you are. Your salary depends on it. Your salary isn’t fixed. It’s based 
on how many hours a week you work, what classes you teach, what rank you 
have, and also how you work each month. […] The salary is laughable. In regular 
schools, the pay is ridiculous. It would be unrealistic to try to live on it.  
Eastern Ukraine 
Eastern Ukraine encompasses three of the five oblasts with the highest percentage 
of Ukrainian citizens citing Russian as their native language: 44.3% in Kharkiv, 68.8% in 
Luhansk, and 74.9% in Donetsk.48 Therefore, eastern Ukraine has traditionally fought for 
Russian language rights and allied itself with Russia. Given that significant portions of 
eastern Ukraine are currently occupied by separatist troops, one would expect responses 
to be affected by the ongoing war and military occupation of far-eastern areas of Ukraine, 
particularly in the Donbas region.  
Svetlana, who teaches in northeastern Ukraine, reported that while no one forbids 
people [in her area] from speaking Russian, attitudes toward the Russian language have 
worsened. “It’s like this: ‘I have no need for Russian. I need English, because then I can 
travel. I need Ukrainian because I need it to pass exit exams. But Russian, well, okay, I 
know it, and that’s good enough.’” In contrast, many parents have told her that 
knowledge of Russian is essential and that they feel bad that their children study Russian 
                                                
47 Natasha works part-time as a freelance tour guide. 
48 According to the 2001 Ukrainian census. 
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only one hour a week. “As soon as someone new comes to power, they start to change the 
curriculum. But what is there to change in the Russian curriculum? Nothing! All you can 
do is cut down on hours.” Svetlana’s thoughts on the low number of hours of Russian 
language instruction—no more than one or two hours per week in Ukrainian-language 
schools—reflect those of teachers across Ukraine.  
Donbas  
Three teachers interviewed live and work in the Donbas region of Ukraine: one in 
an unoccupied area that falls under the jurisdiction of Ukraine, and two in the self-
proclaimed People’s Republic of Donetsk, which the Ukrainian government refers to as a 
“temporarily occupied territory” and has designated a terrorist organization. Although the 
three teachers interviewed from Donbas live within seventy miles of one another, their 
location—either inside or outside of occupied territory—affects their experiences as 
teachers of Russian. 
According to a report issued by the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (2016), the ongoing war in Donbas has displaced over 
two million citizens (7) and disrupted the education of some 50,000 children in the 
second half of 2014 alone (UNICEF, 2014). Schools in non-occupied territories still 
follow the programs of study handed down by the Ukrainian Ministry of Education but 
have taken in children whose families have fled from occupied territories, whereas 
teachers in occupied territories now follow the curriculum created by the Ministry of 
Education of the self-declared people’s republic where they live, and receive their 
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salaries in Russian rubles, an indication of the extent of Russia’s influence in the 
occupied territories. 
Vera, who lives in an unoccupied area, refused to answer questions related to the 
influence of Ukrainian politics on attitudes toward the Russian language and the teaching 
of Russian. The director of her school, however, reported the following:  
[Our city] has not been occupied by Russians. We are in a war zone, but our city 
has not been captured. Nothing about the educational system has changed, other 
than the fact that young men who protect us and our territory perish every day. 
With regard to the occupied territories, a large portion of the population has 
moved. Over two thousand children of immigrants [from occupied territories] 
study in our city alone. There, schools were completely closed for quite a long 
time. Only since about October of last year [2015] have the schools been open 
again. Whether all of them are open or not, I don’t know.  
When asked how political conditions in contemporary Ukraine affect language 
policy and, more specifically, the teaching of Russian, Nadya, who lives in an occupied 
territory, did not know how to respond at first and said that she just wanted the war to 
end. She believes that teachers should remain outside of politics and finds the discussion 
of politics very painful. She recounted the following: 
Here in Ukraine, Russian has gone through a whole range of stages. When I was a 
young girl visiting Donbas, […] I went to a Russian-language school where 
Russian was studied first and foremost, and Ukrainian was of secondary 
importance. But when I came back to Donbas to enter the university, Ukrainian 
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was the more important language, and Russian was secondary. Then the Soviet 
Union fell, and Russian and Ukrainian were equalized. Then, about eight years 
ago, Russian became a second foreign language here. It disappeared. […] They 
even gave Russian the status of a minority language. For Donbas, this was a very 
serious matter, because from a political standpoint, this designation was very 
difficult to understand. But we managed to focus again on our Ukrainian, which 
had gotten rusty over the course of those eight years. And then two years ago 
[following Euromaidan], there was another reshuffle, and now Ukrainian has been 
replaced by Russian, and all of our documentation has to be in Russian again.  
Our politicians overstepped when they decided that all documentation had to be in 
Ukrainian.  
Aside from issues of language policy, Nadya also expressed difficulties on account of the 
ongoing war in her area. She explained: 
Today, since so many teachers have left Donbas, we have a disaster on our hands. 
There are not enough teachers, especially teachers of Russian language and 
literature. There are not enough teachers to fill the vacancies in schools, because 
everyone has left. But what can I say? I love my students. I stayed for them. They 
have even threatened to take away our job titles. Take away everything. Remove 
all academic degrees from any university professor who stays here and won’t 
leave. But I love Donbas, so I stayed. It's hard, just hard. Two of our teachers 
were killed by shrapnel. They were protecting their students, their first graders, by 
shielding them with their bodies. Glass shards flew through the air, and those 
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teachers died. There is so much mourning. Another teacher had his leg blown off, 
but he saved a fifth-grader. But he was lucky. He survived. 
 
Alexandra, who also lives and works in an occupied area, explained that 
politicians, no matter how hard they try, cannot create conflict between people who have 
been so closely connected for centuries: 
Regardless of the will of the politicians, the love of Russian culture and of 
Ukrainian culture and language will not change. […] But [in the people’s 
republic] the number of hours devoted to the study of Russian has increased. 
Before, we studied Ukrainian two hours a week and Russian two hours a week… 
But the Ministry of Education [of the people’s republic] decided just this year that 
we would teach more Russian.  
When asked how the political climate over the past two years has affected her work, 
Alexandra said that she and others try to distance themselves from politics. They try to 
“live in their own little world of kindness and warmth in an effort to create an atmosphere 
that is far away from the war. […] Of course, everyone understands that there is a war 
going on, so it’s hard to keep morale up.”  
The responses from teachers in eastern Ukraine indicate that politics greatly 
affects the teaching of Russian in that part of the country, with responses varying 
considerably between northeastern areas and Donbas. The teachers in the northeast, 
which is not occupied by separatist troops, reported issues similar to those of other 
teachers in Ukrainian-language schools: a reduced number of hours of Russian language 
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studies and a worsening in attitudes toward the Russian language. In occupied areas of 
Donbas, the influence of politics on the teaching of Russian is considerably greater. 
There, the ongoing war has resulted in the closure of schools, displacement of students, 
an insufficient number of teachers due to their fleeing the region, and even deaths among 
students and teachers who choose to remain in those territories. The education policies 
created by self-proclaimed people’s republics in Donbas have resulted in changes in the 
status of the Russian language in schools and the number of hours devoted to Russian 
language study, with Russian experiencing a rise in status and now holding a place of 
greater prominence in the curriculum. Education policies in Ukraine-controlled areas of 
Donbas have not changed as a result of the war, as those areas continue to fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Ministry of Education. However, the work of teachers is 
affected by the war due to large numbers of displaced children now studying in their 
schools.  
The data demonstrate that Ukrainian politics and geography have a significant 
effect on attitudes toward the Russian language and the teaching of Russian throughout 
Ukraine, with a greater effect on teachers in the east and west and a lesser effect on 
teachers in the central regions. Responses from teachers in central regions, the dividing 
line between the traditionally pro-European west and pro-Russian east, revealed a split in 
attitudes that reflected this historic division of attitudes. Southern regions continued to 
display their longstanding tolerance toward multilingualism. The greatest changes in 
attitudes were, predictably, reported from teachers in the west and east. In the west, 
which has long fought to raise the status of the Ukrainian language and increase respect 
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toward the nation as an independent state, worsening attitudes toward the Russian 
language result from aggression on the part of Russia toward Ukraine. In the east, 
attitudes toward Russian are negatively affected by the politically motivated war in 
Donbas. The education system in Crimea, now controlled by Russia, is described as a 
“madhouse,” indicating that the political unrest and subsequent annexation of that 
territory from Ukraine has had a significant effect on teachers throughout that area.  
GEOPOLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE AND ATTITUDES TOWARD 
THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE  
The third research question for this study was how current geopolitical relations 
between Russia and Ukraine have affected the status of, and attitudes toward, the Russian 
language and the study of Russian in Ukraine. The hypothesis was that heightened 
political tensions between Russia and Ukraine since 2014 have led to a worsening of 
attitudes toward the Russian language and toward the study of Russian in Ukrainian 
schools. With seventeen of nineteen teachers indicating that the conflict between Russia 
and Ukraine has negatively affected attitudes toward the Russian language both in 
general and in schools, the interview data support this hypothesis.  
Tanya, a teacher in north central Ukraine, expressed that the conflict between 
Russia and Ukraine had significantly affected attitudes toward the Russian language both 
within her school and the country at large. In terms of how political tensions have 
affected her work as a teacher of Russian, she stated that the conflict between Russia and 
Ukraine had ruined relationships between former colleagues. She also reported the 
experience of a colleague of hers who works at a different school in the same community: 
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“My colleague gave a student a low grade for his incorrect completion of an exercise, and 
the parents of this child wrote in the grade book ‘Russian is the language of the enemy’ in 
Ukrainian. At the moment, this is a very big problem.”  
Tanya went on to discuss how the conflict between Ukraine and Russia has 
affected attitudes toward the Russian language. 
Beginning in 2014, in 2014 and 2015, attitudes toward the Russian language have 
just begun to change. I understand that right now, the attitude is that Ukrainian is 
the main language, and people are turning away from Russian. The image of the 
enemy is so glaring […]. When our colleagues, male teachers from our school, are 
called to report to the military enlistment office, and it’s possible that they will be 
drafted into the army, well, they’ve changed that, and they aren’t going to draft 
teachers anymore, but still, the thought is so hard to stomach. And that’s what’s 
going on right now. This whole situation is based on an image of the enemy. 
Many people say that Russia is the aggressor. Russia has its version of the truth, 
and Ukraine has its own version, too. A lot of people look at all this and find it 
ideologically painful […].  
Tanya also expressed the opinion that Crimea and eastern Ukraine had broken off from 
the rest of Ukraine due mostly to a decree adopted after the 2014 revolution that upheld 
Ukrainian as the sole state language.  
They shouldn’t have brought that up. They raised the language issue, and panic 
ensued immediately. People in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine feared that 
everyone would be forced to speak Ukrainian. And that’s simply not true. […] I 
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can speak Ukrainian, I can speak Russian, but no one in my native city of 
Kiev…has ever commented…on what language I speak. People are very patient 
and tolerant, but there are people who have seen so much of the enemy, and 
there’s nothing you can do about them. But regardless, there was competition to 
enter our school this year [2015]. I mean, we didn’t have to drag children in from 
off the street. There were three or four applications for every open seat in the 
school. So regardless of current events, our school has children, and there are 
children in other Russian-language schools, too. Because smart people, wise 
people, they understand that it’s impossible to make people speak a language 
immediately. It should be an organic process that takes place over the course of 
years. […] I never thought I’d live in a country under martial law. It’s not that 
Ukrainians are good and Russians are bad or Russians are good and Ukrainians 
are bad. On both sides there are a lot of stupid, uneducated and short-sighted 
people who do not understand. All they can see is the face of the enemy. In this 
situation, it’s very hard to say what kind of status Russian will have in the next 
five years.  
 
Katya reported significant changes in attitude toward the Russian language in her 
classroom due to deteriorating geopolitical relations between Ukraine and Russian. She 
stated that many children no longer wished to study Russian. On the first day of school in 
2014, several of her students told her that they did not want to study “the language of the 
aggressor.” She said that Russia had always lobbied to make Russian the second state 
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language in Ukraine but that “there cannot be two state languages when a nation such as 
Russia is in your backyard.” She cited the fate of the Belarusian language as an example, 
explaining that she has a lot of relatives in Belarus whom she visits. “They have two state 
languages there…and Belorussian is dying,” she explained. “It doesn’t exist anymore. It 
is even recognized by UNESCO as a dying language.” Katya’s assertion that students 
don’t want to study “the language of the aggressor” reflects Bilaniuk and Melynk’s 
(2008) findings that choosing Russian over Ukrainian is frequently viewed as a statement 
of political and cultural allegiance to Russia (340). Additionally, Katya’s statement that 
Russia has always lobbied to make Russian the second state language in Ukraine mirrors 
Solchanyk’s assertion that Moscow believes the Russian minority in Ukraine requires its 
attention due to the repression of the Russian language in Ukraine (547). 
When asked whether the geopolitical relationship between Ukraine and Russia 
affected the teaching of Russian, opinions varied among teachers in western Ukraine. 
Tamara replied that it probably affected the teaching of Russian somewhere in Ukraine, 
but that in her community, the effect had been imperceptible.  
Iryna, my colleague and a teacher of history in western Ukraine, cited a 
conversation with Larissa, a teacher of Russian at her school, as protests began on 
Maidan:  
Larissa asked, ‘How do you feel about us?’ I said, ‘What do you mean, how do 
we feel about you? Have there been any problems at work because you are 
Russian? Or does anyone say anything to you when they hear you speaking 
Russian on public transportation? No. Why do you say that the Russian language 
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is being persecuted, is not supported, is discriminated against?’ She didn’t answer 
my question. She said that we were going to execute or beat them [the Russians]. 
I told her, ‘No one is going to beat anyone, because I have always treated you as a 
teacher, as a colleague…. My relationship with you will not change because you 
speak Russian and I am Ukrainian.’49 
Iryna’s account, like Tanya’s, demonstrates that Ukrainians generally do not hold 
negative attitudes toward ethnic Russians in Ukraine, even in light of the current political 
tensions between Ukraine and Russia. Both of these teachers, however, indicate that 
Russian-speakers feel persecuted by ethnic Ukrainians.   
Olena, who teaches Russian in northwestern Ukraine, reported the following: 
“Parents and students don’t want to study Russian anymore. They are all patriots, and 
they say that they don’t need this language. They study foreign languages, but they don’t 
want to study Russian. It all has to do with Russian aggression. The Russians tried to kill 
our speech, our language. We studied their language, but they didn’t study ours. They 
still feel Ukrainian isn’t even a language.” The assertion that Ukrainian is a dialect of 
Russian and not a separate language has persisted for centuries, as stated by Krawchenko 
(1985). Confidence in the value of one’s native language allows people to claim social 
legitimacy and establish a sense of their social worth (Bilaniuk, 2005, p. 2), so the 
suggestion that others don’t recognize Olena’s native tongue—Ukrainian—as a legitimate 
language could cause her and others like her to feel marginalized and disrespected.  
                                                
49 According to Iryna, Larissa left Ukraine with her young daughter and settled in Russia. The researcher 
contacted Larissa by e-mail, and Larissa responded with information about the experiences that led her to 
flee the country. Unfortunately, Larissa did not respond to a request for permission to share her personal 
account of how the Russia-Ukraine conflict had affected her work as a teacher of Russian. 
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Although the majority of teachers reported that tensions between Ukraine and 
Russia had affected their work, three teachers reported no significant changes in their 
work life since 2014. Kostya, while admitting he could speak only for his city and his 
school, said that the ongoing tensions had not affected his work. He did, however, note 
that in the process of asserting itself politically and embracing democratic values, 
Ukraine has witnessed a growing interest in its own culture and language. He reported, 
for example, that bands that perform music in Ukrainian have grown in popularity and 
that he has witnessed greater interest in Ukrainian-language literature, writers, and poets. 
Furthermore, he reported, people now try to speak Ukrainian more. While he has not seen 
people pretend not to understand Russian, he has definitely witnessed that Ukrainian is 
being spoken more now.  
Valentina reported that attitudes toward the Russian language in Ukraine had not 
changed due to the geopolitical tensions between Russia and Ukraine. “Nothing at all has 
changed. If your friends and neighbors speak Russian, how can you change your attitudes 
toward them? …There are a few nationalists who say that everything in Ukraine should 
be in Ukrainian, but their numbers are miniscule, and honestly, no one listens to them.” 
Valentina did, however, take issue with politicians’ efforts to make Ukraine and Russia 
into enemies. “It’s the politicians who started this propaganda machine who have turned 
us into enemies. Deep inside, we’re not enemies. But they make their people think that 
we are their enemies.” This sentiment reflects Kulyk’s (2015) finding that most of the 
Ukrainians in the focus groups he studied in early 2015 “stressed that their negative 
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attitude toward the state does not extend to the Russian people,” but that “some felt 
Russians were guilty […] in preferring to believe official propaganda” (3). 
While two of the seventeen teachers interviewed indicated that the geopolitical 
relationship between Ukraine and Russia had not affected their work, they did report 
having witnessed an increased interest in the Ukrainian culture and language and an 
emergence of Ukraine as a “political nation […] that definitively embraces democratic 
values” (Kostya). This commentary from both teachers indicates that while the 
geopolitical relationship between Ukraine and Russia may not have affected their work—
indeed, the Ukrainian Ministry of Education has not made sweeping changes to the 
curriculum in the past several years—ongoing tensions between Ukraine and Russia have 
had a negative impact on attitudes toward language and culture in Ukraine in general. 
Overall, the data demonstrate that political tensions between Ukraine and Russia since 
2014 have, indeed, led to a worsening of attitudes toward the Russian language and 
toward the study of Russian in Ukrainian schools, harmed relationships between teachers, 
and lessened students’ interest in studying Russian. While the majority of the teachers 
interviewed would like to see more, or at least a continuing amount, of Russian language 
instruction offered, some parents and children have turned against Russian as a 
demonstration of allegiance to Ukraine. It appears, therefore, that attempts by Russia to 
retain Ukraine in its sphere of influence have not resulted in closer relations between the 
two countries, but, instead, have led to increased animosity toward and rejection of 
Russia and the Russian language on the part of many Ukrainians.   
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MOST PRESSING ISSUES FACING TEACHERS OF RUSSIAN IN CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE 
In order to glean information that would lead to a more nuanced understanding of 
the challenges faced by teachers of Russian in Ukraine today, research subjects were 
offered an opportunity to express opinions about what they viewed as the most pressing 
issues faced by teachers of Russian in their country. Their comments encompassed three 
general categories: Material Support, Working Conditions, and Other Issues.  
Material Support 
The issue most often cited by teachers was related to the quality and/or 
availability of Russian-language teaching materials. Ten of sixteen teachers cited issues 
related to material support, and in all ten cases, this lack of support was the first issue 
raised.  
Textbooks 
The majority of materials-related issues expressed by teachers were related to 
Russian language textbooks, including not receiving textbooks on time, a lack of 
available textbooks to meet changing standards in the curriculum, and the poor quality of 
available textbooks.  
Four teachers cited frustration over not receiving textbooks in time for the 
beginning of the school year, and the fact that state-mandated changes in curricula are not 
always accompanied by textbooks that meet the new standards. Lyudmyla summed up 
the situation this way: “This is our third year with a new program for seventh-graders. All 
of the textbooks should have been ready by September 1. We received them in the second 
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semester, after New Year’s. So we had a curriculum but no textbooks.” Katya reported 
that the teachers at her school received textbooks created for the wrong curriculum, with 
“absolutely nothing that the teachers needed.” She and her students had to download 
textbooks onto their tablets and print them out. The complaints of these teachers confirm 
Janmaat’s (2000) assertions about the historic shortage of textbooks in Ukraine. 
Four teachers complained about the quality of the Russian-language textbooks 
available to them. Nadya summed up the situation this way, “We have serious problems 
with textbooks. This has always been a problem. There are no good, high-grade, 
competently written textbooks.” Tamara went so far as to label the textbooks and literary 
readings for Russian “disgusting.” “They created new ones after the fall of the Soviet 
Union in an attempt to make everything over,” she explained. “They ended up bad and 
poorly thought out.” Valentina explained the situation this way:  
The paradox is that those who prepare textbooks have never been in a school. 
They are scholars of some kind. They throw the textbook at us and say, ‘Here! 
Use it.’ And the textbooks have mistakes, because some petty official sits there, 
some guy who has never been in a school and can’t even imagine how things need 
to be taught there. I was visiting an elementary school and picked up a textbook 
just to look at it and page through it. Without even trying, I found two mistakes.  
 
Another issue expressed by teachers is the age of textbooks, i.e., having to choose 
between textbooks published in the Soviet era and newer textbooks, if they are available, 
that contain fewer grammar explanations. Olena expressed exasperation about the issue 
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of textbooks: “The [newer] textbooks are awful. They have only text, but almost no 
grammar rules. So we are forced to use methods from 1986. I use a book and assessment 
materials written by Baranov. It’s an ancient textbook from 1986.” When asked why she 
uses that textbook, she explained that first, there was no money for new ones, and second, 
attitudes toward Russian in Ukraine were such that money is not invested into the study 
of Russian in general.  
While nearly all teachers were displeased with their textbooks, Alexandra voiced 
an opposite view. She teaches in an occupied area in Donbas and works, therefore, under 
a different ministry of education. She said, “Now we can teach using textbooks that we 
had [from Ukraine] and ones that we receive from Moscow. We are widening the 
worldview of our students, who can see how they teach Russian in Russia and compare 
those textbooks with ours.” Lyuba, who teaches in a specialized lyceum in central 
Ukraine, also does not face the same issues as her peers in other schools. She said, 
“There’s no problem with resources. A creative teacher can find all the materials she 
wants and needs or can create them herself. Our textbooks are very good. They are 
written by Ukrainian scholars.”  
Methodological Materials 
Closely tied to issues related to textbooks were those related to the availability of 
methodological materials for use in teaching Russian. Several teachers related that fewer 
methodological materials are available now that Russian is less widely taught. A couple 
of teachers conjectured that the lack of materials was tied to the political situation and the 
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fact that since the Ukrainian language has taken on greater importance in the education 
system, it is more profitable for publishers to create materials for the Ukrainian language 
classroom. Svetlana related, “I went to a bookstore to look at new books and materials 
created for the new curriculum, but there were very few. Sometimes I go up and ask what 
they have that’s new for Russian language and literature for the new curriculum. They 
say they don’t have anything. Or just one or two little books.” Olena lamented: “Teachers 
have to spend a lot of time preparing for lessons, because we have almost no 
methodological materials. We have to do everything ourselves. But that’s only for 
Russian. Other subjects have great materials. Our students study English with books from 
Oxford. But Russian, that’s a separate conversation.” Tanya expressed similar views, 
adding that a lot of literature doesn’t make it to them from Russia, because everything 
that comes to Ukraine has to be approved by the Ministry of Education. “If there is no 
stamp that reads ‘Approved by the Ministry of Education,’ we can’t use those 
textbooks… We just experienced a huge scandal because they gave us textbooks with the 
Russian coat of arms and some texts that glorify Russia and Russian achievements. Some 
parents protested and complained, saying that their children would not study using those 
textbooks. Really? Just because of the Russian coat of arms?”  
Access to Technology 
 Three teachers cited a lack of access to instructional technology such as 
interactive boards and computers as a pressing issue facing teachers of Russian in 
Ukraine. Lyudmyla asked, “How can I organize my work if I have to bring a computer 
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from home, just one for everyone to look at, so that I can show them something? Imagine 
if every child had one on his table? Or an interactive board? I have a ton of materials, but 
how am I supposed to show them? On my fingers?” Oksana expressed that in terms of 
challenges faced by teachers of Russian in Ukraine, a lack of material resources was 
above all. “It’s a disaster,” she explained. “My classroom has bare walls and nothing in it. 
I have pens, paper, and chalk. That’s it. That’s all I have to teach with. I get to use a 
smart board once a year: when I give an open lesson. I don’t even have a computer at 
school.” 
Working Conditions 
Lack of hours 
Another issue teachers frequently cited is a lack of teaching hours. Given the 
closure of many Russian-language schools and the fact that Russian is no longer taught as 
a required course in the majority of Ukrainian-language schools, the number of hours 
devoted to Russian-language studies has dropped significantly. While one teacher 
expressed concern that salaries are now tied to a lower number of hours, most of the 
teachers who cited lower hours as a major concern focused on insufficient time to cover 
material. Valentina explained her answer this way: “I think two hours a week would be 
sufficient to make teachers’ jobs easier and to allow students to learn the language more 
easily. If they gave us just one more hour a week, I wouldn’t be against it; just one more 
hour, and then everything would be great.” Lyudmyla expressed her concerns this way: 
“When Russian was taught two or three hours a week, children wrote more correctly. 
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Now, there are no hours devoted to Russian. In western Ukraine, Russian is not taught at 
all.” 
Galina, the director of a Russian-language gymnasium, explained the situation 
this way: “The main problem is a lack of hours. Teachers of Ukrainian divide their 
classes in half, so they have enough hours, but teachers of Russian don’t, so they have 
fewer hours. Since there always used to be a lot of teachers of Russian, many had to be 
let go—there were a lot at this school. Now, in order not to have to let more teachers go, I 
try to divide up the hours in order to satisfy everyone.” 
The comments from these teachers about the reduced hours devoted to Russian 
language studies in the current curriculum, combined with the policy-related data in the 
third chapter detailing the number of hours allotted to Russian language studies in 
contemporary Ukraine, support the second part of the first hypothesis: that changes in 
language policy have resulted in decreased hours devoted to the study of Russian in 
Ukrainian schools. 
Low Salaries 
 In addition to concerns about fewer hours devoted to Russian, teachers also cited 
low salaries as a major issue for them. Olena said, “There is no money. My colleague 
who left to teach in Russia gets paid nine times more than we do.” Natasha, who teaches 
in Crimea, recalls the following:  
In Ukraine, we were paid according to seniority… and category. In order to do so 
[reach the highest category], we gave lessons, we worked really hard, but the 
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difference in salary was, I believe, 100 hryvnia [approximately $4] per month. 
That was nothing. So why do it? You use up a lot of nerves and a lot of paper in 
order to earn an extra 100 hryvnia a month. It’s better to be alive and well for 
essentially the same salary.  
Other Issues 
Other issues cited by teachers included those related to literacy or that have an 
impact on literacy: a lack of desire among students to study; poor literacy skills and a 
poor knowledge of literature among students; and the notion that children are spending 
more time on computers and less time reading these days. “The older they get, the less 
they want to read,” explained Galina. “They have limited vocabularies and can’t express 
themselves,” added Valentina.  
The poor quality of continuing education courses, heavy course loads among 
students, burnout among teachers, the notion that some teachers do not take their jobs 
seriously, and a loss of prestige were also mentioned. “Now that Russian is no longer 
taught, the prestige of our profession is zero,” explained Lyudmyla.  
Positive Responses 
While nearly all teachers interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the current 
state of Russian language education in Ukraine, two teachers had positive things to say 
about their experiences as teachers. Alexandra reported that Russian teachers in her 
region “have enough hours.” For his part, Kostya reported that he “can’t complain,” 
because there are “no major problems.” He went on to suggest that “actually, it’s a little 
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easier to be a teacher of Russian, because there is less responsibility and more freedom. 
There are lots of Ukrainian language contests in addition to Olympiads and exit exams, 
so there are a lot of demands on teachers of Ukrainian.”  
Alexandra’s response to this question can be explained by her unique working 
conditions. First, Alexandra lives and works in an occupied area in Donbas, in a Russian-
language lyceum where Russian is a required course for all students. Furthermore, 
students in her lyceum study Russian the highest number of hours per week of any of the 
teachers interviewed: six hours per week in grade five, five hours per week in grades six 
through eight, and four hours per week in grades nine through eleven. Students of 
Russian in non-specialized Ukrainian-language schools, on the other hand, study Russian 
a maximum of one hour per week, so it is not surprising that teachers in Ukrainian-
language schools report struggling to get enough hours.  
 
This study set out to answer three questions: 1) How have policies related to the 
role and status of the Russian language in Ukraine evolved since Ukraine became an 
independent nation, and how has this evolution in language policy affected the teaching 
of Russian there?; 2) How do geography and political conditions in contemporary 
Ukraine affect language policy, attitudes toward the Russian language, and the teaching 
of Russian?; and 3) How has the geopolitical relationship between Ukraine and Russia 
affected the status of, and attitudes toward, the Russian language and the study of Russian 
in Ukraine? A close analysis of language and education policies in post-Soviet Ukraine, 
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together with interviews with seventeen teachers of Russian in that country, yielded a rich 
set of data from which to form answers to these questions.  
Since Ukraine became an independent nation in 1991, policies related to the role 
and status of the Russian language in Ukraine have aimed to counteract Soviet policies of 
Russification in favor of the promotion of the Ukrainian language and culture. This 
evolution in language policy has resulted in sweeping changes in the role of the Russian 
language within the education system, leading to an end to compulsory Russian language 
studies, a drop in the prestige of the Russian language within the education system, a 
significant drop in the percentage of students studying Russian in Ukrainian schools, the 
closure of many Russian-language schools, a drop in the number of hours in the 
curriculum devoted to the study of Russian, the removal of Russian literature courses 
from Ukrainian-language schools, and increasingly negative attitudes toward the study of 
the Russian language. 
In contemporary Ukraine, geography and political conditions also affect attitudes 
toward the Russian language and the teaching of Russian. The historic political, cultural, 
and linguistic divide between pro-European western Ukraine and pro-Russian eastern 
Ukraine continues to influence attitudes toward the Russian language in predictable ways. 
Political conditions—who is in power in Ukraine and what kinds of efforts they make to 
influence language policy in that country—also influence attitudes toward the Russian 
language and the teaching of Russian. The teachers who were interviewed for this study 
indicated that language policy and attitudes toward the Russian language have, indeed, 
been closely linked to significant changes in Ukrainian politics. 
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Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the geopolitical relationship 
between Ukraine and Russia has affected the status of, and attitudes toward, the Russian 
language and the study of Russian in Ukraine. Russia’s attempts over the years at 
intervention in Ukrainian language policy with the supposed aim of protecting rights of 
Russian-speakers in Ukraine have led to resentment on the part of many Ukrainian 
citizens, who sense that Russia continues to try to undermine their sovereignty, even 
nearly a quarter century after Ukraine became an independent nation. Attitudes toward 
the Russian language worsened considerably following Euromaidan and Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea, and negative attitudes persist due to Russia’s ongoing support of 
the war in Donbas. This dissatisfaction over Ukraine’s relationship with Russia has also 
led to a significant decrease in interest in Russian language studies in schools. Yana, one 
of the teachers interviewed for this study, best sums up how the geopolitical relationship 
between Ukraine and Russia affects attitudes toward the Russian language: “Whatever 




Chapter 6: Findings and Conclusions 
 This chapter will summarize the findings related to the research questions, discuss 
them in the context of the relevant literature, present implications for policy, outline the 
limitations of the study, and offer suggestions for further research.  
SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES AND FINDINGS 
Seventeen research subjects, all of them teachers of Russian in Ukraine, 
participated in this study. The research subjects first completed demographic 
questionnaires, and then participated in interviews via Skype. Data from the 
questionnaires and interviews were analyzed, as were language and education policies in 
post-Soviet Ukraine. 
The first research question investigates how policies related to the role and status 
of the Russian language in Ukraine have evolved since Ukraine became an independent 
nation, and how this evolution in language policy has affected the teaching of Russian in 
that country. The data demonstrate that 1) language policy in post-Soviet Ukraine has 
been directed toward promoting the use of the Ukrainian language while at the same time 
protecting Russian and other minority languages; 2) changes in language policy have led 
to significant changes in the education system, including, but not limited to, an end to 
compulsory Russian language studies and a drop in the percentage of students studying 
Russian overall, a decline in the prestige of the Russian language, the closure of many 
Russian-language schools, a drop in the number of hours in the curriculum devoted to the 
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study of Russian, the removal of Russian literature courses from Ukrainian-language 
schools, and increasingly negative attitudes toward the study of the Russian language. 
The second research question investigates how geography and political conditions 
in contemporary Ukraine affect language policy, attitudes toward the Russian language, 
and the teaching of Russian. The data demonstrate that 1) the historic political, cultural, 
and linguistic divide between pro-European western Ukraine and pro-Russian eastern 
Ukraine continues to influence policy and attitudes toward the Russian language in 
predictable ways; 2) language policy and attitudes toward the Russian language are 
closely linked to changes in Ukrainian politics; and 3) geography and political conditions 
in contemporary Ukraine affect the teaching of Russian by influencing the languages of 
instruction and whether Russian is offered as a course of study. 
The third research question asks how the geopolitical relationship between 
Ukraine and Russia has affected attitudes toward the Russian language and the study of 
Russian in Ukraine. The data demonstrate that 1) Russia’s attempts over the years at 
intervention in Ukrainian language policy have led to resentment on the part of many 
Ukrainian citizens, which has led to a worsening of attitudes toward the Russian language 
both in general and within the education system; 2) attitudes toward the Russian language 
have worsened significantly since Euromaidan and Russia’s annexation of Crimea; 3) 
negative attitudes persist due to Russia’s ongoing support of the war in Donbas and anti-
Ukraine messages in the media; and 4) dissatisfaction over Ukraine’s relationship with 
Russia has led to a significant decrease in interest in Russian language studies in schools.  
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DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 
Research Question One: Language Policies and the Teaching of Russian 
Language policy in post-Soviet Ukraine holds that Ukrainian is the sole state 
language and also guarantees the right to the free development, use, and protection of 
other languages of national minorities. A lack of clarity about the role and status of the 
Russian language vis-à-vis Ukrainian, however, has not only opened the door to internal 
debates and conflicts over the relative status of these two languages, but also left Ukraine 
at the mercy of influence from Russia and from politicians determined to promote their 
own agenda. These findings are consistent with Carnysh’s (2013) assertion that Ukraine’s 
“complex linguistic landscape incentivizes politicians to rely excessively on identity 
cleavages that ultimately obstruct the country’s democratic transition” (10). The lack of 
clarity in the language policy also leads to discontent and nervousness among those on 
both sides of the language issue, because neither Ukrainian-speakers nor Russian-
speakers have a clear understanding of their linguistic rights or their protections under the 
law. Given that this lack of clarity and enforceability of language policy has caused 
political destabilization, impeded nation-building, and made it more difficult for Ukraine 
to assert itself as an independent nation, a compromise solution that will be acceptable to 
all parties could create much-needed stability in the country. This suggestion reflects a 
similar suggestion by Kulyk (2013), who posits that “the best solution would be to adopt 




The sweeping changes in language policy since Ukraine gained independence 
have left the education system in disarray. As Cairncross states, “For the moment, 
Ukrainian education is too inward-looking, too corrupt and too poor to do a good job” 
(2010). Major changes that have affected teachers and influenced attitudes toward the 
Russian language include the abrupt end to the compulsory study of Russian in Ukrainian 
schools, and the sharp drop in the number—or outright elimination—of hours in the 
curriculum devoted to the study of Russian. These changes have led to an overall decline 
in Russian literacy, negatively impacting society as a whole. After all, strong literacy 
skills in Russian, a language of international communication, can open doors to careers 
that are unavailable to those who speak only Ukrainian. By neglecting this reality, 
Ukrainians may themselves be creating a permanent underclass.50 It is possible that 
Ukraine has eliminated Russian from many school programs in an effort to promote 
Ukrainian and, at the same time, to send a signal to Russia that Ukraine is no longer 
interested in close ties with that country. Many years from now, however, Ukraine may 
regret its decision to remove Russian from the curriculum. Ukraine had a strong system 
of Russian language education in place when it gained independence from the Soviet 
Union, so rather than eliminate Russian from its schools, Ukraine could instead draw on 
its tradition of excellence in language education and cultivate further language 
opportunities for its young people.   
                                                
50 A similar phenomenon occurs in Hawaii, where some people insist on speaking Hawaiian for political 




The closure of many Russian-language schools or their conversion to Ukrainian-
language schools has led to a loss of jobs for many teachers of Russian and fewer options 
regarding native-language education for Russian-speakers. In those schools that remained 
open and experienced a rapid change in language of instruction, some teachers of Russian 
found themselves without work or without the Ukrainian language skills needed to 
perform their jobs. In some areas of the country, particularly those that were 
predominantly Russian-speaking, a lack of teachers skilled in Ukrainian caused a rocky 
and uneven transition to a new language of instruction. These findings reflect Bilaniuk’s 
(2008) assertion that there are insufficient numbers of well-trained bilingual teachers to 
provide good instruction in the subject of Ukrainian in Russian-speaking areas (356). 
Finally, the Ukrainian Ministry of Education devotes relatively few resources to 
the teaching of Russian, which has led to the publication of fewer textbooks and 
methodology-related literature for the teaching of Russian. This lack of appropriate 
teaching materials—a major complaint among the teachers who participated in the 
study—leads to frustration, lowered morale, and a feeling of being marginalized, which 
may in turn lead to resentment and translate into fewer efforts to perform well in the 
classroom. The Ministry of Education needs to show more support for teachers of 
Russian in order to attract and maintain high-quality educators for the next generation of 
students, particularly as the current population of language teachers in Ukraine ages out 
of the system. 
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Research Question Two: The Effects of Politics and Historic Divisions on Attitudes 
Toward the Russian Language and the Teaching of Russian 
Given the historic political, cultural, and linguistic divide between pro-Ukrainian, 
pro-European western Ukraine and pro-Russian, pro-Kremlin eastern Ukraine, much of 
the data was analyzed to determine the extent to which this east-west dichotomy affects 
attitudes related to language. This examination of qualitative data organized by region 
follows Jackson’s (1998) suggestion to question the “assumption that Ukraine is neatly 
divided into east and west along lines of cultural and political allegiances” (99), because 
“while east-west differences exist, there is also a need to examine subtler differences and 
processes of change on a smaller scale” (101).  
The data demonstrate that responses to certain questions fall neatly along 
geographic, ethnic, and linguistic lines, whereas other responses transcend geography, 
ethnicity, and language. For example, all of the teachers who were born in Ukraine 
expressed support for Russian-language schools in their country, regardless of their 
geographic location. This support for minority-language education transcends historic 
divisions in Ukraine, suggesting not only tolerance but also outright support for minority-
language education. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the only teachers who 
supported an upgrade in status for Russian to that of a state language alongside Ukrainian 
were all native speakers of Russian from Russian-speaking areas of the country. These 
responses provide evidence that while the historic political and linguistic divide between 
eastern and western Ukraine does influence opinions related to certain aspects of 
language policy, other attitudes transcend this divide. Perhaps nation-building practices 
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and efforts to foster a sense of unity among Ukrainians as citizens of a single nation have 
been, in some cases, successful. The fact that geography still influences other attitudes, 
however, suggests that certain Soviet-era or ethnic notions persist. These findings suggest 
that in order to gain the support of a broad base of Ukrainians, policymakers and 
politicians must avoid appealing to constituents based solely on where they live or on 
their ethnic or linguistic background. By treating voters according to outdated 
stereotypes, politicians risk alienating a citizenship that is evolving new notions of 
nationality and new allegiances to Ukraine as an independent state. 
That fact that the data demonstrate that language policy and attitudes toward the 
Russian language are influenced by Ukrainian politics suggests that policymakers need to 
focus on maintaining rights for speakers of all languages while not aggravating the 
language issue by suggesting or forcing through policy that might appear to infringe on 
people’s linguistic rights. Kulyk (2013), for example, argues that while Ukrainian-
speakers would like Ukrainian be the dominant language throughout the country, they are 
“ready to put up with the widespread use of Russian, provided that […] the titular 
language retains the priority status” (280). The fact that campaigns to strengthen minority 
languages can lead to fistfights in Parliament, as happened during the passage of the law 
in 2012 that granted regional status to Russian and several other minority groups, 
demonstrates that lawmakers need to avoid testing the patience and tolerance of 
Ukrainian-speakers, who have already clearly demonstrated their allegiance to the 
Ukrainian language. Given that the language bill signed into law by President 
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Yanukovych was widely perceived as endangering the use of Ukrainian, its passage 
“contributed to confrontation rather than compromise” (Kulyk, 2013, p. 280).   
One final observation following the analysis of the data related to the second 
research question was that the percentage of teachers in this study who thought Russian 
should be granted equal status alongside Ukrainian—24%—is the same as the percentage 
of respondents who expressed this sentiment in a nationwide survey conducted in 
September 2104 by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, as reported by Kulyk 
(2015, p. 5). This finding serves to further validate the representative quality of the group 
of participants in this study. 
Research Question Three: The Effects of the Geopolitical Relationship Between 
Ukraine and Russia on Attitudes Toward the Russian Language and the Study of 
Russian in Ukraine 
According to prevailing opinions in the West, the current political crisis in 
Ukraine “can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression” (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 
77). The data demonstrate that Russia’s hostility toward Ukraine in the areas of 
diplomacy, dissemination of information, military intervention, and economic sanctions 
have negatively affected attitudes toward the Russian language and the study of Russian 
in Ukrainian schools.  
For many Ukrainians, the Russian language symbolizes Russia as a nation and as 
a former colonizer and oppressor. Ukrainians in their forties or older grew up under 
Soviet-era language policies and remember the marginalization of the Ukrainian language 
in favor of Russian. While the research subjects in this study display great tolerance for 
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Russians as a people and for the widespread use of Russian in their country, Ukrainians’ 
anger over Russian intervention in their politics has spilled over into attitudes toward the 
language.  
Ukrainians’ dissatisfaction over their country’s relations with Russia has led to a 
significant decrease in interest in the study of the Russian language in schools. Reports 
from teachers of their students’ refusal to study “the language of the aggressor” and of 
similar attitudes toward the language on the part of many parents demonstrate that more 
Russian intervention in Ukrainian politics leads to a backlash from Ukrainians.  
PRACTICAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION 
Given that language policy and attitudes toward the Russian language are closely 
linked to Ukrainian politics, policymakers in Ukraine need to focus on ensuring linguistic 
rights for speakers of all languages regardless of who is in power, rather than attempt to 
pass legislation related only to the interests of their party, as did President Viktor 
Yanukovych in his “unconstitutional adoption” (Moser, 2013, p. 36) of the 2012 
language bill “On Principles of the State Language Policy.”  
Russia needs to stop supporting separatist movements in eastern Ukraine, as its 
intervention antagonizes the Ukrainian population and results in increasingly negative 
attitudes toward Russia. Furthermore, Russia needs to stop interfering in Ukrainian 
language policy under the guise of ensuring the rights of ethnic Russians outside of its 
borders. Inciting the Ukrainian population will only worsen relations with Russia and 
galvanize Ukraine’s resolve to align itself with the West.  
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Ukraine needs to recognize that in order to become a respected member of the 
European community, it needs to focus at least some of its efforts on solving the language 
issue. Instead of coopting the law on minority languages to promote Russian, Ukrainian 
policymakers need to demonstrate to European leaders and Ukrainians alike that Ukraine 
truly respects the rights of speakers of all languages within its borders and embraces its 
status as a multilingual nation. 
Given the vital role that schools play in the dissemination of values and attitudes 
toward language—particularly the languages of bordering countries—education policy in 
Ukraine needs to align with the nation’s values as a whole, not just with those of 
outspoken extremists on the far ends of the language issue or those of the political figures 
in power at a given moment. Thoughtful, forward-looking attention to promoting the 
Ukrainian language while protecting the rights of other languages is needed when making 
long-term decisions about language policies in education. If Ukraine chooses to promote 
Ukrainian at the expense of other languages, the nation risks losing critical languages 
such as Russian, potentially weakening its viability as a geopolitical entity in this region.  
LIMITATIONS  
First, as ethnographic research, this study may have benefited from in-country 
collection of data, which would have allowed for interviews with research subjects to 
occur face-to-face. The lack of physical proximity during interviews via Skype may have 
affected the comfort levels of research participants, which, in turn, may have influenced 
the tenor or content of their responses. Second, while the participants in this study 
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represented a range of geographic areas and institutional types in Ukraine, a larger pool 
of respondents may have led to a broader range of responses. Third, as some 
ethnographic studies rely on a researcher’s immersion in a site as a participant observer 
and analysis of collected materials, these approaches could have been incorporated into 
the research. Interviews and demographic questionnaires, however, were deemed the 
most appropriate means to collect qualitative data for this particular study.  
DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research related to this study would include follow-up investigations to 
explore how the research participants characterize the teaching of Russian in Ukraine 
over time, preferably in face-to-face interviews conducted in Ukraine. 
Other avenues of possible exploration include the following:  
• The future of the Russian language in Ukrainian schools, i.e., will the 
language continue to be marginalized? Will it be eliminated from the 
curriculum altogether? Will it be recognized as a critical language in the 
region and gain a more prominent place in Ukrainian schools?   
• The fate of Russian-language schools in Ukraine. Do they still have a 
place in contemporary Ukraine? 
• An assessment of the effectiveness of schools taught in other minority 
languages of Ukraine, e.g., one or more of the languages that are also 
official languages of the European Union.  
• The administration of the Test of Russian as a Foreign Language (TORFL 
or Rus: ТРКИ)—a standardized test supervised by the Russian Ministry 
 
202 
of Education and Science—to obtain quantitative data in order to assess 
the quality of the Russian being taught in Ukrainian schools.  
CONCLUSION 
The results of this study provide an inside look at how language policy and the 
geopolitical relationship between Ukraine and Russia affect the teaching of Russian in 
Ukraine. Although the study focuses on these two countries specifically, the relationship 
between them may be viewed as a microcosm of global diaspora. The findings of the 
study, therefore, will be of interest not only to those focusing on language education, but 
also to those researching the post-Soviet sphere, dispersed populations, language policy, 
immigration issues, and bilingualism.  
The results of this study confirm that Russia’s aggressive stance toward Ukraine 
has created an enormous rift between the two countries that has grown wider over the 
past two years. While the protests on Maidan, the 2014 Ukrainian revolution, and the 
annexation of Crimea are in the past, the data demonstrate that the animus between 
Russia and Ukraine remains. Far from an isolated description of Ukraine’s language 
policies and its geopolitical relationship with Russia, this dissertation serves as a case 
study of language issues around the world, especially, but not exclusively, those related 
to countries that border one another.  
Given the uncertain present and future role of the Russian language in the 
education system and in Ukrainian society as a whole, language issues in Ukraine will 
continue to be of critical importance in the years to come and, if left unresolved, may lead 
to further division and conflict. Even if uprisings over language rights are avoided or 
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suppressed in the short term, unresolved issues related to languages taught and spoken in 
that country will certainly arise again, only with greater urgency, should Ukraine gain 
entry to the European Union.  
From the unresolved status of the Spanish language in Texas to the emerging use 
of Arabic and related languages in Europe, issues related to language policy both locally 
and worldwide have taken on even greater importance in the 21st century. The results of 
this study represent global issues regarding migration, both voluntary and forced, and 
how people of disparate backgrounds and cultures must learn to communicate with one 
another. While this particular study focuses on language policy within a single country, 
the results serve as a cautionary tale for similar conflicts that many nations are facing or 





Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Beta Study (English) 
 
Questionnaire for teachers of Russian  
as part of dissertation research on the following theme: 
“The Influence of Language Policy  
on the Teaching of Russian in Ukrainian Schools” 
 
 
I. Questions about your work 
 
 
1. You teach Russian in …  
 
□ a school where Russian is the language of instruction 
□ a school where Ukrainian is the language of instruction 
□ other __________________________________________________ 
 
2. Location of school (city or village) _________________________________ 
 
3. In your school, Russian is taught …  
□ as a first/native language 
□ as a second foreign language beginning in ____ grade 
□ other __________________________________________________ 
 
4. How many teachers of Russian work at your school? ____ 
 
5. Is Russian a required course in your school? 
 
□ Yes  
□ No  
 




6. Number of hours that Russian is taught, in accordance with the prescribed 
curriculum at your educational institution:  
 
Elementary School Secondary School Upper Grades 
Grade Hours per 
week  
Grade Hours per 
week 
Grade Hours per 
week 
1st grade  5th grade  10th grade  
2nd grade  6th grade  11th grade  
3rd grade  7th grade    
4th grade  8th grade    
  9th grade    
 
 
7. Your weekly teaching load: ________ hours.   
 
7.1. Within your weekly teaching load, you teach Russian ________ hours. 
 
8. Which other subjects do you teach? ________________________________ 
 




10. Which of the following devices are available to you, and which of them do you 
use in your Russian language, literature or culture courses?  
 




Used by you 
in the 
classroom 
tablet computer   
desktop computer with Internet access   
smartphone with educational mobile apps   
smartboard   
portable stereo/ CD player/MP3 player   
laptop computer   







11. Which is your main textbook of Russian? (Please include the name, author and 






11.1. How well does the textbook meet the needs laid out in the Russian curriculum?  
(on a scale of 1 to 10) ______ 
 
11.2. How well does the textbook meet the needs of your students?  
(on a scale of 1 to 10) ______ 
 


















12. How would you rate your students' knowledge of Russian? 
□ native-like 
□ as a foreign langauge: 





13. Which of the following difficulties do your students face in their study of 
Russian?  
 
• limited vocabulary; 
• poor knowledge of grammar; 
• insufficient conversational practice; 
• lack of materials to meet their needs; 
• difficulties in reading, speaking, conversation, listening, writing; 
• other ____________________________________________________ 
 
14. In what kinds of Russian-language-related events do your students participate? 













II. Questions about your opinions 
 
 
15. In your opinion, Russian should be taught as a required course in all Ukrainian 
schools.  
 
□ Strongly agree  
□ Agree 
□ No opinion 
□ Disagree 





16. In your opinion, the Russian language in Ukraine should be… 
 
□ the official state language   
□ a second official language (together with Ukrainian) 
□ a recognized second language  
□ a protected national minority language 
□ other: ______________________________________ 
 
 
17. In your opinion, after Ukraine gained independence from the Soviet Union, the 
role of the Russian language within the educational system of Ukraine…  
 
□ became more important 
□ became less important 
□ its value remained the same 
 
18. Russian-language schools play an important role in the Ukrainian educational 
system.  
 
□ Strongly agree  
□ Agree 
□ No opinion 
□ Disagree 
□ Strongly disagree 
 
 
19. What are the most pressing issues facing the teaching of Russian in the 

















III. Questions about yourself 
 
 
20. Experience teaching Russian: _______ years. 
 
 
21. Overall teaching experience: _______ years. 
 
 
22. Category and title:  
 
□ Specialist  
□ 2nd Category 
□ 1st Category 
□ Higher Category 
□ Senior Teacher 
□ Teacher-Methodologist 
□ Other: ________________________  
 
 





24. University attended  ___________________________________________________ 
 
 




26. Where I live, most people speak… 
 
□ Ukrainian  
□ Russian 
□ Ukrainian and Russian equally 
 
27. At home I speak…  
□ Ukrainian  
□ Russian 
□ Ukrainian and Russian equally 
 
 
28. I consider myself to be… 
   
□ Ukrainian 
□ Russian  
□ Other nationality:  
 
29. Мy native language is… 
□ Ukrainian   
□ Russian  




In order to ensure anonymity, I will be analyzing your this data in a general way.  I 
promise not to publish identifying information. If you'd like to take place in further 












Appendix 2: Questionnaire for Beta Study (Russian) 
 
Опрос для учителей русского языка 
в рамках работы над диссертацией по теме: 
“Влияние языковой политики 
на преподавание русского языка в школах Украины” 
 
 
I. Вопросы о Ваших курсах 
 
 
1. Вы преподаете русский язык …  
 
□ в школе с русским языком обучения 
□ в школе с украинским языком обучения 
□ другой вариант __________________________________________________ 
 
2. Населенный пункт _________________________________ 
 
3. Русский язык в вашей школе изучается …  
□ как родной язык 
□ как второй иностранный с ____ класса 
□ другой вариант __________________________________________________ 
 
4. Сколько учителей русского языка работает в Вашей школе? ____ 
 
5. Является ли обязательным изучение русского языка в Вашей школе? 
 
□ Да  
□ Нет  
 




6. Количество часов, которое, согласно учебному плану / программе, отводится 
на изучение русского языка в неделю:  
 










1 класс  5 класс  10 класс  
2 класс  6 класс  11 класс  
3 класс  7 класс  12 класс  
4 класс  8 класс    
  9 класс    
 
 
7. Ваша недельная педагогическая нагрузка: ________ часов.   
 
7.1. Из общего числа часов, Вы преподаете русский язык ________часов. 
 
8. Какие другие предметы Вы преподаете? ________________________________ 
 




10. Какие технические средства доступны Вам и какими средствами Вы 
пользуетесь на уроках русского языка (русской литературы, культуры)?  
 




планшет    
компьютеры с доступом к Интернету    
смартфон с учебным мобильным приложением   
интерактивная доска   
магнитофон / CD/MP3 плеер   
ноутбук   








11. Какой учебник по русскому языку Вы используете в качестве основного? 






11.1. Насколько учебник соответствует учебной программе?  
(оцените по 10-балльной шкале) ______ 
 
11.2. Насколько учебник соответствует потребностям учеников?  
(оцените по 10-балльной шкале) ______ 
 











11.5. Назовите учебники / пособия, которые Вы используете на уроках русского 






12. Оцените уровень владения русским языком своих учащихся: 
□ уровень владения русским языком как родным 
□ уровень владения русским языком как иностранным: 




13. Охарактеризуйте трудности, которые испытывают учащиеся при изучении 
русского языка  
 
• недостаточный словарный запас; 
• слабое знание грамматики; 
• недостаточная речевая практика; 
• отсутствие соответствующих потребностям учащихся пособий; 
• трудности в чтении, монологе, диалоге, аудировании, письме; 
• другое ____________________________________________________ 
 
14. В каких мероприятиях, связанных с изучением русского языка, участвуют 













II. Вопросы о Ваших мнениях 
 
 
15. На Ваш взгляд, русский язык должен преподаваться в качестве 
обязательного языка во всех украинских школах.  
 
□ Полностью согласен/согласна  
□ Согласен/согласна 
□ Придерживаюсь нейтральной позиции 
□ Не согласен/не согласна 





16. По Вашему мнению, русский язык в Украине должен быть… 
 
□ официальным государственным языком   
□ вторым государственным языком (вместе с украинским) 
□ общепризнанным вторым языком  
□ защищённым языком нац. меньшинства 
□ другим: ______________________________________ 
 
 
17. По Вашему мнению, после того, как Украина стала независимой, русский 
язык в системе образования Украины  
 
□ стал более важным 
□ стал менее важным 
□ его значение осталось прежним 
 
18. Русскоязычные школы играют важную роль в системе образования в 
Украине.  
 
□ Полностью согласен/согласна  
□ Согласен/согласна 
□ Придерживаюсь нейтральной позиции 
□ Не согласен/не согласна 
□ Категорически не согласен/не согласна 
 
 
19. Каковы наиболее актуальные вопросы, стоящие перед нынешней 


















III. Вопросы о себе 
 
 
20. Опыт преподавания русского языка: _______ лет. 
 
21. Общий педагогический стаж: _______ лет. 
 
22. Категория и звания:  
 
□ Специалист  
□ 2 категория 
□ 1 категория 
□ Высшая категория 
□ Старший учитель 
□ Учитель-методист 
□ Другое: ________________________  
 
 





24. Какой ВУЗ Вы закочили? ____________________________________________ 
 
 










□ в равной степени по-украински и по-русски 
 
27. Дома я говорю…  
□ в основном по-украински 
□ в основном по-русски 
□ в равной степени по-украински и по-русски 
 
 
28. Я себя считаю… 
   
□ украинцем/украинкой  
□ русским/русской 
□ другая национальность: ________________________ 
 
 
29. Мой родной язык… 
□ украинский   
□ русский  




В целях сохранения вашей анонимности я буду анализировать данные 
обобщённо. Я обещаю не публиковать нигде идентифицирующую вас информацию. 
Если Вы хотите принять участие в моих дальнейших диссертационных 
















Personal information wil not be published (either in printed form or electronically) 




Full name  _______________________________________________________________ 
 
Today's date  _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Date and place of birth  ____________________________________________________ 
 
Sex  ____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Telephone / E-mail  _______________________________________________________ 
 
Residence  ______________________________________________________________ 
 
Teaching experience: _______ years. 
 
Year of most recent rise in qualification: _______ 
 
Category and title:  
 
□ Specialist  
□ 2nd Category 
□ 1st Category 
□ Higher Category 
□ Senior Teacher 
□ Teacher-Methodologist 
□ Other: ________________________  
 
Experience teaching Russian: _______ years. 
 
 







University attended  _______________________________________________________ 
 
Major  __________________________________________________________________ 
 
Where I live, most people speak… 
 
□ Ukrainian  
□ Russian 
□ Ukrainian and Russian equally 
 




□ Ukrainian and Russian equally 
 
 
I consider myself to be… 
   
□ Ukrainian 
□ Russian  
□ Other nationality: _________________________________________________ 
  
 
Мой родной язык… 
 
□ Ukrainian   
□ Russian  
□ Other:  __________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Questions about your courses 
 
 
You teach Russian …  
 
□ in an educational institution where Russian is the language of instruction 
□ in an educational institution where Ukrainian is the language of instruction  
□ other   
 
Name of the educational institution where you teach  _____________________________ 
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Location (city, village) of educational institution  ________________________________ 
 
In the educational institution where you work, Russian is taught…  
□ as a first language/native language 
□ as a second foreign language beginning in ____ grade 
□ other ___________________________________________________________ 
 
How many teachers of Russian work in your educational institution? ________________ 
 
Is Russian a required course in your educational institution? 
 
□ Yes  
□ No  
 
If so, for students in which concentrations?  ____________________________________ 
Number of hours that Russian is taught, in accordance with the prescribed curriculum at 
your educational institution: 
 
Elementary School Secondary School Upper Grades 
Grade Hours per 
week  
Grade Hours per 
week 
Grade Hours per 
week 
1st grade  5th grade  10th grade  
2nd grade  6th grade  11th grade  
3rd grade  7th grade    
4th grade  8th grade    
  9th grade    
 
 
Your weekly teaching load: ________ hours.   
 
Out of your weekly teaching load, you teach Russian ________hours. 
 
Which other subjects do you teach?  __________________________________________ 











Личные данные респондентов никогда не будут опубликованы ни в каком виде 
(ни в печатном, ни в электронном) и 




ФИО  __________________________________________________________________ 
 
Дата заполнения анкеты  __________________________________________________ 
 
Дата и место рождения  ___________________________________________________ 
 
Пол  ___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Телефон / E-mail  ________________________________________________________ 
 
Место жительства  _______________________________________________________ 
 
Общий педагогический стаж: _______ лет. 
 
Год последнего повышения квалификации: _______ 
 
Категория и звания:  
 
□ Специалист  
□ 2 категория 
□ 1 категория 
□ Высшая категория 
□ Старший учитель 
□ Учитель-методист 
□ Другое: ________________________  
 
Опыт преподавания русского языка: _______ лет. 
 







Какой вуз Вы окончили?  _________________________________________________ 
 
Специальность  __________________________________________________________ 
 




□ в равной степени по-украински и по-русски 
 
Дома я говорю…  
 
□ в основном по-украински 
□ в основном по-русски 
□ в равной степени по-украински и по-русски 
 
 
Я себя считаю… 
   
□ украинцем/украинкой  
□ русским/русской 
□ другая национальность:  ___________________________________________ 
 
Мой родной язык… 
 
□ украинский   
□ русский  
□ другой:  _________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Вопросы о Ваших курсах 
 
 
Вы преподаете русский язык …  
 
□ в учебном заведении с русским языком обучения 
□ в учебном заведении с украинским языком обучения 
□ другой вариант  __________________________________________________ 
 
Название учебного заведения, в котором Вы работаете  ________________________ 
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Населенный пункт  _______________________________________________________ 
 
Русский язык в Вашем учебном заведении изучается …  
□ как родной язык 
□ как второй иностранный с ____ класса 
□ другой вариант  __________________________________________________ 
 
Сколько учителей русского языка работает в Вашем учебном заведении?  _________ 
 
Является ли обязательным изучение русского языка в Вашем учебном заведении? 
 
□ Да  
□ Нет  
 
Если «да», то в классах какого профиля?  ____________________________________ 
Количество часов, которое, согласно учебному плану / программе, отводится на 
изучение русского языка в неделю:  
 










1 класс  5 класс  10 класс  
2 класс  6 класс  11 класс  
3 класс  7 класс    
4 класс  8 класс    
  9 класс    
 
 
Ваша недельная педагогическая нагрузка: ________ часов.   
 
Из общего числа часов, Вы преподаете русский язык ________часов. 
 
Какие другие предметы Вы преподаете?  _____________________________________ 







Appendix 5: Consent form (English) 
 
Title: A Nation in Transition: Language Policy in Ukraine and Its Impact on the 
Education System   
Conducted By: Karen Chilstrom 
Of The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Slavic and Eurasian Studies  





You are being asked to participate in a research study. This form provides you with 
information about the study.  The person in charge of this research will also describe 
this study to you and can answer all of your questions. Please read the information 
below and ask any questions you might have before deciding whether or not to take 
part. Your participation is entirely voluntary. You can refuse to participate without 
penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You can stop your 
participation at any time; to do so simply tell the researcher you wish to stop 
participation. The researcher will provide you with a copy of this consent for your 
records. 
 
The purpose of this study is to better understand the impact of Ukrainian 
language policy on the education system in that country. 
 
If you agree to be in this study, we will ask you to do any or all of the following: 
•  Complete a written questionnaire regarding education in Ukraine. 
• Take part in an interview with the researcher via the telephone or Internet. 
•  Allow the researcher to make an audio recording of interview to review and 
record data. The audio recording will not be shared with others.  
 
Total estimated time to participate in the study is two hours.  
 
Risks of taking part in this study: 
• The risks associated with this study are no greater than everyday life. 
• This research may involve risks that are currently unforeseeable. If you wish to 
discuss the information above or any other risks you may experience, you may 
ask questions now or call the principal investigator listed on the front page of 
this form. 
 
Benefits of being in the study include: 
• The opportunity to develop a deeper understanding of the impact of Ukrainian 
language policy on the education system. 
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• Documentation of your experiences and unique points of view, which 




• No compensation is provided, though the researcher is willing to share with you 
the findings of this research study.  
 
Confidentiality and Privacy Protections: 
• Your name and identifying information will be immediately changed to an ID 
number. Your identification will never be reported or available to anyone 
except the researcher. 
• Observations will be digitally audiotaped, and audio files will be coded so that 
no personally identifying information is visible on them. Files will be kept in a 
secure, password-protected computer and UT server. Tapes will be heard only 
for research purposes by the researcher and his or her associates. Recordings 
will be retained indefinitely. 
 
Contacts and Questions: 
If you have any questions about the study, please contact Karen Chilstrom 
now.  If you have questions later, want additional information, or wish to withdraw 
your participation, you will find Karen Chilstrom’s phone numbers and e-mail address 
on the front page of this consent form.  
You will be given a copy of this information for your 
records. 
 
Statement of Consent: 
 
I have read the above information and have sufficient information to make a decision 
about participating in this study.  I consent to participate in the study as follows: 
 
[ ] Yes, I will participate in questionnaires and interviews with this researcher. 
 
 
Please indicate your phone/email contact in order to coordinate interviews: 
 
Phone/Email: ___________________________________________________________ 
   
Printed Name: _____________________________         Date: ____________________ 
 
Signature: ________________________________          Date: ____________________ 
 
Signature of Investigator: __________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 6: Consent form (Russian) 
 
 
Название: Страна в процессе перемен: языковая политика и ее влияние на систему 
образования в Украине 
Исследователь: Чилстром Кэрен 
Аспирант Техасского университета в Остине (University of Texas at Austin), 




ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ О ДОБРОВОЛЬНОМ СОГЛАСИИ 
 
Вас приглашают принять участие в исследовании. Информация об исследовании 
предоставлена в этом заявлении. Лицо, ответственное за проведение этого 
исследования, также опишет вам суть исследования и может ответить на все ваши 
вопросы. Пожалуйста, ознакомьтесь с приведенной ниже информацией и задайте 
любые возникшие у вас вопросы до принятия решения об участии в исследовании. 
Ваше участие является полностью добровольным. Ваш отказ от участия не повлечет 
за собой штрафные санкции или утрату льгот, на которые вы имели бы право в 
противном случае. Вы можете прервать участие в любое время; для этого вам 
нужно всего лишь сказать исследователю, что вы хотите прервать участие. 
Исследователь предоставит вам копию этого заявления о добровольном согласии. 
 
Целью данного исследования является лучшее понимание воздействия украинской 
языковой политики на систему образования в этой стране. 
 
Если вы согласитесь принять участие в этом исследовании, мы просим вас 
выполнить любое или все из следующих действий: 
• Заполнить письменный опрос об образовании в Украине. 
• Принять участие в интервью с исследователем по телефону или Интернету. 
• Разрешить исследователю сделать аудиозапись интервью для изучения и 
записи данных. Доступ к записи не будет предоставлен посторонним. 
 
Общее расчетное время участия в исследовании: два часа. 
 
Риски участия в исследовании: 
• Риски, связанные с этим исследованием, не превышают риски в 
повседневной  жизни. 
• Это исследование может включать в себя риски, которые невозможно 
предвидеть в настоящее время. Если вы хотите обсудить вышеприведенную 
информацию или какие-либо другие возможные риски, вы можете задать 
вопросы прямо сейчас или позвонить по телефону главному исследователю, 
номер которого находится на первой странице этой формы. 
 
Преимущества участия в исследовании включают в себя: 
• Возможность углубить понимание воздействия украинской языковой 
политики на систему образования. 
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• Документация вашего опыта и уникальной точки зрения может дать 




• Вам не будет предоставлена денежная компенсация, но исследователь готов 
 поделиться с вами результатами этого исследования. 
 
Конфиденциальность и защита частной информации: 
• Имя и идентифицирующая вас информация будут немедленно изменены на 
идентификационный номер. Идентифицирующие вас данные никогда не 
будут обнародованы и не будет доступны никому, кроме исследователя. 
• Наблюдения будут записаны в цифровом аудиоформате. Аудиофайлы будут 
закодированы таким образом, чтобы в них не отображались личные 
идентифицирующие данные. Файлы будут храниться в надежном, 
защищенном паролем компьютере и на сервере Техасского университета. 
Записи будут прослушаны исключительно в исследовательских целях самим 
исследователем и ее партнерами по проекту. Записи будут храниться 
бессрочно. 
 
Контактная информация и вопросы: 
Если у вас возникли какие-либо вопросы по поводу исследования, пожалуйста, 
свяжитесь с Кэрен Чилстром прямо сейчас. Если у вас возникнут вопросы позже, 
вы захотите получить дополнительную информацию или отозвать свое согласие на 
участие, свяжитесь с Кэрен Чилстром по номеру телефона или адресу электронной 
почты, которые указаны на первой странице этой формы. 
 
Вам будет предоставлена копия этой информации для ваших записей. 
Заявление о согласии: 
Я прочитал(а) приведенную выше информацию и получил(а) достаточно 
информации, чтобы принять решение об участии в данном исследовании. Я даю 
согласие на участие в исследовании следующим образом: 
 
[   ] Да, я буду участвовать в анкетировании и интервью с этим исследователем. 
Пожалуйста, укажите свой телефон / электронную почту в целях координации 
интервью: 
 
Телефон / E-mail: _______________________________________________________ 
ФИО: _________________________________________________________________  
Подпись: _____________________________________ Дата: ____________________ 
 
 




Appendix 7: Geographical Representation of Research Subjects 
 
 
    
  
Number of 
General region Oblast research subjects 
   West Zakarpattia 2 
Northwest Volyn 1 
West Central Zhitomyr 1 
North Central Kyiv 3 
Central Cherkasy 1 
Central Poltava 2 
South Central Kirovohrad 1 
South Odessa 1 
Crimea Crimea 1 
Northeast Kharkiv 1 
Southeast Donetsk 3 
   
   
      





























Red circles indicate geographical areas represented in the study. 
 

















Appendix 9: Selected Transcripts of Interviews51 
Interview with Oksana, conducted October 28, 2015 
 
Кэрен:  Как изменилась роль русского 
языка в украинской системе образования за 
последние 25 лет, то есть, с момента 
обретения Украиной независимости в 1991 
г.? 
Karen: How has the role of the Russian 
language in the Ukrainian educational system 
changed over the past 25 years, in other words, 
since Ukraine gained its independence in 1991? 
Оксана: До майдана было все хорошо. Были 
русские классы, были украинские. То есть в 
школе родители сами могли выбрать, куда 
своего ребенка отдать, в русский класс либо 
в украинский класс, кто как хотел. Но 
поступать в высшие учебные заведения… 
конечно, требовали знания украинского 
языка. Поэтому многие выбирали все-таки 
украинские классы.  
 
Но специалистов не было. Если здесь, в 
центральной части, они были, потому что 
здесь вузы были, ну, украинские, то там, где 
я работала, то там все было на русском 
языке, специалистов не было.  
 
То есть в моей школе, допустим, были 
болгары-математики, они даже с акцентом 
говорили. Болгарский язык, им тяжело 
было, это чувствовалось. И представляете, 
им тут надо было бы математику за 
короткий период выучить на украинском 
языке. Им тяжело на русском! То есть, 
многие либо уходили, либо они остались, но 
продолжают до сих пор читать на русском. 
В украинской школе, но на русском языке. 
Почему? Потому что нету специалистов, 
нету. В центральной части: Ивано-
Франковская, Западная — там да, потому 
что институты, они говорят на украинском 
языке. А на Бессарабии, там такого нет. 
Поэтому до майдана было все хорошо, был 
выбор, была лояльность, были учебники, 
была программа. После майдана, да, стало 
очень плохо. Именно стало плохо.  
Oksana: Up until Maidan, everything was fine. 
Some classes were conducted in Russian, and 
others were conducted in Ukrainian. In other 
words, parents could decide for themselves 
whether to have their children study in 
Russian-language classes or Ukrainian-
language classes. But admission to a university 
required knowledge of Ukrainian, and for that 
reason, many chose Ukrainian-language 
instruction regardless.  
But there weren't enough [Ukrainian-language] 
specialists. Here, in central Ukraine, there were 
specialists, because there are Ukrainian 
institutions of higher education here, but where 
I worked, everything was in Russian, so there 
weren't any Ukrainian-language specialists.  
In my school, for example, there were 
Bulgarian mathematicians. They even spoke 
with an accent. They spoke Bulgarian, so 
Russian was hard for them. You could tell. 
Now imagine; in a short period of time, they 
had to learn how to teach math in Ukrainian. It 
was already hard for them in Russian! So a lot 
of them either left, or they stayed and 
continued to teach in Russian. It was a 
Ukrainian-language school, but in Russian. 
Why? Because there weren't any specialists. 
None. In the central regions—in Ivano-
Frankovsk, in the west—there were specialists 
there, because they spoke Ukrainian at the 
institutes there. But in Bessarabia, there wasn't 
anything like that. For that reason, everything 
was fine until Maidan. There were choices. 
There was loyalty. There were textbooks. 
There was a curriculum. After Maidan, yes, 
things became very bad. I mean, very bad.  
                                                
51 N.B.: White space has been placed within the transcripts to aid in readability.  
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Кэрен: А как вам кажется, должен ли 
русский язык преподаваться в качестве 
обязательного языка всем учащимся 
Украины?  
Karen: And in your opinion, should Russian 
be a required course for all students in 
Ukraine? 
Оксана: Не обязательно. Почему? Потому 
что должен быть выбор. Вот пришел 
ребенок в школу, он должен выбрать те 
предметы, которые он хочет изучать. Хочет 
изучать биологию и химию — да пусть 
изучает, зачем его физикой грузить. У нас 
общий стандарт для всех, все под одну 
гребенку. Поэтому, я считаю, это выбор 
каждого.  
Oksana: Not necessarily. Why? Because there 
should be a choice. If a child comes to school, 
he should choose the subjects he wants to 
study. If he wants to study biology or 
chemistry, then let him study those subjects. 
Why burden him with physics? We have a 
common standard for everyone—one size fits 
all. For that reason, I think that each student 
should choose. 
Кэрен: У вас сейчас русский язык считается 
защищенным языком национального 
меньшинства, а каким, по вашему мнению, 
должен быть статус русского языка в 
Украине? Он может быть официальным, или 
вторым государственным, или 
общепризнанным вторым без особой 
защиты…. 
Karen: Russian is currently considered a 
protected national minority language. In your 
opinion, what should be the status of the 
Russian language in Ukraine? Official? A 
second state language? A generally recognized 
second language without special protection?  
Оксана: Я считаю, что он должен быть, по 
крайней мере… Пусть не государственным, 
если мы живем на Украине, все документы, 
пусть это будет… мы должны знать язык 
страны, в которой мы живем. Но и русский 
язык, как язык большинства, — он 
действительно язык большинства — он тоже 
должен иметь статус, обязательно. Просто 
даже по телевидению мы видим, даже 
депутаты Верховной Рады говорят на 
русском языке. Значит, должен быть статус.  
Oksana: I think it should be, at the very 
least…Well, not a state language. If we live in 
Ukraine, all of the documents, well, let it be… 
We should know the language of the country in 
which we live. But as the language of the 
majority—it really is the language of the 
majority—Russian also deserves some kind of 
special status. Absolutely. We even see on 
television that the deputies in the Verkhovna 
Rada speak in Russian. That means Russian 
should have some kind of status. 
Кэрен: А как политика влияет на изучение 
русского языка или на отношение к 
русскому языку в Украине? 
Karen: And how does politics affect the study 
of Russian or attitudes toward the Russian 
language in Ukraine? 
Оксана: Ну, когда у нас был министр 
образования Табачник, он развивал русский 
язык. Много было всего хорошего сделано, 
но и в параллели украинский язык 
развивался, нельзя говорить, что это только 
русский, — нет, украинскому у нас тоже, 
как говорится, и почет, и все. Но… Хуже, 
хуже стало, хуже. Если я, например, не 
владею украинским языком, я не хвастаюсь 
этим, я этим не горжусь — да, надо знать 
языки, конечно, надо знать, надо говорить, 
но я считаю, если ты умеешь говорить, то 
Oksana: When [Dmytro] Tabachnyk was the 
education minister of Ukraine [March 11, 2010 
to February 23, 2014], he expanded Russian-
language education. He accomplished a lot, and 
at the same time, he developed Ukrainian-
language education, so you can’t say that he 
focused exclusively on Russian. But now 
everything has gotten worse. Worse and worse. 
For example, if I don’t speak Ukrainian, I don’t 
brag about it. I’m not proud of it. Yes, you 
need to know languages, of course, you need to 
know them, you need to be able to speak, but I 
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ты говоришь, если ты не умеешь, то лучше 
помолчать. С меня требуют, и у нас в 
учительской висит объявление, где мы 
должны разговаривать на украинском языке 
во время учебного процесса. То есть, они 
требуют. Но я говорю на том языке, на 
котором я могу говорить — все.  
 
Дети ко мне обращаются на украинском 
языке, я им отвечаю на русском, они могут 
мне на русском, никогда ничего не 
исправлю. При ответе на вопрос… 
допустим, он разбирает предложение и 
забыл, как существительное называется, я 
ему так и говорю: на украинском языке как? 
Я говорю: хорошо, молодец. Мне все равно, 
на каком языке он ответит, мне самое 
главное, правильно ли он ответит. Главное, 
он отвечает правильно, на каком языке — 
мне все равно. А политика такая, что 
требуют. Все документы, конечно, на 
украинском языке. Журналы на украинском 
языке, заявления, допустим, в отпуск я, 
конечно, на украинском языке должна 
написать. Но у меня есть коллега-подружка, 
учитель украинского языка, я пишу все на 
русском, она мне быстренько переводит на 
украинский язык. И мы с ней общаемся. Мы 
вместе с ней пришли работать в школу, она 
5 лет и я 5 лет в этой школе. И она со мной 
разговаривает только на украинском языке. 
Это ее родной язык, она думает на 
украинском. Я с ней разговариваю на 
русском. Все время все удивляются, говорят, 
а как… Ну вот понимаем!  
 
 
Я говорю, что я неполитичный человек, я не 
люблю говорить о политике. Почему не 
люблю? Потому что я сразу говорю: я в ней 
не разбираюсь. В ней надо разбираться для 
того, чтобы о ней говорить. Я в ней не 
разбираюсь. Я живу скорее эмоциями, 
впечатлениями от увиденного и 
услышанного. Вот если я это вижу, да, я 
могу сказать, это хорошо, это плохо. Я могу 
высказать смело свою точку зрения. Да, мне 
feel that if you can speak, then speak, and if 
you can’t, then it’s better to stay quiet. They 
expect me… in our faculty lounge there is an 
announcement hanging on the wall that reads 
that we all must speak Ukrainian in class. In 
other words, it’s a requirement. But I speak in 
the language in which I’m able to speak, and 
that’s it.  
My students speak to me in Ukrainian, and I 
answer them in Russian, but they can address 
me in Russian, in which case I never correct 
anything they say. If, when they are responding 
to a question, let's say, they are creating a 
sentence and can't remember a particular word, 
I ask, “And what is it in Ukrainian?” I say, 
“Good. Very good.” I don't care what language 
they respond in. What matters to me is that 
they answer the question correctly. But politics 
requires something else…All paperwork has to 
be completed in Ukrainian. All of the journals 
[i.e., lesson plans and reports] have to be in 
Ukrainian, and so do announcements, for 
example, that I’m going to be taking days off. 
They all have to be written in Ukrainian. But I 
have a colleague, a friend of mine, a teacher of 
Ukrainian, and I write everything in Russian, 
and she quickly translates things into 
Ukrainian. And we communicate just fine with 
each other. We both started working at the 
school at the same time, so we’ve both been 
working here five years. And she speaks to me 
only in Ukrainian. It’s her native language. She 
thinks in Ukrainian. And I speak to her in 
Russian. Everyone is surprised all the time, and 
they say, “But how…?” But we understand 
each other! 
 
I always say that I’m apolitical, that I don’t like 
to talk about politics. Why don’t I like to talk 
about it? You have to understand politics in 
order to talk about it, and I don’t understand it. 
I live through my emotions, through the 
impressions I have gleaned based on what I 
have seen and heard. So if I see something, I 
can say, yes, that it’s good or that it’s bad. I can 
boldly express my own point of view. Yes, 
people have tried to call me a separatist. What 
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пытались говорить, что я сепаратистка. 
Какая сепаратистка?! О чем может идти 
речь? Я плохо буду относиться к людям, 
которые сегодня говорят одно, а пришла 
власть, поменялась, и они тут же начали 
говорить другое. Я не из таких. Я уважаю 
свое прошлое, своих учителей, благодаря 
которым я имею, что я имею, чему я 
научилась — как я могу это предать? Это 
нельзя так, это предательство!  
do they mean, separatist?! What are they 
talking about? I can’t respect people who say 
one thing one day and then, when someone 
new comes to power, start saying something 
else. I’m not one of those kinds of people. I 
respect my past and my teachers, thanks to 
whom I know what I do now. Those who 
taught me—how can I betray them? It would 





Interview with Tanya, conducted August 28, 2015 
 
Кэрен: А вы сами, конечно, учились в 
школе с русским языком преподавания, так, 
где вы сейчас работаете. А как вам кажется, 
есть ли до сих пор в Украине 
востребованность русскоязычных школ? 
Karen: You, of course, studied in a Russian-
language school, in the same school where you 
work now. In your opinion, is there still a need 
for Russian-language schools in Ukraine? 
 
Таня: Да, есть. Ну, это мое мнение. 
Конечно, есть. Во-первых, потому что я вот 
уже объясняла, что человек, если он думает 
на русском языке, то он должен грамотно 
писать на этом языке. Человек должен знать 
литературу, которая была написана на этом 
языке, и классическую литературу. Если 
люди только говорят на русском языке, но 
не умеют писать, они просто ущербные, мне 
кажется. И те родители, которые это 
понимают, они отдают детей в школы с 
русским языком преподавания. Они 
понимают, что детям будет тяжелее, потому 
что гораздо проще учить только украинский 
и английский, правда? Чем изучать русский, 
украинский, английский — это нагрузка на 
ребенка, на самом деле.  
Но украинский язык — государственный 
язык, я с этим спорить не буду, это 
правильно, потому что если наша страна 
уже самостоятельное государство, то 
украинский язык должен быть 
государственным. Но язык национальных 
меньшинств… Вот мы называемся «школа 
национальных меньшинств»… Хотя очень 
много людей, которые… То есть это… На 
самом деле, такие школы должны быть. И, 
действительно, востребованность есть, но, в 
связи с тем, что происходит такая вот 
конфронтация между нашими двумя 
странами, между Россией и Украиной, очень 
много испортилось отношений между 
коллегами бывшими, между родственниками 
даже, люди говорят друг другу такие вещи, 
после которых общение потом родственное 
становится уже невозможным. Друзья, когда 
они превыше всего ценят, допустим, 
политические амбиции руководителей своих 
стран, тоже эта дружба распадается, и у нас 
много очень детей, которые сейчас… ну, как 
Tanya: Yes, there is. Well, that’s my opinion. 
Of course there is. First, as I already explained, 
if a person thinks in Russian, that person 
should know how to write in that language. A 
person should know the literature that was 
written in that language, and classical 
literature, too. If people only speak Russian but 
don’t know how to write in it, it seems to me 
that they are simply defective. And parents 
who understand this send their children to 
Russian-language schools. They understand 
that it will be harder on their children, because 
it’s a lot easier to study only Ukrainian and 
English—right?—than to study Russian, 
Ukrainian and English. That’s a burden on the 
child.  
 
But Ukrainian is the state language. 
I’m not going to argue with that. And that’s 
how it should be, because if our country is now 
an independent state, then Ukrainian should be 
the state language. But a national minority 
language…We call ourselves a national 




In truth, there need to be such schools. And 
truly, there is a need, but, in connection with 
what’s happening—the confrontation between 
our two countries, between Russia and 
Ukraine—relationships between former 
colleagues, even between relatives, have 
deteriorated greatly. People say such things to 
one another, after which friendly family 
relations become impossible. When friends 
value, say, the political ambitions of their own 
country’s leaders above all else, that friendship 




бы, и родителей тоже, вот родители тоже… 
Вот моя коллега (в другом районе она 
работает), она поставила ребенку «двойку» 
за неправильное выполнение упражнения. А 
родители этого ребенка написали в тетради, 
ну, на украинском языке, [цитата на 
украинском] то есть русский язык — это 
язык вражеский, понимаете? То есть в 
настоящий момент это очень большая 
проблема. На самом деле, Крым и восток 
Украины они ушли, на самом деле, потому 
по большей части, что одним из, скажем, 
декретов, который был принят после нашей 
революции, оказалось, что языковой вопрос 
был поднят, по поводу того, что украинский 
язык будет самым главным и т. д. Не этим 
нужно было заниматься. Они подняли 
языковой вопрос и сразу люди в Крыму, на 
востоке Украины, сразу паника, что нас всех 
заставят говорить на украинском языке. То 
есть это все неправда. Меня никто никогда… 
Я могу говорить на украинском языке, могу 
говорить на русском языке, но мне никто 
никогда в моем родном городе, никто мне не 
сказал, не сделал замечание, никто мне не 
сказал никогда, что «На каком языке ты 
говоришь» и т. д. Люди, на самом деле, 
очень терпимы, очень толерантны, Но есть 
такие, которые настолько увидели образ 
врага — и вот уже ничего с этим сделать 
нельзя. И вот из-за этого, конечно… Но в 
любом случае, в нашей гимназии конкурс 
был и в этом году. То есть не было такого, 
что нам приходилось просто брать детей с 
улицы. 3-4 человека на одно место, дети 
сдают экзамен, конкурс. То есть, несмотря 
на то, что такие события происходят, в 
нашей гимназии дети есть, и в других 
русских школах — тоже. Потому что умные 
люди, мудрые люди, они понимают, что 
нельзя вот так взять и сразу заставить 
говорить на языке. Это должно быть 
органично, это должны пройти годы.  
Now, we have a lot of children who, well, and 
parents, too…. Take, for example, my 
colleague, who lives in a different part of town. 
She gave her student a grade of “two”52 for 
incorrectly completing an exercise. And the 
parents of this child wrote in the gradebook, 
well, in Ukrainian, [citation in Ukrainian], in 
other words, that Russian is the language of the 
enemy, do you understand? So at the moment, 
this is a very big problem. Actually, Crimea 
and eastern Ukraine left, in fact, mostly due to 
the fact that one of the decrees that had been 
adopted after the [2014] revolution once again 
raised the language issue as a reminder that 
Ukrainian will continue to be the main 
language.  
They shouldn’t have concerned themselves 
with that. They raised the language issue, and 
panic immediately ensued. People in Crimea 
and in eastern Ukraine feared that everyone 
would be forced to speak Ukrainian. And that’s 
simply not true. No one has ever… I can speak 
Ukrainian, I can speak Russian, but no one in 
my native city, no one has ever told me, has 
ever commented… No one has ever concerned 
themselves with what language I speak. People 
are, in fact, very patient and tolerant. 
But there are people who have seen the image 
of the enemy so many times, and there’s 
nothing you can do about it. So for that reason, 
of course... But in any case, there was 
competition for admission to our school this 
year [2015]. I mean, we didn’t have to drag 
children in from off the street. There were three 
or four applications for every opening at the 
school. So regardless of the events taking 
place, our school has students, and there are 
students in other Russian-language schools, 
too. Because smart people, wise people, they 
understand that it’s impossible to just up and 
make people speak a language immediately. It 
should be an organic process that takes place 
over the course of years.   
 
                                                
52 The grading scale in Ukrainian schools is based on a twelve-point system, with twelve being the highest 
grade. The lowest passing grade is four.   
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Кэрен: Так что, да, я спрашивала… Karen: I was asking… 
Таня: О востребованности языка, да. На 
самом деле, востребован, но из-за 
политической вот этой ситуации, понимаете, 
многие в штыки относятся к языку, хотя 
Пушкин, Лермонтов, Достоевский ничем не 
виноваты в том, что сейчас происходит 
вокруг. И их сбрасывать с парохода 
современности нельзя. Как говорил 
Маяковский.  
Tanya: About the need for the language, yes. 
In actuality, there is still a demand for it, but 
because of this political situation, you 
understand, many people feel hostility toward 
the language, although Pushkin, Lermontov 
and Dostoevsky are not to blame for what is 
happening around us. And we shouldn’t throw 
them from the ship of modernity, as 
Mayakovsky said. 
Кэрен: А как изменилась роль русского 
языка в украинской системе образования с 
момента обретения независимости в 91-м 
году? То есть за последние 25 лет?  
Karen: And how has the role of the Russian 
language in the Ukrainian educational system 
changed since Ukraine gained its independence 
in 1991? Over the past 25 years, in other 
words? 
Таня: Ну, за последние 25 лет в основном, 
скажем так, изменилось отношение к языку. 
В основном — в последние два года. Начиная 
с 14-го года, 14-15-й год, вот только сейчас 
изменилось отношение к языку. И сейчас, 
ну, скажем так, я была на августовской 
конференции, где собирались все учителя 
русского языка, были авторы программ по 
русскому языку, и журналы, русскоязычные 
журналы профессиональные, они 
закрывают. Вот два журнала, «Русская 
школа» и «Российская словесность», два 
журнала закрываются. То есть, авторы и 
издатели будут подавать в Министерство 
образования прошение по поводу того, 
чтобы эти журналы профессиональные для 
учителей остались, но… Понимаете, если 
учительница говорит, что ее сепаратисткой 
называют на уроке ученики некоторые, то… 
То есть, это все культура родителей, 
культура семьи, культура воспитания… 
Поэтому только последние два года резко, 
скажем так, роль русского языка… Я 
понимаю, что сейчас такой настрой, что 
главное … главный язык — украинский, а 
русский постепенно сворачивает. Просто, 
знаете, когда образ врага очень яркий, я вам 
хочу сказать, что я телевизор перестала 
смотреть, я смотрела новости, я плакала, 
потому что когда смотришь новости и 
понимаешь, в тысяче километров от тебя 
взрываются бомбы, гибнут дети, мужчины, 
Tanya: Well, let’s say that in general, attitudes 
toward the language have changed over the 
past twenty-five years. Mainly, over the past 
two years. Beginning right now, in 2014, in 
2014 and 2015, the attitude toward the 
language has changed. And now, well, let’s say 
it this way, I was at a conference in August, a 
gathering of all of the Russian-language 
teachers, and I met with authors of Russian-
language curricula and of journals, professional 
Russian-language journals. They are all 
closing. Two journals—“Russian School” and 
“Russian Literature”—those two journals are 
ending publication. Authors and publishers are 
going to petition the Ministry of Education to 
allow them to continue publishing these 
professional journals for teachers, but…Do you 
understand? If a teacher says that some 
students call her a separatist during class, 
then…I mean, this is all a reflection of the 
culture of the parents, the culture of the family, 
the culture of childrearing… For that reason 
only in the past two years, shall we say, the 
role of the Russian language has sharply… I 
understand that right now, we have that 
particular mindset, that the most important 
thing…that the main language is Ukrainian, 
and Russian is gradually shrinking. It’s just 
that, you know, when the image of the enemy 
is very bright, I want to tell you that I stopped 
watching television. I used to watch the news 
and cry, because when you watch the news and 
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женщины — это настолько страшно, и когда 
еще это показывают, показывают 
участников этих событий, и ты понимаешь, 
что завтра это может коснуться и тебя, 
когда это все нагнетается, понимаете, когда 
приходят повестки нашим коллегам, 
мужчинам-преподавателям, нашей школе 
тоже пришли повестки, для того, чтобы они 
явились в военкомат и, возможно, их могли 
бы взять в действующую армию. Сейчас это 
отменили, учителей призывать в армию не 
будут, но это, знаете, такой момент, 
который очень тяжело переживать. И вот 
эта вот вся ситуация, она провоцирует образ 
врага. Очень многие так и считают, что вот 
Россия — агрессор, все. Всех русских под 
одну гребенку, все плохие.  
 
 
В России — там другая ситуация. Вот моя 
старшая дочка, она вышла замуж за 
москвича. Но в Москве живет только его 
мама, а дочка со своим мужем, они живут в 
Германии. Он там работает, в Россию он 
возвращаться не собирается, и вот они с 
моей старшей дочкой сейчас живут в 
Германии. И вот я когда летом к ним ездила, 
и мой зять мне сказал: «Я смотрю новости 
на немецких каналах, на украинских и на 
российских каналах. И все рассказывают об 
одном событии совершенно по-разному.» То 
есть у России своя правда, у Украины своя 
правда, Европа придерживается каких-то 
своих взглядов на всю эту ситуацию… И 
мой мудрый зять мне говорит: «Вы читали 
Булгакова?» Я говорю: «Конечно, читала». 
— «Помните «Собачье сердце»? Что 
говорил профессор Преображенский 
доктору Борменталю? «Никогда не читайте 
советских газет» — «Других же нет.» — 
«Вот никаких и не читайте». Вот такой 
совет дал мне мой зять. Но много людей, 
которые смотрят это все, и идеологически 
это очень тяжело. Поэтому как дальше 
будут развиваться события и хватит ли 
мудрости у руководителей наших стран, 
чтобы все-таки сохранить хрупкий мир и 
understand that a thousand kilometers away 
from you, bombs are exploding and children 
and men and women are perishing, it’s so 
frightening. And when they also show people 
participating in these events, and you realize 
that tomorrow, this could happen to you, when 
all of this tension is being stoked, you 
understand, when our colleagues, male teachers 
from our school, are called to report to the 
military enlistment office, and it’s possible that 
they will be drafted into the army. Well, 
they’ve changed that, and they aren’t going to 
draft teachers anymore, but still, the thought is 
so hard to stomach. And that’s what’s going on 
right now. This whole situation creates an 
image of an enemy. Many people say that 
Russia is the aggressor. It’s as simple as that. 
One size fits all: all Russians are bad.  
 
In Russia, the situation is different. My elder 
daughter married a Muscovite. But only his 
mom lives in Moscow, while my daughter and 
her husband live in Germany. He works there 
and doesn’t plan to return to Russia, and so he 
and my elder daughter now live in Germany. 
When I went to visit them in the summer, my 
son-in-law said, “I watch the news on German, 
Ukrainian and Russian channels. And each one 
describes events in a completely different 
way.” Russia has its version of the truth, and 
Ukraine has its own version, too. And Europe 
has its own unique points of view about this 
entire situation. And my wise son-in-law asks 
me, “Have you read Bulgakov?” And I reply, 
“Of course.” And he asks, “Do you remember 
‘Heart of Dog’ and what Professor 
Preobrazhensky says to Doctor Bormenthal? 
Never read Soviet newspapers. ‘But there 
aren’t any others.’ ‘Then don’t read any at 
all.’” That’s the advice my son-in-law gave me. 
But a lot of people look upon all of this and 
find it ideologically painful. For that reason, 
how events will play out and whether those in 
power in our countries will have enough 
wisdom to somehow preserve some fragile 




дать людям возможность… Потому что 
очень много украинцев работает в России, 
очень много русских работает здесь. И 
семьи… Вот, например, моя мама русская, 
мой отец украинец. Бабушка белоруска… 
Такая вот семья. Муж у меня армянин. И 
получается вот такая интернациональная 
семья. Поэтому вот такая ситуация. Как 
будет дальше — я не знаю. Но роль русского 
языка в Украине в последние два года 
значительно сузилась. Еще два года назад 
эти восточные области, Крым, это были те 
регионы — Харьков — где русскоговорящих 
было больше, ну и, следовательно, там было 
больше школ с русским языком обучения. 
Там были, конечно, и школы с украинским 
языком обучения, но большинство было с 
русским языком обучения. А как дальше 
будет — просто не знаю. Хотя, знаете. Есть 
русские школы и в Ужгороде, в Мукачево 
(это Закарпатье), во Львове русские школы, 
то есть русские школы по Украине есть. 
Запорожье… То есть это не только в Киеве. 
Русские школы есть, но вот щас… что с 
ними будет дальше…  
Because many Ukrainians work in Russia, and 
many Russians work here. And families… For 
example, my mother is Russian, and my father 
is Ukrainian. My grandmother is Belorussian… 
That’s the kind of family we have. My husband 
is Armenian. So we ended up with a very 
international family. And that’s why we have 
this kind of situation. How things will go in the 
future—I don’t know. But the role of the 
Russian language in Ukraine has worsened 
significantly over the past two years. Two 
years ago, these eastern regions, Crimea, it was 
those regions--and Kharkov--where there were 
more Russian-speakers, and, well, logically, 
there were more Russian-language schools. 
There were, of course, some Ukrainian-
language schools, but the majority were 
Russian-language schools. What the future 
holds, I simply don’t know. Although, you 
know, there are Russian-language schools in 
Uzhgorod, in Mukachevo (in Zakarpattia), and 
in Lvov there are Russian-language schools, in 
other words, there are still Russian-language 
schools in Ukraine. And Zaporozhe…I mean, 
not only in Kiev. There are still Russian-
language schools, but now…what will happen 





Interview with Yana, conducted October 21, 2015 
 
Кэрен: У вас общий педагогический стаж 20 
лет. А что вы преподавали в течение этих 20 
лет? 
Karen: You have been teaching for twenty 
years. What have you been teaching during 
these twenty years?  
Яна: Зарубежную литературу. Yana: Foreign literature.  
Кэрен: Вы писали, что вы преподавали 
русский язык 7 лет. А это было в этой 
школе? 
Karen: You wrote, that you taught Russian for 
seven years. Was that at this school? 
Яна: Вот в этой [xx-й] школе. Я перешла в 
школу, я преподавала русский язык. 
Yana: It was at this school. I taught Russian 
when I came to work at this school. 
Кэрен: Вы работаете в школе с украинским 
языком обучения, и изучение русского 
языка не является обязательным у вас. Вы 
писали, что это второй год, когда русский 
язык не преподается в новых классах, кроме 
тех классов, где он изучался с 5 класса. А 
есть ли школы в вашем городе, где вообще 
не преподается русский язык? 
Karen: You work in a Ukrainian-language 
school, and Russian is not a required course 
there. You wrote that this was the second year 
that incoming classes didn’t study Russian, 
other than in those classes that have studied it 
since fifth grade. Are there schools in your city 
where Russian is not taught at all? 
Яна: Он не преподается уже нигде.  Yana: It is no longer taught anywhere.  
Кэрен: Вы имеете в виду в вашем городе? 
Или в вашем районе? 
Karen: Do you mean in your city? In your 
area? 
Яна: В [моем городе] уже не преподается 
русский язык. 
Yana: In [my city], Russian isn’t taught 
anymore.  
Кэрен: Интересно. А кто решил перестать 
преподавать русский язык [в Вашем городе]? 
Karen: Interesting. Who decided to stop 
teaching Russian [in your city]? 
Яна: Не могу ответить на этот вопрос — кто 
решил. Я даже там написала, что у нас была 
русская школа, и в этом году не приняли 
детей в первый класс с русским языком 
обучения. Они не открыли ни одного 
русского класса.  
Yana: I can’t answer that question—who 
decided. I even wrote [to you] that we had a 
Russian school, but that this year, they didn’t 
accept any first-graders into Russian-language 
classes. They didn’t open a single Russian-
language class.  
Кэрен: Так у вас в [городе] одна... Karen: So in your city there is one… 
Яна: Была одна русская школа, но в этом 
году даже в эту русскую школу не приняли 
детей в русский класс, не открыли русского 
класса.  
Yana: There was one Russian-language school, 
but this year even that school didn’t admit 
Russian-language first-grade classes.  
Кэрен: А в этой школе есть 1 класс? Это 
украиноязычный класс в русской школе? 
Karen: Does this school have a first-grade 
class at all? Do they have a Ukrainian-language 
class? 
Яна: Украиноязычный класс.  Yana: They have a Ukrainian-language class.  
Кэрен: А [в Вашей школой] до прошлого 
года русский язык был вариативный или 
инвариативный предмет в школе? 
Karen: In your school, up until last year, was 




Яна: В этом я даже не разбираюсь, что 
вариативное, что инвариативное... Я знаю, 
что дети, которые сейчас в 7 классе, они 
обучаются по новой программе. Новый 
государственный стандарт. У них есть 
русский язык как второй иностранный. 
Yana: I don’t even know what school-
mandated and what is state-mandated. I know 
that this year’s seventh-graders are studying 
under a new program. A new state standard. 
They study Russian as a second foreign 
language. 
Кэрен: А у них английский первый 
иностранный? 
Karen: Do they study English as a first foreign 
language? 
Яна: Да, первый иностранный английский. А 
второй иностранный считается русский.  
Yana: Yes, as a first foreign language. Russian 
is considered a second foreign language.  
Кэрен: А кроме украинского, русского, 
английского преподается у вас немецкий, да? 
Karen: Other than Ukrainian, Russian, and 
English, your school offers German as well, 
yes? 
Яна: Да. Yana: Yes.  
Кэрен: А английский, немецкий — они оба 
являются обязательными? 
Karen: Are English and German required 
languages? 
Яна: Нет. Немецкий язык в 5 классе идет 
как второй иностранный.  
Yana: No. German is a second foreign 
language beginning in fifth grade.  
Кэрен: Вместо русского языка? Karen: Instead of Russian? 
Яна: Ну да, получается, что так. Там 
написано, что родители могли выбирать, но 
реально родителей никто не спрашивал, 
хотят они, не хотят... Этим детям вообще не 
нужен был второй иностранный, им и 
первый плохо идет. Ребенок в 11 лет имеет 7 
уроков, это 7 часов он сидит за партой. Это 
очень тяжело для детей.  
Yana: Well, yes, that’s how it turns out. It’s 
written that parents could choose, but in reality, 
no one asked the parents whether they want 
that or not. These kids didn’t even need a 
second foreign language; they have a hard time 
with the first one. At the age of eleven, children 
study seven subjects. They sit at their desks for 
seven hours. It’s really hard for children.  
Кэрен: Вы говорите, у них слишком много 
предметов? 
Karen: You’re saying that they study too many 
subjects? 
Яна: Да, очень. Ребенку в таком возрасте 
все это освоить и высидеть, физически 
высидеть — это очень тяжело.  
Yana: Yes, way too many. At that age, it’s 
really hard for children to take everything in 
and physically sit through all of it.  
Кэрен: А это в каждой школе или только у 
вас? 
Karen: And is this in every school or just 
yours? 
Яна: Да, это государственная программа. Yana: Yes, it’s the state program.  
Кэрен: Так что это Министерство 
образования выбрало? 
Karen: So the Ministry of Education created 
it? 
Яна: Да. Я не вмешиваюсь, что там 
администрация школы выбирает. Есть, 
например, у нас «этика» — это я знаю, что 
администрация выбрала этот предмет. Как 
он там идет, вариативное, инвариативное — 
я в этом не разбираюсь. Русского языка не 
дали.  
Yana: Yes. I don’t get involved in what the 
administration of the school decides. We have, 
for example, an ethics course. I do know that 
the administration chose this course. Whether 
it’s school-mandated or state-mandated, I don’t 
really know. But they didn’t give us hours for 
Russian. 
Кэрен: У вас изучают русский язык в 7, 8, 9 
классах по 2 часа в неделю. 
Karen: At your school, Russian is taught two 
hours per week in grades seven through nine. 
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Яна: В 7 классе он идет как второй 
иностранный, а 8-9-е классы еще имеют 
возможность учиться по той старой 
программе, что была до этого. А 7-е классы 
идут по программе нового государственного 
стандарта.  
Yana: In seventh grade, Russian is taught as a 
second foreign language. The eighth- and 
ninth-graders still have the opportunity to study 
under the old program, the one before this one. 
But the seventh-graders study under the new 
state standard.  
Кэрен: А что вы думаете о количестве 
часов, посвященных изучению русского 
языка в вашей школе? Должно быть больше, 
меньше? 
Karen: What do you think of the number of 
hours devoted to the study of Russian in your 
school? Should there be more? Fewer? 
Яна: Не думаю, что должно быть больше. 
Оставить, все нормально. Русский язык — 
это не английский, не немецкий, дети 
смотрят телевизор... Два часа нормально.  
Yana: I don’t think there should be more. 
Everything is fine as it is and can be left alone. 
Russian isn’t English or German. Kids watch 
[Russian on] TV… Two hours is fine.  
Кэрен: А учащиеся сами выбирают языки, 
которые они хотят изучать? 
Karen: Do students themselves decide which 
languages they want to study? 
Яна: Нет. Yana: No.  
Кэрен: Ну, у вас государственная 
программа. Вы преподаете 20 часов в 
неделю. Вы преподаете украинский язык и 
литературу, и зарубежную литературу. А 
сколько лет вы преподаете украинский 
язык? Как вам нравится? 
Karen: Well, you have a state program. You 
teach twenty hours per week. You teach 
Ukrainian language and literature, and also 
foreign literature. How many years have you 
taught Ukrainian? How do you like it? 
Яна: Только в этом году я начала 
преподавать.  
Yana: I began teaching Ukrainian just this 
year.  
Кэрен: А как вам нравится? Karen: And how do you like it? 
Яна: Не могу сказать, оно мне нравится или 
не нравится, я смотрю на это с той точки 
зрения, что... Мне 40 лет, работать надо, а 
часов нет. Поэтому я должна иметь какую-
то работу. Вопрос нравится — не нравится 
не ставится. Нужна какая-то работа, нужна 
какая-то зарплата, правда? С этой точки 
зрения. Если бы была у меня такая 
возможность, я бы не преподавала. 
Yana: I can’t say whether I like it or not. I look 
at it from the point of view, well… I’m forty 
years old, and I need to work, but there aren’t 
enough hours. For that reason, I need to have 
some kind of work. I don’t even consider 
whether I like it or not. I need work. I need 
some kind of income, right? From that point of 
view. If I had the opportunity, I wouldn’t teach 
it.  
Кэрен: А кем бы вы работали? Karen: What kind of work would you do? 
Яна: Я бы осталась учителем зарубежной 
литературы и не лезла бы в язык. 
Yana: I would teach foreign literature and 
wouldn’t get involved in language teaching.  
Кэрен: А, вы предпочитаете литературу! Karen: So you prefer literature! 
Яна: Да, если бы была у меня возможность 
выбора, я бы только занималась 
литературой.  
Yana: If I could choose, I would teach only 
literature. 
Кэрен: А какие у вас любимые авторы? Karen: And who are your favorite authors? 
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Яна: Любимые? Очень тяжело сказать. 
Люблю очень многих. Люблю Бальзака. 
Люблю поэзию. Таких чтобы очень 
предпочтений нет у меня. Люблю почитать 
про хорошее. Коэльо люблю. С 
удовольствием иногда классику 
перечитываю.  
Yana: My favorite? That’s really hard to say. I 
have so many. I like Balzac. I like poetry. I 
don’t have a huge preference for one author 
over another. I like to read about pleasant 
things. I like Coelho. It’s a pleasure to reread 
classics from time to time. 
Кэрен: А кто решил, кто будет преподавать 
русский, когда в городе перестали изучать 
его? Директор школы? Или они сами 
решили? 
Karen: And who decided who would continue 
to teach Russian when they stopped teaching it 
in your city? The school director? The teachers 
themselves? 
Яна: Я не могу сказать. Но в новом 
государственном стандарте есть второй 
иностранный язык. Там идет по выбору 
родителей. И решили, что у нас родители 
будут выбирать немецкий. Администрация 
так решила. Не учителя это решают. С 
другой стороны, надо радоваться в этой 
ситуации, что нам оставили эти 7, 8, 9 
классы. Потому что я знаю, в других школах 
забрали вообще русский язык. Даже не дали 
закончить изучение русского языка по этой 
программе, что была 5-9 классы. Нам дали 
возможность. У нас идут дети, но они дойдут 
до 9 класса — и все.  
 
Нам еще нужно радоваться. Тем более что 
нас тут трое. Я потому и ушла, потому что 
понимаю, что на всех нас троих не будет 
хватать часов. Соответственно, и зарплата 
будет совершенно другая. У меня есть 
образование, плюс диплом украинского 
филолога... У них нету. У моих коллег нет, а 
у меня есть диплом украинского филолога. 
Yana: I can’t say. But the new state standard 
has a second foreign language that parents get 
to choose. It was decided that parents at our 
school would choose German. The school 
administration decided that. The teachers don’t 
make those decisions. On the other hand, we 
should be grateful that they allowed us to 
continue teaching Russian in grades seven, 
eight, and nine. I know that other schools 
stopped teaching Russian altogether. They 
didn’t even allow students studying under the 
old program to finish their Russian studies. But 
they allowed us to do this. Our students will 
continue studying Russian until ninth grade, 
but that’s it.  
So we need to be glad, especially since there 
are three Russian teachers at our school. For 
that reason, I stopped teaching Russian. I 
understand, that there aren’t enough teaching 
hours for all three of us, and our salaries would 
also be affected. I have a higher education, plus 
additional credentials as a Ukrainian 
philologist. They don’t have that. My 
colleagues don’t have that, but I do. 
Кэрен: А скажите, как изменилась роль 
русского языка в украинской системе 
образования за последние 25 лет — с 
момента обретения Украиной независимости 
в 1991 г.? 
Karen: Tell me, how has the role of the 
Russian language within the Ukrainian 
education system changed over the past 
twenty-five years—since Ukrainian gained 
independence in 1991? 
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Яна: Был период, когда он не преподавался, 
потом преподавался... Я думаю, у нас роль 
русского языка зависит от политической 
обстановки. У нас это какая-то мания. С 
другой стороны, я знаю, что в Киеве почти 
все разговаривают на русском языке. На 
переменах, дети, взрослые — только 
русский язык. У нас так нет. У нас [западная 
Украина], у нас люди разговаривают на 
украинском языке, на местном диалекте.  
Yana: There was a time when it wasn’t taught, 
and then it was taught… I think that the role of 
Russian depends on the political situation. We 
have some sort of craze here. On the other 
hand, I know that almost everyone in Kiev 
speaks Russian. During breaks, both children 
and adults speak only in Russian. It’s not like 
that here. Here in western Ukraine, people 
speak Ukrainian, and the local dialect.  
Кэрен: A как вам кажется, должен ли 
русский язык преподаваться в качестве 
обязательного всем учащимся Украины? 
Karen: In your opinion, should Russian be a 
required course for all students in Ukraine? 
Яна: Нет, не считаю, нет. Я бы сказала, что 
в [нашем регионе] должен преподаваться в 
качестве обязательного венгерский. Или 
словенский. Я бы вообще убрала слово 
«обязательный». Я бы сказала, на выбор, 
что они хотят и что считают нужным. Но 
точно что не русский. 
Yana: No, I don’t think so. I would say that in 
[our region], Hungarian should be a required 
language. Or Slovenian. I would take away the 
word “required” altogether. I would say that 
students should be able to study what they want 
and what they consider they need. But 
definitely not Russian. 
Кэрен: А когда вы учились, он был 
обязательным предметом? 
Karen: When you were in school, was Russian 
a required course? 
Яна: Да, конечно. Я еще училась в 
советской школе.  
Yana: Yes, of course. I studied in a Soviet 
school.  
Кэрен: У вас в [городе] одна русскоязычная 
школа. А как вам кажется, есть ли до сих 
пор в Украине востребованность 
русскоязычных школ?  
Karen: There is one Russian-language school 
in your city. In your opinion, is there still a 
need for Russian-language schools in Ukraine?  
Яна: Каждый имеет право обучать своего 
ребенка на том языке, который он для себя 
считает родным. Значит, такие школы 
должны быть. Должны быть и [в нашем 
городе], и в других городах, потому что 
русских здесь много, люди общаются на 
этом языке.  
Yana: All parents have the right to have their 
child educated in what they consider to be their 
native language. That means that there should 
be such schools. We should have them in our 
city and in other cities, because there are lots of 
Russians here, and people speak Russian. 
Кэрен: Вы очень хорошо говорите по-
русски. А каким языком вы лучше всего 
владеете? Украинским или русским? Потому 
что у вас чистый русский язык.  
Karen: You speak Russian very well. What 
language do you speak better—Ukrainian or 
Russian? Because your Russian is flawless.  
Яна: Я, естественно, владею украинским 
языком, но этот язык мне не родной. Я 
владею венгерским языком... У меня отец 
венгр, поэтому я разговариваю на 
венгерском языке.  
Yana: Naturally, I speak Ukrainian, but it’s not 
my native language. I speak Hungarian… My 




Кэрен: Вы говорите, что политика в 
Украине влияет на статус русского языка и 
на изучение русского языка, как мы уже 
видели. А как геополитические отношения 
между Россией и Украиной влияют на 
статус русского языка и на изучение 
русского языка в Украине? 
Karen: You have said that politics in Ukraine 
affect the status of Russian and the teaching of 
Russian, as we have seen. And how does the 
geopolitical relationship between Russia and 
Ukraine affect the status of Russian and the 
teaching of Russian in Ukraine? 
Яна: Вот это и влияет. На нашу политику, 
на статус русского языка. Все это очень 
взаимосвязано. Какие отношения с Россией 
— такой будет статус русского языка.  
Yana: It definitely affects both our politics and 
the status of the Russian language. They are all 
very interconnected. Whatever our relationship 
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